Af/Pak Stabilization Strategery: The Missing Number

The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan released its Af/Pak Regional Stabilization Strategy (January 2010) last week.  Briefly -- nearly 1,000 personnel on the ground by early 2010 and some 20-30% additional staffing after that.  I’ve dug up an OIG report from last year that talks about staff expansion of protective service in Afghanistan.  If the OIG number actually means 14 FSOs to each of the new consulates in Mazar and Herat plus 67 protective service personnel in each location – that amounts to almost 5 security contract personnel for every direct hire employee.  And we’re not even talking yet about the additional protective service and life support requirements for the 1,000+ surge personnel.

The $400 million indicated below as resource requirement is probably nowhere closed to the actual amount when personal protective service and life support services are taken into account.  Since we unavoidably are going to “surge” the contractors into Afghanistan – shouldn't we have those numbers?  Just because we can’t see them, doesn’t mean we’re not paying for them. 

By the way, you must see this numbers from Sam Stein about how the Top Defense Contractors Spent $27 Million Lobbying At Time Of Afghan Surge Announcement. Ugh!

Excerpt from Af/Pak Stabilization Strategy: PDF | HTML

Hundreds of civilian experts have answered that call to service, and we are now in the midst of the most significant deployment of U.S. civilian expertise to a war zone in decades. The increase, coordinated by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, includes some of the top experts from 10 different U.S. government departments and agencies. Many have previous experience in Afghanistan or other conflict environments. U.S. civilian experts contribute to the mission in field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama will deploy. They partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of national and sub-national government institutions, and to help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors. When their tours are complete, permanent civilian experts are encouraged to continue service on Afghanistan or Pakistan, in Washington or abroad, as well as to help in training their successors. Our goal is to create a cadre of civilian expertise on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Enhanced Civilian Presence: The vast majority of civilian experts deploy to Afghanistan for a minimum of one year. Under the first phase of this uplift, the civilian footprint in Afghanistan will triple from roughly 300 personnel on the ground in January 2009 to nearly 1,000 on the ground by early 2010. We anticipate further increasing our civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30 percent, concentrating experts in the field and at key ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan people. Each U.S. civilian hires or works with an average of 10 Afghans and other implementing partner personnel. Additionally, civilians act as force multipliers for military personnel, helping build relationships with local community leaders and coordinate military civil affairs projects with civilian programs. Civilian personnel will remain deployed in significant numbers even after the security situation improves and our combat troops come home.

Expanded Presence in Ministries and Outside of Kabul: Responding to the Afghan government’s request for targeted technical assistance, we are placing more than 50 additional civilian advisors in core Afghan ministries. Outside of Kabul, we are deploying several hundred additional personnel to more than 50 locations. In addition to staffing PRTs, civilians are living and working alongside forward deployed military units in District Support Teams (DSTs). Civilians will also extend our permanent diplomatic presence outside of Kabul by staffing new consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, which will serve as assistance platforms for the North and West and also symbolize our long-term, increasingly normal relationship with Afghanistan.

Resource Requirements

Resources available to meet requirements from FY 2010 and prior year appropriations: approximately $400 million.           

* * *

A publicly released OIG audit of USTC/Blackwater/Xe’s performance in Afghanistan in 2009 includes this item:

"The Department has decided to open consulates in the north of Afghanistan at Mazar-e-Sharif and in the west at Herat. According to Department cable 027341 of March 29, 2009, 14 Foreign Service Officers will be deployed to these locations in 2009. USTC has submitted a proposal to add 67 personnel to each location. The RSO in Kabul has reported that the security threat in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat is considerably lower security than in Kabul."



This IG report was prepared last year; before rockets were fired on the new consulate site in western Afghanistan.  

Related Items:

-01/21/10 Af/Pak Regional Stabilization Strategy (January 2010) HTLM

-08/31/09   Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08) Aug 09

$250 Million to Counter Extremist Voices in Af/Pak Region

This one is extracted from the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Af/Pak Regional Stabilization Strategy (January 2010) released last week:

The Taliban and al-Qaeda use information as a weapon, dominating the information space. While our previous strategy focused largely on traditional public diplomacy and communications tools, we are now elevating our communications efforts in importance and innovation. New programs will empower Afghans and Pakistanis to challenge the extremist narrative and offer their own vision for Afghanistan and Pakistan’s future. A sustained media and outreach strategy will set the record straight, highlight key civilian efforts, and explain our larger strategic rationale for the fight in Afghanistan, as well as our strategic support for Pakistan, to the Afghan and Pakistani peoples.

Key Initiatives

Expanded Media Outreach: We will respond more quickly to misinformation, serve as a source of credible information for journalists, conduct polls on key issues, and expand training of Afghan and Pakistani journalists in the United States. We will actively build our partnerships with all parts of Afghan and Pakistani society, including youth, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and political actors and institutions at all levels.

Building Communications Capacity: Our support will help the Afghan and Pakistani governments communicate effectively with their people, and help people better communicate with one another. We will also leverage new technologies to support people with SMS services, mobile banking, telemedicine, and mobile micro-finance. And we will help build media infrastructure (radio, television, and cell towers) to carry communications into underserved areas dominated by extremist voices.  

• In Afghanistan, we are supporting the expansion of the Government Media Information Center in Kabul and an additional 16 provincial satellite offices. We will also enhance communications capabilities in core ministries by providing mentoring, public affairs training, and exchange opportunities for communications personnel. 
  
  

• In Pakistan we have helped launch Humari Awaz, Our Voice, the first mobile based social network empowering Pakistan’s 95 million mobile users with a voice. Our Voice mobile users harness mobile phones to instantly share news and information with a network of friends and followers via SMS messages. In five weeks, 20 million messages were sent and over 150,000 people enrolled, with an average of 3,000 new followers joining daily.

