Snapshot: USTC/Blackwater/Xe in Afghanistan

2,730 missions | 0 casualties | 0 incidents with deadly force

This is the personal security contractor that everybody loves to hate. State’s Inspector General’s Office conducted a performance audit of the U.S. Training Center (a Xe company) contract in Afghanistan last year and had some good things to say:     

“In 2008, USTC conducted 2,730 personal protection missions in support of staff from the Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, USAID, and various Congressional delegations (see Table). In 2008, 257 (9.4 percent) of the missions were performed for USAID. During the entire time USTC has operated in Afghanistan, no one under USTC’s protection has been injured or killed, and there have been no incidents involving the use of deadly force. OIG observed personal protection missions and interviewed various representatives from the Department of State and USAID who regularly use USTC’s personal protective services. The representatives reported that USTC employees are professional, make them feel secure, and are respectful to both officials under chief of mission authority and their Afghan counterparts.”

Staff composition as of April 8, 2009

USTC staff consists of a project manager, personal security specialists, administrative and support employees, and interpreters, as well as local guards who are third-country nationals. As of April 2009, there was one project manager, 75 personal security specialists, 18 administrative and support personnel, 20 local guard force personnel, and five interpreters (94 Americans, 20 Columbians, and five Afghan interpreters).

On the need for a dedicated Contracting Officer’s Representative to Embassy Kabul to provide proper oversight of contractor activities, the OIG reports:

Despite its overall satisfactory contract management, DS could improve its performance in two areas, both of which have been mentioned in previous OIG reports. First, two Assistant Regional Security Officers at Embassy Kabul are currently acting as Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR). These officers’ many other duties may prevent them from providing adequate oversight of the USTC contract, particularly as personal protective service needs increase in Afghanistan. Second, the current acting CORs do not review or verify the personnel rosters (muster sheets) before they are sent to USTC and then DS in Washington, DC.

The OIG report concludes that “USTC personal protective services have been effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in Afghanistan’s volatile security environment. Additionally, OIG found USTC has effective control over government-furnished equipment. Nevertheless, OIG has identified several areas in which contractor performance could be improved.”  The audit provides a 6-item recommendation. You can read it here.

Actually not just OIG.  Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, our former Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007)  last December also had this to say at a congressional hearing:  "I would like to pay special tribute to the brave and hard working personnel, RSOs and ARSOs, who have protected me and my missions in dangerous times. I would also like to acknowledge my respect for the men of DynCorp and Blackwater who ran my personal protection details in Iraq and Afghanistan. They performed with courage, judgment and restraint and one lost his leg in the process. Whatever opprobrium now attaches to others I owe all those gallant men—State Department and contractor employees--my gratitude and I am glad to have a public forum in which to express it."

Related Item:

OIG Report No. MERO-A-09-08, Performance Audit of the USTC Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan - Aug. 2009 | PDF

On Abdulmutallab: The Dots Were Never Connected

Image by Mel's ATCs via Flickr

The White House released yesterday the preliminary review of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack of flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. Excerpted below.

The preliminary White House review of the events that led to the attempted December 25 attack highlights human errors and a series of systematic breakdowns failed to stop Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab before he was able to detonate an explosive device onboard flight 253. The most significant failures and shortcomings that led to the attempted terror attack fall into three broad categories:

• A failure of intelligence analysis, whereby the CT community failed before December 25 to identify, correlate, and fuse into a coherent story all of the discrete pieces of intelligence held by the u.s. Government related to an emerging terrorist plot against the U.S. Homeland organized by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and to Mr. Abdulmutallab, the individual terrorist;
  
  

• A failure within the CT community, starting with established rules and protocols, to assign responsibility and accountability for follow up of high priority threat streams, run down all leads, and track them through to completion; and
  
  

• Shortcomings of the watchlisting system, whereby the CT community failed to identify intelligence within u.S. government holdings that would have allowed Mr. Abdulmutallab to be watchlisted, and potentially prevented from boarding an aircraft bound for the United States.

The most significant findings of our preliminary review are:

• The U.S. Government had sufficient information prior to the attempted December 25 attack to have potentially disrupted the AQAP plot-i.e., by identifying Mr. Abdulmutallab as a likely operative of AQAP and potentially preventing him from boarding flight 253.
  
  

• The Intelligence Community leadership did not increase analytic resources working on the full AQAP threat.
  
  

• The watchlisting system is not broken but needs to be strengthened and improved, as evidenced by the failure to add Mr. Abdulmutallab to the No Fly watchlist.
  
  

• A reorganization of the intelligence or broader counterterrorism community is not required to address problems that surfaced in the review, a fact made clear by countless other successful efforts to thwart ongoing plots.

FAILURE TO WATCHLIST

Although Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was included in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), the failure to include Mr. Abdulmutallab in a watchlist is part of the overall systemic failure. Pursuant to the IRTPA, NCTC serves "as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups.,,4 As such, NCTC consolidates all information on known and suspected international terrorists in the Terrorist Identities Datarnart Environment. NCTC then makes this data available to the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which reviews nominations for inclusion in the master watchlist called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The TSC provides relevant extracts to each organization with a screening mission.

Hindsight suggests that the evaluation by watchlisting personnel of the information contained in the State cable nominating Mr. Abdulmutallab did not meet the minimum derogatory standard to watchlist. Watchlisting would have required all of the available information to be fused so that the derogatory information would have been sufficient to support nomination to be watchlisted in the Terrorist Screening Database. Watchlist personnel had access to additional derogatory information in databases that could have been connected to Mr. Abdulmutallab, but that access did not result in them uncovering the biographic information that would have been necessary for placement on the watchlist. Ultimately, placement on the No FIy List would have been required to keep Mr. Abdulmutallab off the plane inbound for the U.S. Homeland.

VISA ISSUE

Mr. Abdulmutallab possessed a U.S. visa, but this fact was not correlated with the concerns ofMr. Abdulmutallab's father about Mr. Abdulmutallab's potential radicalization. A misspelling of Mr. Abdulmutallab's name initially resulted in the State Department believing he did not have a valid U.S. visa. A determination to revoke his visa, however, would have only occurred ifthere had been a successful integration of intelligence by the CT community, resulting in his being watchlisted.