Taking Back the Airwaves: We are empowering indigenous voices to drown out extremist propaganda. We will expand local radio coverage and support creation of public, private and university radio stations. Using local partners, we will support distribution of content on all media, and use cell technology to help people build communities and get critical information.

Strengthening People to People Ties: Strengthening ties between all aspects of American, Afghan, and Pakistani society will deepen our long-term partnership. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are enhancing educational opportunities, including teacher training and English language training. Secretary Clinton’s three-day visit to Pakistan in October 2009, much of which was covered live on Pakistani television, underscored our new approach by engaging broad segments of Pakistani society in honest dialogue. This approach will be reinforced with a new public diplomacy and communications effort that will feature: greater engagement with Pakistani media; increased academic and business exchanges; and more robust outreach to the Pakistani-American community through the American Pakistan Foundation and similar organizations. We are also increasing professional, educational, and cultural exchanges.

Milestones

• 24-hour cell coverage is restored in areas of the South and East of Afghanistan. 
  
  

• Afghans and Pakistanis utilize radio and other media platforms to criticize extremists and hold government officials accountable. 
  
  

• Enemy propaganda is significantly decreased – in quantity and effectiveness – by July 2011. 
  
  

• The number of people-to-people exchanges is doubled by 2012. 
  
  

• U.S. disapproval ratings in Pakistan decrease, with Pakistanis’ increasingly convinced that the United States is committed to a long-term partnership on an array of issues, not just counterterrorism.

Resource Requirements

Resources available to meet requirements from FY 2010 and prior year appropriations: approximately $250 million.

Quickie: State Department Arm Wrestling with the Pentagon

And the winner is ….

Josh Rogin of The Cable has this piece yesterday: Pentagon wins turf war with State over military aid. Quick excerpt: 

One big chunk of funding at issue is in foreign security assistance, known as the "1206" account, which could total about $500 million next year. This is money used to do things like military training and joint operations with countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Indonesia and Somalia.

Since the military doesn't have the lead in those countries, the funding should flow through State, right? Well, not in 2011. The president's budget will keep those funds in the Pentagon's purse in its Feb. 1 budget release, following a pitched internal battle in which the State Department eventually conceded.

"That literally is the result of vigorous arm wrestling within the administration," one source familiar with the discussions said. The battle had been waged primarily between the shops of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro, but finally Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew got involved.

[…]

Overall, State is expected to receive a hefty increase in its top-line budget request for fiscal 2011, but much of that money will be for Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing little growth in the rest of the State-USAID accounts.

The slow pace of rebalancing national security spending and the lack of a comprehensive strategy for guiding that process is the subject of a new book by former OMB national security funding chief Gordon Adams, entitled Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home.

"The tool kit is out of whack," Adams told The Cable. "There's been a major move over the last 10 years to expand the Defense Department's agenda, which has been creeping into the foreign-policy agenda in new and expensive ways."

Read the whole thing here.

US Embassy Kabul Honors Steven Thomas Stefani IV

Photo from US Embassy Kabul/Flickr

On January 12, the US Embassy in Kabul held a ceremony to honor USDA employee, Steven Thomas Stefani IV who was killed when his PRT team convoy was hit by roadside bombs in 2007.  USDA also announced the establishment of the Tom Stefani Award for Reconstruction and Stabilization in Fragile States.  USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack made the following remarks:

The U.S. Department of Agriculture has been deploying civilian agricultural experts to Afghanistan since 2003. Among the nearly 100 who have accepted the challenge was Steven Thomas Stefani IV - "Tom" to his family, friends and colleagues at the U.S. Forest Service.



Today we are gathered to honor Tom, who until his untimely death in October 2007 was a model of how Americans and federal employees can make a positive impact on the lives of those around them.



Tom was raised in Auburn, California. His friends remember a sweet-natured kid with a sideways smile who ran around in oversized cowboy boots and a giant hat falling over his eyes.



He was the kind of boy who worked hard and made his parents proud. He raised prize-winning sheep for the local fairs where he was a standout 4-H-er. He was an Eagle Scout and an honor student. And like his parents, Barbara and Steve, Tom lent a hand to those in need in his community, helping to organize fundraisers and gatherings.



As a student, Tom studied soil salinity in the deserts of the Western United States. And as a Range Manager for the U.S. Forest Service in Nevada's Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest, everything began to fall into place - his Eagle Scout background, the 4-H accomplishments, years of helping his Dad with the family construction business, his education, and a lifetime of caring for animals.



Tom loved the Forest Service and he loved the outdoors. Naturally, the challenge of Afghanistan's beautiful, hardscrabble landscape beckoned to him.



Like so many other dedicated USDA employees, Tom requested to serve in Afghanistan because he wanted to work to improve the lives of the Afghan people who live in this great country, people who have suffered through years of strife and conflict.



While some people saw only denuded grazing lands and wasted soil in Afghanistan, Tom recognized the opportunity to restore a once legendary agricultural region. He accepted his responsibility to serve as he had so many other challenges in his life -- he embraced it in a great, big bear hug.



In Afghanistan, while Tom was developing projects he worked directly to plan a large-scale poultry farm and a cold storage facility. He worked alongside grape producers to improve trellising methods. His contributions were real and they're lasting.



Tom made the ultimate sacrifice to this nation and to our nation when his PRT team convoy was sabotaged by roadside bombs. But unlike his assailants -- who scattered into the rocky hills like shadows - Tom, even today, continues to accomplish positive things for the people of Afghanistan.

Snapshot: USDA Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan

Image via Wikipedia

QUESTION: Alan Bjerga from Bloomberg News. Yesterday, the Administration said that it was going to be increasing civilian presence in Afghanistan. I’m wondering, from a USDA and USAID standpoint, how many more boots on the ground do you expect to be putting down?

SECRETARY VILSACK: We currently have 54 people in country and another 10 are on their way. And we’ll have an opportunity after this visit not only to thank those workers, but also to evaluate what additional assistance may be necessary. It isn’t just necessarily government boots on the ground; it’s also ways in which we can partner with the many land grant universities and other universities that are providing assistance and help, as well as working with USAID.

So we’re going to have a significant presence. I suspect and know that over the short time, all it’s going to increase. And I also know that there’s already significant work being done, from planting additional trees, up to 3 million additional trees in a forestation effort, to building storage facilities, to improving productivity, there’s good work being done.

from U.S. Government Agriculture Sector Programs in Afghanistan and Upcoming Travel to the Region Briefing with Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, and SRAP Richard C. Holbrooke Washington, DC | January 7, 2010 (link)

Quickie: Suicide Bomber Kills Eight at FOB Chapman

Worst single-day
casualty toll Since Beirut

Joby Warrick in
today’s issue of the Washington Post writes about a suicide attack that killed
8 American civilians in Afghanistan (Suicide
bomber attacks CIA base in Afghanistan, killing at least 8 Americans
| WaPo | December 31, 2009). Quick excerpts below:

A suicide bomber
infiltrated a CIA base in eastern Afghanistan
on Wednesday, killing at least eight Americans in what is believed to be the
deadliest single attack on U.S. intelligence personnel in the eight-year-long
war and one of the deadliest in the agency's history, U.S. officials said.

The attack
represented an audacious blow to intelligence operatives at the vanguard of
U.S. counterterrorism operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan,
killing officials whose job involves plotting strikes against the Taliban, al-Qaeda
and other extremist groups that are active on the frontier between the two
nations. The facility that was targeted -- Forward Operating Base Chapman -- is
in the eastern Afghan province of Khost, which borders North Waziristan, the
Pakistani tribal area that is believed to be al-Qaeda's home base.

[…]

A former senior
agency official said it was the worst single-day casualty toll for the agency
since eight CIA officers were killed in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut in April 1983.

Read the whole
thing here.

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• Afghan Suicide Bomber Kills C.I.A. Operatives (nytimes.com)


• US citizens killed in Afghanistan (news.bbc.co.uk)


• Taliban Claim Blast That Killed 8 Americans (abcnews.go.com)

USAID/Afghanistan: Audit Says Civilian Assistance – Not on Target

Image by melilab via Flickr

USAID’s OIG office had just released its audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghan Civilian Assistance Program. Quick summary below excerpted from the report:

The main goal of the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (the program) is to provide assistance to Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents and the Taliban. Assistance under the program is generally provided in goods and services to those who have suffered losses─a farmer might receive a tractor or livestock and a grocer might receive merchandise to restock his store. The program is being implemented through a $27 million, 3-year cooperative agreement (April 2007 to April 2010) with the International Organization for Migration (IOM, the implementer). As of December 31, 2008, $18.5 million had been obligated and about $6.4 million had been spent for program activities. (See page 3.)

The audit concluded that the program is not on target to assist eligible beneficiaries under the program. The implementer reported that as of September 1, 2008, close to the midpoint of the program, only 803 of the more than 6,000 eligible families under the program were receiving assistance (about 13 percent). As of January 22, 2009, the implementer reported that it had actually assisted only about 40 percent of the estimated target number of 5,102 eligible families included in a recovery plan it had developed in October 2008. (See page 5.)

Program Assistance Was Not Effectively Monitored and EvaluatedWe found that the mission was not substantively involved in the program and had not followed up regularly on the status of the implementation plan, monitoring and evaluation plan, and quarterly program reports. The mission also had not performed sufficient site visits of program activities or properly monitored the staffing of key positions. The mission’s current technical representative indicated that, because of other responsibilities, he had worked on the program only as time permitted. Until recently, the mission was not aware of the program’s slow progress. The lack of key planning documents, early in the life of the program, has impeded the program’s progress. Because of program delays, many of the intended beneficiaries did not receive assistance expeditiously.

Program Progress Was Impeded by UnderstaffingThe program cannot achieve its intended results, under an ambitious recovery plan, without sufficient staffing to keep pace with changing conditions. As of January 2009, only 56 of the 86 staff members that are needed to meet program targets had been acquired, and the program implementer was not keeping pace with changing program conditions. High-risk security conditions affected the staffing levels, and the need for program changes was not addressed effectively. Staffing shortages and slow reactions to changing conditions have delayed the program’s progress.

Program Implementation Approaches Can Be ImprovedThe Code of Federal Regulations states that recipients of USAID awards are responsible for managing and monitoring each program. The audit identified four issues that are making implementation of the program inefficient and less effective. Implementer officials said that they were too focused on program implementation issues or had not thought of changes needed to streamline the implementation process. Improved approaches should be implemented during the course of the program to ensure that resources are being used efficiently and effectively.

USAID/Afghanistan’s written comments on the draft report are included in its entirety, without attachments, as appendix II to the OIG report (see pages 16 to 23).

The program’s new end date is now November 30, 2010. No mention on how much more money would be needed for the seven-month extension, or a realistic expectation about this program. The implementer was only able to assist 40% of the target beneficiaries in the two years plus that it was running the program. And it will be able to bridge the 60% gap in less than a year? Is that really possible?