Read the whole thing here.

A couple of senior State Department officials also conducted a background briefing yesterday following the release of the WH security review. You can read it here. 

I’m sure this is not the end of it. There will be hearings on Capitol Hill.  This being an election year, well -- who knows what surprises are in the cookie jar for us.  But I expect we’ll see some of the following officials over State’s role on this and the visa angle before too long.

• HRC (maybe)
  
  


• Jacob J. Lew: Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources; he oversees “M” which has direct oversight of the Bureau of Consular Affairs.


• Patrick F. Kennedy: Under Secretary for Management or “M”; the Bureau of Consular Affairs reports to him.


• Janice L. Jacobs: Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Consular Affairs; top boss of BCA


• David T. Donahue: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services

One More Reason Why Professional EFM Jobs Matter Now

The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) calls population ageing one of the biggest challenges of our century. While working age adults currently make up the largest share of the population in the UNECE region and percentages of dependent children and older adults are relatively small, this situation is changing rapidly. In Europe, there are now 4.4 persons of working age per one person 65 or older. By 2025, there will be 3.1 and by 2050 only 2.1. To help its member States make the appropriate policy responses, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is launching a series of Policy Briefs on Ageing. Drawn from the latest insights in research, the Briefs highlight strategies for policymakers and offer good practice examples for the variety of policy contexts found in the UNECE region.

One of the policy briefs is on gender equality, work and old age. Excerpted below is the section citing the link between labor force participation and social security.  Although this brief refers to ECE countries, I see some particular relevance to this and trailing spouses and partners in the Foreign Service.

The truth is -- despite progress in the workplace in the United States, trailing spouses particularly women (whether they like it or not), eventually regress into the traditional gender division of labor when posted overseas.  The inability of most Foreign Service spouses (81% of total population is female) and partners to pursue their careers while they are overseas (on their spouses’ government orders) will likely impact their financial and social security in old age. And since the female life expectancy in the United States is now 81.43 and expected grow to 86.62 in 2050, I think of this issue as a possible double whammy future fraught with peril. From the report:

Elderly women outnumber elderly men in all countries of the UNECE region. They are more likely to live in poverty and to be affected by disability and restrictions of mobility. They are more represented among those living in residential care and are at bigger risk of elderly abuse. Many elderly women are widows and at an economic disadvantage due to low incomes. To tailor adequate social policies to respond to an increasingly ageing society, it is important to take into account these gender differences.

Financial and social security of women and men in old age is connected to their current and previous participation in the labour market. Gender differences in socio-economic status are partially rooted in the traditional gender division of labour, where men bear the primary responsibility for breadwinning - that is, for paid work - and women for unpaid housework and family care. This has an impact on men’s and women’s ability to accumulate social security entitlements for their pension age.

Nevertheless, it is desirable that men and women are able to form their family and work lives during their working age period in the way that best suits their personal needs without risking their security in old age. To shape the political framework for gender equality throughout the life course, three strategies are important. The first is to enable and encourage women, and mothers in particular, to participate in the labour market and build careers in the same way as men do. Among others things, this would contribute to their social security entitlement in old age as well as to the current pay-as-you-go pensions system of their countries. Secondly, women who decide to take a career break due to caring responsibilities should nevertheless enjoy social security in old age. A gender-assessed pension system would need to compensate for this. Thirdly, it should be acknowledged that support from family members traditionally plays an important role in the care of older persons and can often be the most desirable form of such care for those involved. Therefore, working-age family members need to have the opportunity of assistance when undertaking such caring tasks.

Frankly, I can imagine a gender-assessed pension systems in some parts of Europe, but not in the United States.  Click here to read the full brief.  To read the other policy briefs, check out UNECE launches Policy Briefs on Ageing.

A Strategy for that $7.5 billion Pakistan Aid

Image by Omer Wazir via Flickr

Christopher Flavelle writes Washington to Reduce Funding for U.S. Contractors in Pakistan for ProPublica on December 22, 2009. The report quotes Stephen P. Cohen, a South Asia expert at the Brookings Institution and a former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department who praised the new report (Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report), but questioned the ability of Pakistani NGOs to handle the increase in American funding, as well as USAID's ability to monitor those projects. "We should have been addressing Pakistan's problems more effectively earlier," Cohen said. "This is a good report. They say all the right things. The question is, is it too much, too late?"

Flavelle did a follow-up report yesterday State Dept. Responds to Criticisms Over Pakistan Aid Report (Pro Publica | December 23, 2009). Report reprinted below under creative commons license:

The State Department has responded to criticisms over how it is going to spend and oversee $7.5 billion in new civilian aid for Pakistan, outlined in a plan that ProPublica reported on [1] yesterday.

That plan, which is outlined in a report [2] (PDF) the department sent to Congress last week, calls for shifting spending on U.S. aid projects away from American contractors and nongovernmental organizations and toward their Pakistani counterparts, as well as relying more on Pakistani public accounting firms to monitor that money. Development workers have raised concerns that the policy shift could make American taxpayer money more vulnerable to waste and abuse.Robin Raphel, the U.S. coordinator for economic and development assistance in Pakistan, told ProPublica today that the key point of the plan is to foster lasting development in Pakistan and help strengthen local institutions."When you don't have Pakistani buy-in, input, ownership of these programs, you might think you're gaining something fast in the short term, but it isn't sustainable," said Raphel. The emphasis on strengthening institutions in Pakistan may include allowing the Pakistani government to run the bidding process for some U.S.-funded programs. Instead of the U.S. Agency for International Development choosing the Pakistani groups that will provide goods and services for the programs it funds, Raphel said that some of those contracts may go through the Pakistani procurement process, with American oversight.Asked about the risks involved in relying on Pakistani accounting firms, Raphel said that much of the work would be done by Pakistani branches of international accounting firms like KPMG, and that accounting firms used would first be vetted by the USAID's Inspector General's office. She added that any training of accounting firms done by that office, which will have just nine staff members in Pakistan, would be contracted out.A senior administration official, who asked not to be identified, expressed frustration over the criticism of Pakistani organizations. "There's a widespread perception that every Pakistani you run into is corrupt," said the official. "I find myself a little impatient with that assumption. Pakistanis are very capable of doing this kind of work. I think it's very patronizing."