Related Item:Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghan Civilian Assistance Program | Audit Report No. 5-306-10-004-P | December 15, 2009 | PDF

Quickie: A surge at $57,077.60 a minute

Image by Jayel Aheram via Flickr

Jo Comerford writing for Tomdispatch calculates the cost of the 30,000-troop surge to Afghanistan ($57,077.60 Surging by the Minute):

“Women and men from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, will be among the first to head out. It takes an estimated $1 million to send each of them surging into Afghanistan for one year. So a 30,000-person surge will be at least $30 billion, which brings us to that $57,077.60. That’s how much it will cost you, the taxpayer, for one minute of that surge. […]

For purposes of comparison, $30 billion -- remember, just the Pentagon-estimated cost of a 30,000-person troop surge -- is equal to 80% of the total U.S. 2010 budget for international affairs, which includes monies for development and humanitarian assistance.”

Read the whole thing here.

Afghanistan Contracts and Woodrow Wilson -- Hey! That Sounds Familiar!

Image via Wikipedia

Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight held a hearing yesterday on Afghanistan Contracts: An Overview (Thursday | December 17, 2009). The five witnesses who were at the hearing yesterday are listed below with links to their testimonies. Additional documents for the hearing are archived at: Hearing 7: Afghanistan Contracts: An Overview (Documents):

Mr. William H. Campbell , III [view testimony] Director of Operations, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)U.S. Department of Defense

Mr. Edward M. Harrington [view testimony] Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement), Department of the ArmyU.S. Department of Defense

Mr. Charles North [view testimony] Senior Deputy Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task ForceU.S. Agency for International Development

Mr. Daniel F. Feldman [view testimony] Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and PakistanU.S. Department of State

Mr. Jeffrey Parsons [view testimony] Executive Director, Army Contracting Command, Department of the ArmyU.S. Department of Defense

Mr. Feldman, one of the Deputy Special Representatives for Af/Pak had this to say:

“We are shifting away from large U.S.-based contracts to smaller, more flexible reconstruction contracts with fewer sub-grants and sub-contracts that enable greater on-the-ground oversight. The premise behind this flexibility is simple: in a dynamic conflict environment like Afghanistan, we need to be able to adapt our programs as conditions change on the ground. These smaller contracts and grants will be managed by U.S. officials in the field, closer to the actual activity implementation, making it easier for those same officials to direct, monitor, and oversee projects to ensure the proper use of taxpayers' funds. In most cases, these contracts are implemented by local Afghan personnel. And if programs are not producing the anticipated results, our personnel now have increased authority to direct corrective actions.”

Read the whole thing here.

Mr. North, the Senior Deputy Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force for USAID had this to say on USAID Civilian Staffing in Afghanistan:

“As of December 7, 2009, USAID/Afghanistan has 180 American staff on the ground. It is anticipated that USAID will have 333 American staff on the ground in early 2010. USAID/Afghanistan also currently has 136 Afghan staff and 16 third country national staff. USAID/Afghanistan works with approximately 20,000 implementing personnel on USAID programs, 19,000 of whom are Afghan employees.”

Mr. North then concluded his testimony with this:

“Afghanistan is hungry for development. The United States, in coordination with its international partners, is providing jobs to the jobless, a voice to the voiceless, heat for cold homes, water for the thirsty, and food for the hungry. In short, it is offering Afghans a path to hope and sustainable development. We are optimistic about a new era of prosperity and peace. We are also optimistic that one day we will echo Woodrow Wilson’s famous words: ―The ear of the leader must ring with the voices of the people.”

Hey Woodrow Wilson – that sounds familiar –

Remember that new PRISM journal with the Armitage interview? Well, shucks – USAID Afghanistan Mission Director William M. Frej and David Hatch, USAID Program Officer had exactly the same thing, word for word in A New Approach to the Delivery of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan!

Trust, Confidence, and Hope

"Afghanistan is hungry for development. The United States, in coordination with its international partners, is providing jobs to the jobless, a voice to the voiceless, heat for cold homes, water for the thirsty, and food for the hungry. In short, it is offering Afghans a path to hope and sustainable development. We are optimistic about a new era of prosperity and peace. We are also optimistic that one day we will echo Woodrow Wilson’s famous words: “The ear of the leader must ring with the voices of the people.”

Read Mr. North’s Senate testimony Read A New Approach to the Delivery of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan

In any case -- the day before the hearing, the Subcommittee Majority Staff circulated a memo, reported in the Federal Eye, examining reconstruction, development, and troop support contracts in Afghanistan. It lists among others, the following:

• Wasteful Spending on Defense Department Contracts Nears $1 Billion. According to federal auditors, approximately $950 million in questioned and unsupported costs has been submitted by Defense Department contractors for work in Afghanistan. This represents 16% of the total contract dollars examined.

• Number of Defense Department Contractors in Afghanistan May Reach 160,000. There are currently 104,000 Defense Department contractors currently working in Afghanistan. The increase in troops may require an additional 56,000 Defense Department contractors, bringing the total number of Defense contractors in Afghanistan to 160,000.

The Defense Department is the single largest employer of contractors in Afghanistan. As of September 30, 2009, there were approximately 104,000 Defense Department contractors and approximately 64,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan. In other words, contractors comprised more than 60% of the Defense Department’s workforce in Afghanistan. In December 2008, contractors comprised 69% of the Defense Department’s workforce, the highest ratio of contractors to military personnel in US history.

• New Concerns about Troop Support Contracts. The Army continues to rely heavily on LOGCAP III, the monopoly troop support contract held by KBR, to support operations in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. In 2010, the Army anticipates spending more than $657 million under LOGCAP III and approximately $87 million under LOGCAP IV – despite the fact that the Army intends to complete the transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV in Afghanistan by June 2010.

The memo also cites failure to apply lessons learned from Iraq such as:

• Poor Coordination of Interagency Efforts | No single individual or office currently has responsibility for coordinating development and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. The SPOT database, a database intended to coordinate contracts and contractor personnel for all federal agencies in Iraq, was not implemented until July 2008 and, due to inadequate data, remains largely unused.

• Continual Personnel Turnover | The frequent turnover of personnel in Iraq led to significant gaps in contract management and oversight. According to Special Inspector General Bowen, the frequent changes in personnel increased the risk that contractors would not meet the contract requirements. The turnover also created opportunities for unscrupulous contractors to take advantage of the lack of oversight. GAO has reported that frequent staff turnovers also led to cost increases and schedule delays on reconstruction contracts in Iraq.Personnel turnover has been a challenge in Afghanistan as well. USAID, which generally requires its employees to serve tours of duty lasting between three to five years, has limited personnel to one-year tours in Afghanistan. The State Department’s foreign service officers are also limited to one-year tours. The Air Force, which supplies team leaders for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, rotates individuals every six months.

The memo says that the Defense Contract Audit Agency had reported it identified a total of more than $950 million in questioned and unsupported costs submitted by Defense Department contractors for work in Afghanistan during a briefing to Subcommittee staff on December 9, 2009. The majority staff concludes that the $950 million is likely to underestimate the total amount of wasteful or undocumented spending in Afghanistan because “Although the DCAA auditors have reviewed $5.9 billion in Afghanistan spending, this does not include all of the dollars spent under contracts in Afghanistan, including more than $2.1 billion spent under USAID reconstruction and development contracts.”

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US Consulate Herat Moves Forward

5 Star Hotel of HeratPhoto from Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan

Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was in a lease-signing ceremony last Wednesday for the US Consulate in Herat, in western Afghanistan. The event was attended by Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta . According to Wikipedia, Herat is the third largest city of Afghanistan, and the gateway to Iran, collecting the highest amount of customs revenue for Afghanistan. The country shares a 936 km border with Iran.

Excerpted from Ambassador’s Eikenberry remarks during the ceremony:

There are few occasions more important and symbolic in the friendship of nations than for a U.S. Ambassador to be able to stand before you and announce with great pride, as I do today, that the U.S. Government is establishing a Consulate in "Shahr-e Bostan Herat" – this ancient, wonderful city of Herat.

When the U.S. Government first considered its options for opening Consulates, there was never any doubt that the ancient crossroad of Herat would be one of the cities selected for extending U.S. representation within Afghanistan.[…]Since last spring, when we first identified properties that might serve as a future U.S. Consulate, the 5-Star Hotel property literally stood out as the most logical and usable space to lease until we could buy land and build a more permanent Consulate compound.

Signing this lease today brings us one big step closer to opening the Consulate in Herat.

Let everyone understand: Our aim in Afghanistan and in establishing U.S. Consulate Heart is to promote peace and security, prosperity and stability.[…]Our history and experience of diplomatic relations with many countries shows that our diplomatic presence brings economic opportunity for many as it promotes stronger governance and rule of law to all. We are a country founded on such principles and values. Opening Consulate Herat is a tangible reflection of our commitment to such common interests.

This ceremony, following as it does upon the signing ceremony several weeks ago for the lease of land permitting the opening of another U.S. consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif next year, affirms America’s enduring friendship with Afghanistan and its people.

Read the full remarks here.

It looks like no western media covered this event. China’s Xinhua and People's Daily Online did have brief reports on this on Wednesday including the foreign minister’s remarks: “Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta noted that the opening of the U.S. consulate will not affect the relations between Kabul and Tehran.”

From best I could tell, there is only one 5-Star Hotel in Herat, which is the 5-Star Hotel of Heart. Here is a photo of the hotel from Flickr, with the user’s comments: “I think the 5-Star part is more self-proclamation and naming than the official prestige category bestowed on hotels. Still this is probably one of the best hotels in Afghanistan, and doubtlessly the best outside Kabul.”

From Wikitravel’s entry: “Five Star Hotel, (North east of downtown - every taxi driver knows where it is). A favorite with NGO workers and expats the Five Star hotel is a comfortable western style place. A good option if you have your own transport, otherwise you are at the mercy of overcharging taxi drivers. $50 per night.”

Other photos around Herat here, here and here.

David Ensor to US Embassy Kabul?

Via Al Kamen: “Word at the State Department is that David Ensor, longtime national security correspondent for CNN and more recently executive vice president for communications at Mercuria Energy Group in London, is being talked about to run the public affairs office at the embassy in Kabul.” (links added)

Huh? What? Hmmnn. Why?

Just a couple quick thoughts –

First, I think US Embassy Kabul’s PAS office has done a marvelous job over there. The post that needs help is the other half of Af/Pak, and it’s not Afghanistan. Public diplomacy efforts have taken a beating in Pakistan, and hope and help is probably needed there more than anywhere else.

Second, when was the last time you’ve heard of a non-career appointee run a public affairs shop at the embassy level?

Hmmn, let me see – how about Dan Senor, remember him? Probably most noted as chief spokesperson for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in the old days.

The CPA was not quite the embassy but close enough. The Bush II White House, after all called Senor “Advisor to the U.S. Presidential Envoy in Iraq” (that is, Presidential Envoy L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority).

I've watched Ensor on CNN; I remember him as telegenic; don't know his politics. Before joining CNN, he served as ABC News' diplomatic correspondent from 1995-1998.Still -- I hope no one is trying to replicate the CPA’s “Green Room” in Baghdad at the US Embassy in Kabul …

Who Runs the War? Nominate Your Own Afghan Power-Broker

President Barack Obama attends a briefingon Afghanistan in the Situation Room of the White HouseOct. 9, 2009 (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

WhoRunsGov.com and Foreign Policy invite you to participate in a collaborative contest to define the less visible Obama war counselors by contributing your knowledge to a profile nominated already or by nominating your own Afghan power-broker.