Active links added above.

USAID/Afghanistan: Audit Says Civilian Assistance – Not on Target

Image by melilab via Flickr

USAID’s OIG office had just released its audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghan Civilian Assistance Program. Quick summary below excerpted from the report:

The main goal of the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (the program) is to provide assistance to Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents and the Taliban. Assistance under the program is generally provided in goods and services to those who have suffered losses─a farmer might receive a tractor or livestock and a grocer might receive merchandise to restock his store. The program is being implemented through a $27 million, 3-year cooperative agreement (April 2007 to April 2010) with the International Organization for Migration (IOM, the implementer). As of December 31, 2008, $18.5 million had been obligated and about $6.4 million had been spent for program activities. (See page 3.)

The audit concluded that the program is not on target to assist eligible beneficiaries under the program. The implementer reported that as of September 1, 2008, close to the midpoint of the program, only 803 of the more than 6,000 eligible families under the program were receiving assistance (about 13 percent). As of January 22, 2009, the implementer reported that it had actually assisted only about 40 percent of the estimated target number of 5,102 eligible families included in a recovery plan it had developed in October 2008. (See page 5.)

Program Assistance Was Not Effectively Monitored and EvaluatedWe found that the mission was not substantively involved in the program and had not followed up regularly on the status of the implementation plan, monitoring and evaluation plan, and quarterly program reports. The mission also had not performed sufficient site visits of program activities or properly monitored the staffing of key positions. The mission’s current technical representative indicated that, because of other responsibilities, he had worked on the program only as time permitted. Until recently, the mission was not aware of the program’s slow progress. The lack of key planning documents, early in the life of the program, has impeded the program’s progress. Because of program delays, many of the intended beneficiaries did not receive assistance expeditiously.

Program Progress Was Impeded by UnderstaffingThe program cannot achieve its intended results, under an ambitious recovery plan, without sufficient staffing to keep pace with changing conditions. As of January 2009, only 56 of the 86 staff members that are needed to meet program targets had been acquired, and the program implementer was not keeping pace with changing program conditions. High-risk security conditions affected the staffing levels, and the need for program changes was not addressed effectively. Staffing shortages and slow reactions to changing conditions have delayed the program’s progress.

Program Implementation Approaches Can Be ImprovedThe Code of Federal Regulations states that recipients of USAID awards are responsible for managing and monitoring each program. The audit identified four issues that are making implementation of the program inefficient and less effective. Implementer officials said that they were too focused on program implementation issues or had not thought of changes needed to streamline the implementation process. Improved approaches should be implemented during the course of the program to ensure that resources are being used efficiently and effectively.

USAID/Afghanistan’s written comments on the draft report are included in its entirety, without attachments, as appendix II to the OIG report (see pages 16 to 23).

The program’s new end date is now November 30, 2010. No mention on how much more money would be needed for the seven-month extension, or a realistic expectation about this program. The implementer was only able to assist 40% of the target beneficiaries in the two years plus that it was running the program. And it will be able to bridge the 60% gap in less than a year? Is that really possible?

Related Item:Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghan Civilian Assistance Program | Audit Report No. 5-306-10-004-P | December 15, 2009 | PDF

Child Abduction Case Threatens Trade Bill

Image via Wikipedia

On December 17, Secretary Clinton released this statement on the Sean Goldman custody case in Brazil:

"I was pleased to hear that the Appellate Court in Rio de Janeiro has upheld the lower court’s decision that Sean Goldman, a young American boy wrongfully retained in Brazil for more than five years, should be reunited with his father David in New Jersey. We appreciate the assistance and cooperation of the Government of Brazil in upholding its obligations under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. And it is my hope that this long legal process is now complete and that the Goldman family will be reunited quickly. They will be in my thoughts and prayers today and throughout this holiday season."

The next day, the US Embassy in Brazil released this State Department statement expressing disappointment after Brazil's Supreme Court stopped the father, David Goldman from picking up his son Sean and taking him home to New Jersey:

"The State Department is disappointed that Sean is still unable to be reunited with his father. A key intention of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is the expedient return of children who are abducted or wrongfully retained to their places of habitual residence in order to minimize the human and social cost of international parental child abduction. This cost includes the risk of serious emotional and psychological problems for abducted children, and severe emotional stress and significant financial pressures for the left-behind parent that both Sean and his father will now continue to endure." (active links added)

The facts of this case are detailed in H.R. 2702 also known as the ‘Suspend Brazil GSP Act’. Excerpts below:

• David Goldman, a United States citizen and resident of New Jersey, has been trying unsuccessfully since June 2004 to secure the return of his son Sean to the United States where Sean maintained his habitual residence until his mother, Bruna Bianchi Ribeiro Goldman, removed Sean to Brazil.

• On September 3, 2004, Mr. Goldman filed an application for the immediate return of Sean to the United States under the Hague Convention to which both the United States and Brazil are party and which entered into force between Brazil and the United States on December 1, 2003.

• Pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague Convention, the judicial authority of Brazil was required to order Sean’s return to the United States ‘forthwith’, customarily defined under international law as within six weeks after an application for return has been filed.

• On October 13, 2005, the Brazilian court refused to return Sean in contravention of Brazil’s obligations under the Hague Convention even though it found that Sean was a habitual resident of the United States and, pursuant to international law, had been wrongfully removed and retained in Brazil.

• On August 22, 2008, Mrs. Goldman passed away in Brazil leaving Sean without a mother and separated from his biological father in the United States. Instead of returning Sean to the custody of his father David, Mrs. Goldman’s second husband, Joa.AE6o Paulo Lins e Silva, petitioned the Brazilian courts for custody rights over Sean.