Who Runs the War? The contest runs from Dec. 8th to Dec. 23rd. The organizers will announce the top three profiles the week of Jan. 4, 2010, as judged by the strength of the cumulative case made by those who wrote them (WRG readers). Everyone who contributed content to a winning profile will receive a prize.

Contest prizes:

• First Place - Autographed copy of Peter Bergen’s book, “The Osama bin Laden I Know”
• Second Place - A Washington Post wind-breaker or jacket
• Third Place - Washington Post golf balls or business card-holder

Afghan experts, journalists and bloggers list their picks as to who they think has the most war clout inside the U.S. government.

Currently up with his top five picks is Parag Khanna, the Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation. He is author of the international best-seller The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order and advised U.S. officials in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007. His picks: Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal | Karl Eikenberry | Joseph R. Biden | Richard C. Holbrooke | James L. Jones

Click here to see Peter Bergen and Steve Walt's picks. Michael Goldfarb, the web editor at the Weekly Standard is also up with his six picks starting with Sarah Palin (R) (?!#).

WhoRunsGov.com, is a Washington Post Company site that profiles top policymakers and influencers on the web. A dedicated in-house editorial team seeded the site for the initial launch, but it is now open to the public and expert policymaking community for their contributions.

Quickie: Tent Problems with Team USA in Kabul?

Cover via Amazon

Mark Perry, a military and foreign policy analyst whose most recent book is Partners in Command, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace has an interesting article in the December 10 issue of Asia Times (The day the general made a misstep).

Some quite meaty blind quotes if you ask me, not just from the State Department but also from the Pentagon, er make that from the 3Ds. But if there’s smoke, there’s fire. So the fact that these relationship and personality problems are leaking out means that whatever other larger problems we have in Afghanistan, our first problem appears to be with the Team USA tent we have pitched in Kabul.

Quote 1: A US Development officer says:

“They absolutely flooded the zone.” […]"There must have been hundreds of them. They were in every province, every village, talking to everyone. There were 10 of them for every one of us."

Quote 2: A senior State Department official says with a tinge of bitterness:

"What a shock. If you deploy a gang squad, they're going to find a gang." […] "They were looking for an insurgency and they found one."

Quote 3: From an Eikenberry colleague:

"McChrystal came in and he just thought he was some kind of Roman proconsul, a [Douglas] MacArthur." […] "He was going to run the whole thing. He didn't need to consult with the State Department or civilians, let alone the ambassador. This was not only the military's show, it was his show."

Quote 4: A senior Pentagon official:

The PACC is "a stovepipe operation" [….]. "It's beautiful. It's headed up by McChrystal acolytes, former special operations officers who view him [McChrystal] as their patron. So they follow his lead. And there is no requirement for them to share any of the information they get from Kabul with the State Department or anyone else - let alone with Eikenberry. This is McChrystal's game. The PACC people in Washington pass information to McChrystal without going through any channels and they take the best information from Kabul and they brief [JCS chairman Admiral Mike] Mullen - and he briefs the president. So during the run-up to the Afghanistan decision, the military always looked current. They had the best information. Everyone else looked like a bunch of amateurs. Eikenberry was out of the loop. He had no chop [influence] on any of it. They just ran circles around him."

Quote 5: A senior State Department official in Washington:

"We kept saying 'we need to open up to the other side, like we did in Iraq with the Anbar insurgency,' and the military kept saying, 'well this isn't Iraq.' And so we'd answer: 'fine, so if Afghanistan isn't Iraq, then why do you keep talking about a surge?' And we never got an answer."

Quote 6: One State Department employee says:

"You can only be treated like a bunch of idiots for so long before you get fed up," […]. "It was PowerPoint after PowerPoint, all filled with this lingo and it all sounded pretty scientific. But it all amounted to the same thing - who do we kill. Well, it won't work."

There are at least three individuals in the article who are not wearing paper bags over their heads: James Clad, a former Pentagon deputy assistant secretary of defense for South Asia; Graham Fuller, a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Kabul and Andrew Bacevich, the dean of America's military thinkers.

More in the article. Read the whole thing here.

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• Officials Try to Unite on Afghan Plan (nytimes.com)

Quote: 5th Largest Recipient of USAID Funds

"If it were a state, Helmand alone would be the world’s fifth largest recipient of funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development."

Gilles DorronsoroVisiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTestimony at the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign AffairsCommittee on Oversight and Government ReformNovember 2009

Will the Afghanistan Civilian Surge Go Super Surge?

It looks like the much touted 974 figure is just a “down-payment” to the “total” civilian surge to Afghanistan. SRAP deputy Paul Jones is now talking about more civilian advisers to Afghanistan beyond the 974 expected to get there in early 2010. Ambassador Holbrooke’s deputy was over at the American Enterprise Institute yesterday and had this to say:

The President will soon request from Congress the resources needed to implement this focused civilian effort. His request will include not only a sizable increase in civilian assistance, but also funds to support deployment of additional civilian experts beyond the roughly 1,000 U.S. government civilians who will be on the ground by early next year. These civilians will help build Afghan governance and private sector capacity. In the field, they will work from District Support Teams and PRTs, side by side with our military. Some will also extend our permanent diplomatic presence outside of Kabul by staffing new consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat.We are now in the midst of the civilian surge. I spoke last Thursday at the Foreign Service Institute with a class of 90 experts from USAID, USDA and State who will be deploying before Christmas; the next such class is in two weeks, so our tempo is quick. On Friday, I met with a packed room of Foreign Service Officers looking to sign-up for tours in 2010 and beyond. Next week, I’ll travel to Camp Atterbury, Indiana, where every civilian deploying to the field undergoes a week-long, realistic, intensive field exercise with our military counterparts.Secretary Clinton is proud of noting that among these civilians are our top experts from 10 different U.S. government departments and agencies. And once deployed, they report to our Embassy in Kabul through a unified civilian chain of command, with senior civilian representatives at every civ-mil platform. In short, our selection, training and leadership is better than ever before. The result is improved civ-mil coordination at all levels of our effort in Afghanistan, and gives us the civilian expertise out in key districts that will allow our locally-focused strategy to succeed. Admiral Mullen attested to the quality of the civilians during his appearance before the Congress last Thursday.