• On September 25, 2008, Mr. Goldman filed an amended application under the Hague Convention against Mr. Lins e Silva for the return of custody over Sean.

• On June 1, 2009, a federal court judge in Brazil ordered that Sean be turned over to the United States consulate in Rio de Janeiro and returned to his father on June 3, 2009. The court further ordered that, following a 30-day adaptation period in the United States, Mr. Goldman be given full custody over Sean.

• On June 2, 2009, one Brazilian Supreme Court justice suspended the order of the first level of the Federal Court on the basis of a motion filed by the Progressive Party, a small Brazilian political party, that objects to the application of the Hague Convention in Brazil. This suspension must now be heard by the full Supreme Court, could further delay the Goldman case for months, and could prevent the return of any other abducted children to the United States.

The bill also points out that Brazil is a primary beneficiary under the Generalized System of Preferences program. In 2008, Brazil received duty-free status under the GSP for United States imports totaling $2.75 billion. This bill was last referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means on 6/4/2009 but has shown no further development.

Early this year, the State Department issued its 2009 report of the Office of Children’s Issues on compliance with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The report evaluated convention partner countries for compliance in three areas: Central Authority Performance, Judicial Performance, and Law Enforcement Performance. Seven countries are evaluated as “Demonstrating Patterns of Noncompliance:” Brazil, Chile, Greece, Mexico, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Venezuela.

Brazil acceded to the Convention on 10-19-1999. Its date of entry into force with the United States was on 12-1-2003. The 2009 report lists a pattern of non-compliance by Brazil in all three areas. Further the report states that:

"[T]he Brazilian courts continue to show a troubling trend of treating Convention cases as custody decisions, and often deny Convention applications upon finding that the children have become “adapted to Brazilian culture.” Six abductions from the United States initially reported prior to April 2007, three of which were initially reported in 2004, remain unresolved.[…] Our experience indicates that it takes many months before a court receives a case to analyze and many more months before a court issues a decision. The USCA observed during the reporting period that Brazil’s courts exhibit widespread patterns of bias towards Brazilian mothers in Convention cases.”

Last Friday, Senatus reported that Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey placed a hold on a bill that would allow Brazil and other countries to export some products duty-free to the United States.

I imagine that the bill reported here is the Generalized System of Preference that is set to expire in a couple of weeks. The 110th Congress extended the GSP for one year through December 31, 2009 (P.L. 110-436); so it remains a legislative issue for the 111th Congress.

H.R. 4284: “To extend the Generalized System of Preferences and the Andean Trade Preference Act, and for other purposes” was introduced in Congress in early December. On Dec 14, 2009 the bill was passed in the House of Representatives by voice vote (a record of each representative's position was not kept). The bill was received in the Senate on the same day with no further action todate.

The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established by the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2465; Sec. 505) and provides preferential duty-free entry to more than 4,650 agricultural and non-agricultural products from 131 designated beneficiary countries and territories. In 2007, the top six beneficiary countries ranked by import value — Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, India, the Philippines, and Turkey — accounted for the majority of agricultural imports under the GSP. Brazil and India accounted for nearly one-fifth of agricultural imports under the program. (See the CRS Report on the GSP dated November 10, 2008).

In a statement last year, the American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil supported retaining Brazil's eligibility status as a GSP beneficiary country: “The program has allowed businesses based in Brazil to become reliable suppliers of eligible duty free products for use in the United States. This mechanism grants a limited tariff exemption to US companies on 3,357 products from Brazil. In 2007, US companies imported from Brazil over US$ 3.4 billion of GSP covered products. As a result, US companies saved over US$ 100 million – an amount they would otherwise have had to pay if Brazil was not a beneficiary of the program.” It points out that “GSP has contributed positively for the development of Brazil by means of export promotion.”

An AP report quotes Sergio Tostes, attorney for Sean's stepfather Joao Paulo Lins e Silva, as saying that the case should never have become a political battle. "This is not a fight between two countries," Tostes said. "This is just the pursuit of the truth and the pursuit of what is in the best interest of the boy."

How much more complicated can this get? The stakes are high: a nine year old boy separated from his natural father since 2004, 131 countries with duty free tariffs until end of the year, billions in trade, and the reputation of one country that refuses to abide its international obligations pursuant to the Hague Convention.

Related Items:

• Bring Sean Home | http://bringseanhome.org/help.html
• International Child Abduction Hearings | Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission (TLHRC) | December 2, 2009 (with links to witnesses testimonies)
• State Dept/Office of Children’s Issues | International Child Abduction

Related articles by Zemanta

• The Battle for Sean Goldman: The View from Brazil (time.com)
• The Sean Goldman Controversy: Memories of EliÁn GonzÁlez (time.com)
• Brazil Court Halts Boy's Return to U.S. (nytimes.com)
• Brazil orders son returned to U.S. dad (cnn.com)

GAO Report: Diplomatic Security Needs Strategic Review

Image via Wikipedia

The Government Accountability Office had just released its report titled Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review (GAO-10-156 November 2009). It lists down Diplomatic Security’s policy and operational challenges.

First, according to Diplomatic Security officials, State is maintaining missions in countries where it would have previously evacuated personnel, which requires more resources and, therefore, makes it more difficult for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment.

Second, although Diplomatic Security has grown considerably in staff over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges further tax Diplomatic Security’s ability to implement all of its missions. Finally, State has expanded Diplomatic Security without the benefit of solid strategic planning; neither State’s departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau’s resource needs or its management challenges.

The GAO report also gives an overview of the impact of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan on Diplomatic Security:

Staffing the Iraq mission: As previously discussed, staffing the large number of special agents at the Iraq embassy has drawn staff away from other missions and offices. Iraq is a critical threat post; therefore, Diplomatic Security fills it and other critical threat posts first. In 2008, 81 Diplomatic Security special agents—or 16 percent of Diplomatic Security staff—were posted to Iraq for 1-year tours. To fill this need, State officials reported that special agents frequently leave positions in other countries before completing the end of their tours to serve in Iraq. In 2008, we reported that, in order to provide enough Diplomatic Security special agents in Iraq, Diplomatic Security had to move agents from other programs, and those moves have affected the agency’s ability to perform other missions, including providing security for visiting dignitaries and visa, passport, and identity fraud investigations.

Afghanistan is currently Diplomatic Security’s second largest overseas post with a staff of 16 special agents in 2008, which increased to 22 special agents in 2009. As of April 2009, Diplomatic Security was responsible for the security of approximately 300 authorized U.S. civilian personnel, although Diplomatic Security expects that number to increase if State opens consular offices in the cities of Herat and Mazar-e-Sherif. While Diplomatic Security has not been placing a special agent in every contractor-led convoy, as in Iraq, Diplomatic Security plans to increase the use of Diplomatic Security staff for all convoys. To address these changes, Diplomatic Security plans to add an additional 25 special agents in 2010, effectively doubling the number of agents in Afghanistan.

Other operational challenges that impede the Diplomatic Security’s ability to fully implement its missions and activities were also indentified including two glaring ones on foreign language deficiencies and experience gaps. Excerpted from report:

Foreign language deficiencies: Earlier this year, GAO found that 53 percent of RSOs do not speak and read at the level required by their positions. According to officials in Diplomatic Security, language training for security officers is often cut short because many ambassadors are unwilling to leave security positions vacant. However, GAO concluded that these foreign language shortfalls could be negatively affecting several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including security operations. For example, an officer at a post of strategic interest said because she did not speak the language, she had transferred a sensitive telephone call from a local informant to a local employee, which could have compromised the informant’s identity.

Experience gaps: Thirty-four percent of Diplomatic Security’s positions (not including those in Baghdad) are filled with officers below the position’s grade. In a previous publication, GAO reported that experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness. In addition, Diplomatic Security officials stated that these gaps between the experience level required by the position and the experience level of the employee assigned can affect the quality of Diplomatic Security’s work. For example, several ARSOs with whom we met were in their first overseas positions and stated that they did not feel adequately prepared for their job, particularly their responsibility to manage large security contracts.

The GAO concludes that “Diplomatic Security faces human capital challenges, such as inexperienced staff and foreign language proficiency shortfalls. The implications of this growth—in conjunction with the potential for increased challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other hostile environments as well as the management challenges listed above— have not been strategically reviewed by the department. Nevertheless, State leadership acknowledges the importance of broad strategic planning, as evidenced by the Secretary’s new QDDR, which is intended to ensure people, programs, and resources serve the highest priorities at State.”

According to the State Department’s response to this report, there is no current plan to conduct a strategic review of Diplomatic Security’s mission and capabilities under the QDDR, but it still mentioned the QDDR’s overall strategic focus on building operational and resource platforms for success” in its response. See State’s full response in Appendix X.

For the next several months, State can point to the QDDR as the possible response to the different challenges ranging from foreign assistance to human capital challenges and all that ails State. But the QDDR is not expected to be completed until summer or fall of 2010 (I hear that an interim report could be released early next year), half-way through this administration’s first term.

Let’s see what else DS, the American Academy of Diplomacy and AFSA might add to this report. The GAO as well as Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, A/Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, (Ret.) of the American Academy of Diplomacy and Susan R. Johnson of the American Foreign Service Association will be at the Senate tomorrow, December 9 for The Diplomat’s Shield: Diplomatic Security in Today’s World hearing (Dirksen Senate Office Building, room 342, 2:30 PM).

Related Item:GAO-10-156 State Department: Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review | November 2009 | PDF

2009 Influenza Pandemic: Border Entry Issues

The Congressional Research Service recently prepared a report on the 2009 Influenza Pandemic for Congress. The report provides a brief overview of selected legal issues including emergency measures, civil rights, liability issues, and employment issues. The report also contains interesting snippets on inadmissibility under INA, border quarantines and border closure.

Inadmissibility of Infected Aliens

Those most easily excluded from the United States are aliens already infected with the influenza A(H1N1) virus. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifically bars aliens who are determined to have “a communicable disease of public health significance,” from receiving visas and admission into the United States. “A communicable disease of public health significance” is defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation. Although the regulatory definition does not specifically include influenza A(H1N1), it does include, by reference, communicable diseases as listed in a Presidential Executive Order issued pursuant to section 361(b) of the Public Health Service Act. The relevant order, Executive Order 13295, as amended by Executive Order 13375, specifies “[i]nfluenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic” as a communicable disease for purposes of section 361(b). Thus, for purposes of the INA, the influenza A(H1N1) virus is a ground for inadmissibility into the United States. Of course, this law only applies to aliens, not citizens, and prior to inadmissibility being triggered, the alien must be diagnosed with the influenza A(H1N1) virus. These considerations could therefore prevent this provision from being the most effective means to interdict individuals infected with the influenza A(H1N1) virus from entering the country.

Border Quarantines of Citizens or Aliens

There are currently no legal provisions that can exclude American citizens from the United States solely because of an infection with a communicable disease. The primary means to prevent infected citizens from introducing these diseases into the United States is to place them into quarantine or isolation at the border rather than deny them entry outright. As noted above, the Secretary has the authority to promulgate regulations to prevent the entry and spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States. The implementing regulations at 42 C.F.R. Part 71 specify that when there is reason to believe an arriving person is infected with “any communicable disease listed in an Executive Order, as provided under section 361(b) of the Public Service Act,” the person may be isolated, quarantined, or placed under surveillance or disinfected if deemed necessary to prevent the introduction of the communicable disease. “Influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic” is one such disease that can warrant quarantine.