See Mr. Jones’ full remarks at the AEI here.

Although we now know that there are 10 participating agencies, we still do not have a breakdown of which agencies are going to Afghanistan, and how many staff they are contributing to this effort. We also still do not have the breakdown sector-wide of these civilian experts.

And – some of you may know this, but I still have no idea where the larger part of the 974 are coming from. See my previous post 974 to Afghanistan for the Civilian Surge. Or where are they going to get the “beyond” 1,000 civilian experts now planned.

I also almost forgot to mention – this OIG report from August 2009 indicates that there are “nearly four life support and personal security contractors to every one U.S. Government staff member at these Regional Embassy Offices and Regional Reconstruction Team.” That report was on the regional embassy staffing in Iraq. Note that Mr. Jones above has the “District Support Teams and PRTs” in Afghanistan --different name but I suspect, functionally similar to REOs in Iraq.

Afghanistan is in a far worse state than Iraq, of course, but if we go by the Iraq calculation rounded down, that 974 civilian surge number actually means additional life support and personal security personnel of 2,922 or a total surge of 3,896 individuals (life support and protective services normally handled by contractors).

On a related note, Laura Rozen of Politico has posted a December 5 memo from retired General Barry R McCaffrey, who is now adjunct professor of International Affairs at West Point. The memo “provides a strategic and operational assessment of security operations in Afghanistan.” In it the general says that the “civilian agency surge will essentially not happen” – see below:

“The international civilian agency surge will essentially not happen ---although State Department officers, US AID, CIA, DEA, and the FBI will make vital contributions. Afghanistan over the next 2-3 years will be simply too dangerous for most civil agencies.”

A bunch of folks would have something to say about that from Foggy Bottom to Pennsylvania Avenue.

974 to Afghanistan for the Civilian Surge

Image via Wikipedia

Last month, Jack Lew, the State Department’s Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, visited Camp Atterbury-Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations in Indiana and had a town hall.

Here is part of what he said:

“This is really important work. It’s really hard work. We have a lot of confidence in all of you as you go out to Afghanistan to be able to make a difference. And here in a week and a day, when it’s a new beginning for the government there, it’s a time of hope for the people there, we can’t lose sight of the challenges. You’re going to be dealing with bureaucratic challenges, political challenges, security challenges, and people who may not always be motivated the way we would want them to be motivated. I have confidence that each of you can make a difference in the work you do, and I hope the training here has helped prepare you to go out and be as effective as we know you can be.”

They had a Q&A for about 10 minutes with about half a dozen questions. One question on expanding participating agencies, another one on program continuity, excerpted below:

QUESTION: Thank you, sir, for the opportunity. My question is related to the participating agencies in the mission. Are there any plans to expand the number of participating agencies, i.e., Department of Transportation?

DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW: The Department of Transportation is already helping out with a number of functions, so they’re in the – not a great number, but there’s a handful of people from the Department of Transportation.[…]We didn’t sit down and say, we need X, Y, and Z agencies involved. We identified – ultimately the 974 positions that we’re now filling are 974 specific position descriptions. Each of you was recruited because you have a core capability to help with one of those, or a number – a set of those missions. And that’s what makes it challenging to recruit civilians, because you don’t – you can’t just ask for a team of a hundred people who do agricultural work or a team of a hundred people who do rule of law work. If there’s more work for the Department of Transportation, my conversations with the Department of Transportation lead me to believe that they are fully prepared to be part of the effort.

QUESTION: […] But in this short a time, I wouldn’t think it will be effective enough to complete the mission. And I myself hate that I’ll start something and leave it in the middle and then come back and somebody else will come after me, start from the beginning again.

DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW: One of the challenges in crisis and post-crisis missions is continuity of program. These are not programs where you have decades to do it, so you have to work intensely in a short period of time, but we have deployments that have not traditionally been long enough. One of the things about the mission, and what all of you have signed onto, is a longer assignment than, historically, civilians have been taking. The fact that you have made commitments for a year is a huge improvement in terms of continuity, from a situation where we would send civilians out for three months at a time. People can do a lot of good work in three months, but the number of transitions makes continuity very challenging.So the fact that we’re in the process of building a civilian force from 320 to almost a thousand, and that will be, for the most part, full-year commitments addresses that issue right off the bat. I don’t think that we’ll get most people to sign up for two and three years, but we are encouraging people to make multi-year commitments.I think we have to be realistic that these are difficult assignments, and if we make the standard that you can only do this work if you do it for two or three years, that will artificially limit the effectiveness of our ability to get people in the right place at the right time. On the other hand, we are very much going to encourage and support multi-year commitments.We’re also going to try and stagger the turnover. We’re going to try and not have it be that everyone comes and goes on the same day. Part of the challenge in these transitions and the continuity is that the hand-off – it’s kind of like being in an American hospital on July 4^th weekend. Everybody’s new. You don’t want to be sick in America on July 4^th.A lot of the turnover in programs like this has tended, because of the schedule of Foreign Service assignments – has been all at once, partially because we’ve been staffing up gradually over an extensive period. People’s years will end at different times. And we’re very conscious of it, and building in with Kabul – with our Embassy in Kabul – a plan to not have the kind of sudden transition that really does create a problem in continuity. The military has been very effective in a lot of places, and Foreign Service has been very effective in a lot of places with these kinds of short-term but very intense assignments.I think going to a year for the basic assignment is a huge step forward. Having the transitions be smoother is a second one. And I think you put your finger on what is a critical challenge. These are not 12-month projects. The – many of the development projects that we’re going to be undertaking in the traditional development context take many years. We don’t have many years to show progress, because it’s a situation where if we can’t show progress quickly, the political reality on the ground won’t be there where it needs to be to keep moving forward.But that doesn’t mean you finish the job. Showing progress and finishing the job are different. We need to be able to show progress quickly, and then have a realistic trajectory towards the kinds of objectives, and ultimately the transfer of responsibility, from international and American staff and military, to Afghans.