Closing the Border

The most drastic measure discussed so far is “to close the borders.” Presumably, this would entail a blanket bar on all aliens and citizens seeking entry into the United States regardless of their health. There appear to be no laws specifically authorizing an executive agency to take such action. However, Congress could presumably enact a law to do so, at least with regard to aliens, because the Supreme Court has long recognized “the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute that is largely immune from judicial control. However, United States citizens cannot be barred from entering the United States. Thus, if Congress were to theoretically “close the borders,” it could do so only by excluding aliens. In the absence of an act of Congress, it may be possible for the President to “close the borders” to aliens by Executive Order. However, this course of action appears to be fraught with legal and practical challenges, which would likely result in extensive litigation. Because Congress has not given the President authority to conduct blanket closings of borders, it would appear that the President could do so only if the exclusion power is one where he has concurrent authority with Congress. Although this exclusion power is characterized as a power “exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control,” the President appears to have rarely exercised any authority within this realm outside of the authority expressly delegated by an act of Congress. Considering the rather extensive inadmissibility regime codified within the Immigration and Nationality Act, it would appear unlikely that the President can exercise this power without express congressional authorization.

Read the whole thing here.

SFRC Report: How We Failed to Get Osama bin Laden

Image by Michael Foley Photography via Flickr

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) posted today its report titled “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today.” And in black and white print, it points fingers -- “the decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks.” Elsewhere in the report, and much harsher: “The responsibility for allowing the most wanted man in the world to virtually disappear into thin air lies with the American commanders who refused to commit the necessary U.S. soldiers and Marines to finish the job.”

You think maybe one of those guys named in the report would take to the air waves or the op-ed pages to rebut this in the next 24-48 hours? Quick excerpts below:

Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan’s loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area. Most analysts say he is still there today.

The decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as Operation Enduring Freedom. Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread insurgency. Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy known as the Powell doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks refused to deviate from the plan.[…]After bin Laden’s escape, some military and intelligence analysts and the press criticized the Pentagon’s failure to mount a full-scale attack despite the tough rhetoric by President Bush. Franks, Vice President Dick Cheney and others defended the decision, arguing that the intelligence was inconclusive about the Al Qaeda leader’s location. But the review of existing literature, unclassified government records and interviews with central participants underlying this report removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora.[…]Regardless of the exact number of enemy fighters, assaulting Tora Bora would have been difficult and probably would have cost many American and Afghan lives. The Special Operations Command’s history offered this tightly worded assessment: ‘‘With large numbers of well-supplied, fanatical AQ troops dug into extensive fortified positions, Tora Bora appeared to be an extremely tough target.’’ For Dalton Fury, the reward would have been worth the risk. ‘‘In general, I definitely think it was worth the risk to the force to assault Tora Bora for Osama bin Laden,’’ he told the Committee staff. ‘‘What other target out there, then or now, could be more important to our nation’s struggle in the global war on terror?’’[…]The responsibility for allowing the most wanted man in the world to virtually disappear into thin air lies with the American commanders who refused to commit the necessary U.S. soldiers and Marines to finish the job.[…]For American taxpayers, the financial costs of the conflict have been staggering. The first eight years cost an estimated $243 billion and about $70 billion has been appropriated for the current fiscal year—a figure that does not include any increase in troops. But the highest price is being paid on a daily basis in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where 68,000 American troops and hundreds of U.S. civilians are engaged in the ninth year of a protracted conflict and the Afghan people endure a third decade of violence. So far, about 950 U.S. troops and nearly 600 allied soldiers have lost their lives in Operation Enduring Freedom, a conflict in which the outcome remains in grave doubt in large part because the extremists behind the violence were not eliminated in 2001.

Read the entire report here.

Snapshot: State Dept's Family Member Employment - Part 3

What type of jobs are there?

(Click on image for larger view)

Related Posts:

• Snapshot: State Department's Family Member Employment
• Snapshot: State Dept's Family Member Employment – Where are the Jobs Located?

Did we legally adopt Afghanistan while we were asleep?

In addition to building power plants in Afghanistan at a total cost of $305.5 million, US taxpayer funds have also been expended to purchase fuel because the host country could not afford to buy it.

The USAID/OIG had just released its audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s power sector activities under its Afghanistan Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program. This does not look pretty; you might want to cover your eyes: $249.6 million had been expended for 12 megawatts of power (the goal was to generate 140 MW); an additional $15.6 million was also used for procurement of fuel last year.

Quick summary from the report:

The utilities sector in Afghanistan is among the least developed sectors in the economy. Only about 15 percent of the population has access to electricity.[…]To promote political stability, providing sufficient electrical power has been important for both the capital city of Kabul as well as for the agricultural provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. The Governments of Afghanistan and the United States became increasingly concerned that Afghanistan’s North East Power System might not be able to provide sufficient power to Kabul by the winter of 2008–2009. Furthermore, the Kajakai Dam hydroelectric power plant has been considered a vital component of the South East Power System in Afghanistan, which provides electricity primarily to the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar—the agricultural breadbaskets of the country.

So in an effort to help the Afghan Government and to make electricity more available within Kabul and within the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, USAID/Afghanistan awarded two task orders under its Afghanistan Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program to Louis Berger Inc./Black and Veatch Special Projects Corp. Joint Venture.

1: Task Order 9 was awarded in July 2007, with an objective to build a diesel-powered electricity generating plant that would provide 105 megawatts of additional generating capacity in Kabul by the 2008–2009 winter season. This task order had a completion date of April 2009.Results: As of May 13, 2009, when audit field work ended, the mission-funded projects were able to deliver only 12 megawatts of power, far less than the original goal of 140 megawatts. Moreover, this modest increase in power had not actually been delivered by the new Kabul power plant to the city’s population. By that date only 3 of 18 planned generators had been installed at the plant, 2 of which could generate the 12 megawatts of power. The third generator installed at the plant—which the project had expected to generate 5.8 megawatts—had yet to undergo startup and testing activities.

2: Task Order 2, awarded in January 2007 for the completion of work at the Kajakai Dam in Helmand Province, included refurbishment of an existing turbine, installation of a new turbine, and various supporting services. The objective of this task order was to increase capacity of the dam by 35 megawatts (to a total of 51.5 megawatts) by an estimated completion date of June 30, 2008.