Read the whole Town Hall transcript here.

On a side note -- the November 20 issue of WaPo had a piece on this training site: In Indiana, practice for 'civilian surge' in Afghanistan by Karen DeYoung, in case you missed that.

In any case, at the HFAC the other day, Secretary Clinton also mentioned the magic number of 974 for the civilian surge in Afghanistan:

"The civilian effort is bearing fruit. Civilian experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries, providing development assistance in the field, and when our marines went into Nawa province this last July, we had civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the very next day. As our operations progress, our civ-mil coordination will grow even stronger. We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions to 974 by early in January. On average, each of these civilians leverages 10 partners ranging from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs."

You might remember that in the October 26 briefing that D/Secretary Lew did on the civilian hiring in Afghanistan, one reporter inquired about the sector-wise breakdown of this 974 figure. It was not available at that time, and I have not seen a follow up post on the solicited information from PA. The briefing did indicate that out of the 974 people, 64 will come from the Department of Agriculture and 128 positions will come from the Department of Justice. State has a total of 423 while USAID’s total number will be 333.

D/Secretary Lew also said this: “So we’re doing pretty well in terms of identifying candidates. We’re not seeing that there’s a lack – we’re seeing a great deal of enthusiasm and interest in going to post. I think that it speaks again both to the – how critical the mission is, and that it’s seen as joining a team that’s doing very important work.”

So there's no talk about going through that silly exercise called "Prime Candidate" again (real life not reality show) as was done previously. Thank goodness! But I am still curious about the breakdown of the 974 figure agency and sector-wise and most particularly interested on the composition of the 756 personnel coming from both State/USAID.

• How many of the 756 are coming from the regular Foreign Service? Regular USAID?

• How many are 5 U.S.C. 3161 employees? More here.

• How many are professional contractors?

• How many are on Limited Non-Career Appointments (LNA) like Matthew Hoh?

• How many are When Actually Employed (WAE) employees (retired Foreign Service personnel with limited work hours)?

• How many are Foreign Service National (FSNs or LES) employees from other US Missions, borrowed for temporary duty in Afghanistan?

The 974 number is for Afghanistan alone. By the way, nobody is even talking very much these days about the staffing need at US Embassy Baghdad post-military drawdown or the staffing need at US Mission Pakistan with the expected expansion there. Also not discussed during these briefings are the number of life support personnel who will accompany the deployment of the 974 individuals.

Anyway -- the core question is a simple one -- how much of this specific civilian surge has the State Department been able to grow on its own? And perhaps, more importantly, how much will be outsourced, since almost nothing can be done anywhere anymore these days without contractors.

I am also interested for one other reason. Although additional hiring has been authorized recently for the Foreign Service, the demand still outpaces the supply at this point. Which means that if -- the entire 473 personnel going to Afghanistan are coming from the regular Foreign Service, there will be 473 slots at home and at 265 embassies/consulates that will go unfilled. Unfilled until new people are brought in, trained and sent off as replacements and all that will not happen overnight. In addition, some 450+ personnel most certainly will be needed for the inbound rotation to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011. Beyond that, who knows?

US Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif Moving Forward

Image via Wikipedia

The US Embassy in Kabul just announced that Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, signed a new agreement under which the United States would lease an historic 1930’s hotel in Mazar-e-Sharif for use as the new U.S. Consulate. Below is the rest of the press release:

This newly-signed lease extends for 9 years and 11 months, with multiple rights to renew in the future. The United States has agreed to invest approximately $26 million to renovate the facility so that it may be used as an office building and housing for consulate employees. Mazar-e-Sharif is a dynamic commercial center of northern Afghanistan and a gateway to Central Asia. Our decision to place a consulate in Mazar signifies the U.S. Government’s commitment to Northern Afghanistan and our permanent commitment to relations with Afghanistan. Today’s lease signing is the first step in realizing this commitment to Mazar.

I cannot find a confirmation of this, but it looks like the hotel referred to here is the Mazar Hotel. Here is the undated description of the hotel from Lonely Planet:

This is a hotel in an 1930s style, all high ceilings, grand dining rooms and monolithic pillars. It's a little dusty, giving the impression that it doesn't see all that many guests, but the swimming pool is popular with local lads in the summer. En suite rooms are a flat price for single or double occupancy, and have the novelty of a bath as well as shower.

Another description from a traveler who stayed at Mazar in 2007:

We are staying at the Mazar Hotel for $50/night. Our room is really a cavernous suite with a bedroom, living room and bath. Our suite is at the end of one of the hotels two long wings. The ceilings must be 15 ft high. It is a huge place built in the 1930 and it doesn't look like any of the furnishings or fixtures have been changed in all that time. The electrical wiring is screwed up and the fuses keep blowing and there is no hot water. When Arvid makes the long walk to the office to complain the three men dressed like cadres of the Northern Alliance who had been there when we checked in are gone. We are the only guests in the building. There is a large dining room or rather banquet hall but it is closed indefinitely. This place is really strange ... it could be a movie set for one of those European art films where there is no dialogue or plot.

TSB of The Skeptical Bureaucrat confirmed that this is the hotel (see comments below). Click here to see the photos.