Results: None of the 35 extra megawatts of power had been delivered to the local population as of May 13, 2009.

Extracted from USAID/OIG Report

As of April 30, 2009, the combined ceiling price for these two task orders (including $2.8 million for related activities, such as demining and building a perimeter wall, specified under another task order) was $305.5 million. By that date, USAID/Afghanistan had obligated $290.8 million and expended $249.6 million for the two projects.

Of course, all is not lost. The OIG points out that “Although the mission-funded projects have not succeeded in providing the electrical production in accordance with its original schedule, USAID/Afghanistan has experienced some successes under each task order. With regard to the 105-megawatt plant, the mission has funded ongoing training, and to date seven engineering interns, three mechanical and four civil, have been trained to maintain the plant. The interns perform tasks that include maintaining a detailed material control and inventory of equipment, monitoring civil installation, performing materials testing, preparing daily construction reports, and interpreting technical drawings.”

Except that the 7 trainees cited above may not really mean anything because --- the report also says that:

Host Government May Not Be Able to Meet Its Commitment to Provide Fuel to Operate the Kabul Power Plant

“Sustainability is a core element of USAID program design guidance. However, it is unlikely that the host government can afford to pay for the fuel to operate the facility, for reasons such as increases in fuel prices and the inability to collect on utility bills. In addition, the current configuration of the northern Kabul transmission system does not allow for use of cheaper electricity alternatives at certain times of the year, although these alternatives could ultimately reduce overall fuel costs. Without fuel to run the facility, the plant will not be able to produce sufficient electricity to meet consumer demands. As a result, businesses will almost certainly suffer, and the anticipated economic gains from having this reliable power source will not be achieved.”

The OIG report cited Section 611(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended and codified in 22 U.S.C. 2361, which provides that whenever certain types of funds are proposed to be used for a capital assistance project exceeding $1 million, the head of agency must take into consideration the mission director’s certification as to the capability of the country to effectively maintain and utilize the project.

Apparently at the start of this project, the mission received a commitment from the Afghan Government to budget and provide for the fuel required to operate the facility. The mission director also certified that the host country had the capability to effectively maintain and utilize the project.

But then in October 2008, the Afghan government notified the mission that it would be unable to purchase fuel for the new facility when it was completed and requested financial assistance to purchase fuel for the upcoming winter when the plant was to have been completed.

In fact, the OIG report says that “the mission reduced its contribution to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, a trust fund managed by the World Bank, by $28 million and used these funds to purchase fuel. However, since the project was not completed on time, the $28 million was used to purchase fuel for an existing plant. Approximately $15.6 million for fuel was procured out of the $28 million, and in April 2009 the host government requested that the remaining funds be reserved for the next winter.”

Huh? Holy mother of goat and all her crazy uncles!

So -- in addition to building the power plants at a total cost of $305.5 million (that have yet to be operational), US taxpayer funds have also been expended to purchase fuel because the host country could not afford to buy it. How long are we supposed to be responsible for the procurement of fuel for this country? I mean seriously -- did we legally adopt Afghanistan while we were all asleep?

Marshal Sokolov during the Politburo Session of January 21, 1987 had this to say about economic assistance to Afghanistan during the Soviet excursion there in the 80’s:

“We have to sort out the economic assistance: they are asking for three times more than they need. Yes, we will have to help. But—so that there is [some] benefit. In 1981, we gave them 100 mln. [rubles] of free assistance. And all of that went to the elite. And there was nothing in the hamlets—no kerosene, no matches.”

Twenty years later, it’s hard to disagree with the officer who led the ground forces in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Yes, let’s do that --- sort out the economic assistance. It’s not like we have a surplus to brag about.

Related Item:Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Power Sector Activities Under its Afghanistan Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program |Audit Report No. 5-306-10-002-P | November 10, 2009

SIGAR Report: Sinks in Its Lightness of Being

Afghan Women Stand in Line to VoteAfghanistan’s National Assembly and Provincial Council ElectionsKabul, Afghanistan. 18 September, 2005Photo from USAID

Last week, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released its audit report on Barriers to Greater Participation by Women in Afghan Elections (SIGAR Audit-10-1 Women’s Participation in Elections | October 28, 2009). I have been reading these inspection and audit reports for a while now and I, frankly, have yet to read a report that I like from SIGAR. This one is no different in its lightness of being. Quick summary below taken from the report:

SIGAR reviewed the level of women’s participation in the elections held on August 20, 2009, and the extent to which the Afghan government and international community created an environment conducive for women to vote openly and freely. Specifically, SIGAR identified the challenges women voters and women candidates faced in the presidential and provincial council elections. SIGAR conducted this performance audit in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from March to September 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found: Lack of a secure environment and cultural and structural constraints limited women’s ability to fully exercise their political rights to register, campaign, and vote in the August 2009 elections. Observers reported incidents of male proxy voting for female voters, very low female voter turnout, and women voters voting on instructions from their families or from people present at the polling station. Many organizations, including both national and international non-governmental organizations, United Nations, and Afghan government institutions, engaged in a variety of public outreach activities to encourage women to participate. Nevertheless, many women restricted their movements and participation in the election process.The Independent Election Commission, Afghanistan’s electoral body, and the United Nations lacked sufficient focus on resolving issues related to women prior to the election. For example, at least 80,000 female polling staff were needed, but only 43,341 were successfully recruited, according to the United Nations. We previously reported that conducting credible and acceptable elections not only depends on the integrity of the election process but the willingness and ability of the next Afghan government to continue to build electoral capabilities so that democratic principles and the electoral process are sustained. In this regard, the Independent Election Commission needs to specifically address the challenges that female candidates and voters face earlier in the process and implement the necessary corrective actions to create an environment more conducive for women to participate in the election process.

Here is the report’s recommendation:

RECOMMENDATIONS To address the challenges that female candidates and voters face, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan urge the IEC, in conjunction with the United Nations, to implement necessary corrective action, including:

• proactively recruit and train female IEC staff and increase the number of female staff to better integrate the fundamental needs of women candidates and voters in IEC’s planning process,

• communicate to all IEC staff the importance and criticality of following electoral law and procedures, including increased supervision over IEC field staff, to eliminate proxy voting (e.g. men voting for women);

• reprimand and/or publicly report violators of electoral infractions, particularly for proxy voting (men voting for women) and multiple registrations (men registering for women) to ensure fairness and credibility in the election process;

• ensure registration and polling centers are located in secure, accessible locations, staffed by females, to allow women to register and vote free from intimidation, and

• raise awareness of the right of women to participate fully in the electoral process through broad civic education programs.

C’mon, have Ambassador Eikenberry urge the IEC? Really? And what if the IEC says “no,” as it did with those polling booths for the now cancelled election run-off? Proactively recruit? Meaning they recruited for this election but it was not proactive? “Reprimand and/or publicly report violators of electoral infractions,” and then what? Give them 5 lashes?

The report says that “Many organizations, including both national and international non-governmental organizations, United Nations, and Afghan government institutions, engaged in a variety of public outreach activities to encourage women to participate.” But it did not say how many is many, 10, 50, 100? It did not indicate which organizations were engaged on which specific activities or what kind of public outreach activities were conducted there prior to the election. What did the Ministry of Women’s Affairs do, if any? How can we read and understand this in context without a baseline data on political participation of women in Afghanistan? Is it better or worse compared to their last presidential election? If so, why or why not? What are we supposed to do with the cultural and structural barriers besides what the many organizations there are already doing? And how much money did we spend on women public outreach? US taxpayer’s money footed half the $300 million election, how much did USAID, State, DOD, etc, spend on better electoral participation by women?

This report sinks in the lightness of its being. I hope SIGAR has better reports coming down the pipe. Oops, sorry, I meant to say, coming down the pipeline...

Related Report: Barriers to Greater Participation by Women in Afghan Elections SIGAR Audit-10-1 Women’s Participation in Elections | PDF

Related articles by Zemanta

• Afghan Corruption: Is the Inspector General Up to the Job? (time.com)

USAID/Egypt: $181 Million Later, Impact Unnoticeable

…in indexes describing Egypt’s democratic environment

I did not know this – but apparently since FY 2004, USAID/Egypt has designed democracy and governance programs valued at $181 million to be conducted until the end of FY 2012. USAID’s OIG just released its audit report on its democracy and governance activities in Egypt.Excerpt below from the report:

Despite USAID/Egypt awarding more than $181 million for program activities since 2004 and the mission’s acknowledgment of the restrictive political environment in which it conducts programs, the Office of Democracy and Governance has achieved limited results for 13 judgmentally selected awards. Valued at $62.3 million, the programs support rule of law and human rights, good governance, and civil society. Based on the audit results, USAID/Egypt’s Office of Democracy and Governance achieved only 52 percent of its planned results for the 13 awards and successfully completed only 65 percent of its activities during fiscal year (FY) 2008.

Based on the programs reviewed, the impact of USAID/Egypt’s democracy and governance activities was limited in strengthening democracy and governance in Egypt. Furthermore, in separate recently published reports, independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) ranked Egypt unfavorably in indexes of media freedom, corruption, civil liberties, political rights, and democracy. Egypt’s ranking in these indexes remained unchanged or declined for the past 2 years. The overall impact of USAID/Egypt’s programs in democracy and governance was unnoticeable in indexes describing the country’s democratic environment.

USAID/Egypt had the authority to take corrective action when an implementer was not achieving its results. But in some instances the mission did not take appropriate action, because the staff was unaware of problems due to weak management controls.

USAID mandatory standard provisions and an acquisition and assistance policy directive establish the legal responsibility for USAID recipients to include antiterrorism clauses in all subawards and comply with a certification regarding terrorist financing. Despite the requirements, four USAID/Egypt implementers did not include mandatory clauses in agreements with subrecipients, and one implementer did not sign the antiterrorism certification. This occurred because technical representatives did not periodically verify the implementers’ antiterrorism measures to ensure that required actions had been taken. As a result, USAID/Egypt has little assurance that its programs do not inadvertently provide material support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism.

Read the whole thing here.

Related Item: Audit of USAID/Egypt’s Democracy and Governance ActivitiesOIG/USAID Audit Report No. 6-263-10-001-P | October 27, 2009 | PDF

Truth or Consequence: Linked Assignments

Image via Wikipedia

The State Department’s OIG has recently released its inspection report of US Embassy London (OIG Report No. ISP-I-09-37A | July 2009). It talks about a lot of things, as these reports tend to systematically go through the different sections of the embassy and look at issues like management control, morale, etc. But I’m struck by what it says about linked assignments. This is a relatively new practice in the State Department of linking one-year assignments to Iraq and Afghanistan with the next onward assignment as part of the war zone incentive package:

“Another challenge has been the absorption of a large number of officers – 60 currently serving in London – who have returned from duty at extreme hardship posts such as Kabul or Baghdad with high expectations of a London tour of duty. Some lack the requisite debriefing or training.”

Elsewhere in the report the OIG writes:

“The impact on London’s ability to manage its staffing and the quality of its work is significant. For example, the current regional security officer (RSO) could only be assigned for a short tour in London (18 months) as his position had already been promised to an officer due to depart Iraq. Other positions have been or will be filled by returnees who have no experience or training for the work they will assume in London.

For example, by 2010 there will be only one officer in London’s large and busy economic section who has served previously as an economic officer. This gradual accretion of tied assignments in London’s staffing pattern has had the unintended impact of putting many positions in London out of reach for virtually all bidders, regardless of how qualified, except for returnees.”

Bob Barker in the old days signs off with, "Hoping all your consequences are happy ones." I hope so, too. I hope so, too.

Related Post:Quickie: Gunning for London via Baghdad? Better Hurry

Related Item:OIG Report No. ISP-I-09-37A | July 2009: US Embassy London, England