$250 Million to Counter Extremist Voices in Af/Pak Region

This one is extracted from the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Af/Pak Regional Stabilization Strategy (January 2010) released last week:

The Taliban and al-Qaeda use information as a weapon, dominating the information space. While our previous strategy focused largely on traditional public diplomacy and communications tools, we are now elevating our communications efforts in importance and innovation. New programs will empower Afghans and Pakistanis to challenge the extremist narrative and offer their own vision for Afghanistan and Pakistan’s future. A sustained media and outreach strategy will set the record straight, highlight key civilian efforts, and explain our larger strategic rationale for the fight in Afghanistan, as well as our strategic support for Pakistan, to the Afghan and Pakistani peoples.

Key Initiatives

Expanded Media Outreach: We will respond more quickly to misinformation, serve as a source of credible information for journalists, conduct polls on key issues, and expand training of Afghan and Pakistani journalists in the United States. We will actively build our partnerships with all parts of Afghan and Pakistani society, including youth, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and political actors and institutions at all levels.

Building Communications Capacity: Our support will help the Afghan and Pakistani governments communicate effectively with their people, and help people better communicate with one another. We will also leverage new technologies to support people with SMS services, mobile banking, telemedicine, and mobile micro-finance. And we will help build media infrastructure (radio, television, and cell towers) to carry communications into underserved areas dominated by extremist voices.  

• In Afghanistan, we are supporting the expansion of the Government Media Information Center in Kabul and an additional 16 provincial satellite offices. We will also enhance communications capabilities in core ministries by providing mentoring, public affairs training, and exchange opportunities for communications personnel. 
  
  

• In Pakistan we have helped launch Humari Awaz, Our Voice, the first mobile based social network empowering Pakistan’s 95 million mobile users with a voice. Our Voice mobile users harness mobile phones to instantly share news and information with a network of friends and followers via SMS messages. In five weeks, 20 million messages were sent and over 150,000 people enrolled, with an average of 3,000 new followers joining daily.

Taking Back the Airwaves: We are empowering indigenous voices to drown out extremist propaganda. We will expand local radio coverage and support creation of public, private and university radio stations. Using local partners, we will support distribution of content on all media, and use cell technology to help people build communities and get critical information.

Strengthening People to People Ties: Strengthening ties between all aspects of American, Afghan, and Pakistani society will deepen our long-term partnership. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are enhancing educational opportunities, including teacher training and English language training. Secretary Clinton’s three-day visit to Pakistan in October 2009, much of which was covered live on Pakistani television, underscored our new approach by engaging broad segments of Pakistani society in honest dialogue. This approach will be reinforced with a new public diplomacy and communications effort that will feature: greater engagement with Pakistani media; increased academic and business exchanges; and more robust outreach to the Pakistani-American community through the American Pakistan Foundation and similar organizations. We are also increasing professional, educational, and cultural exchanges.

Milestones

• 24-hour cell coverage is restored in areas of the South and East of Afghanistan. 
  
  

• Afghans and Pakistanis utilize radio and other media platforms to criticize extremists and hold government officials accountable. 
  
  

• Enemy propaganda is significantly decreased – in quantity and effectiveness – by July 2011. 
  
  

• The number of people-to-people exchanges is doubled by 2012. 
  
  

• U.S. disapproval ratings in Pakistan decrease, with Pakistanis’ increasingly convinced that the United States is committed to a long-term partnership on an array of issues, not just counterterrorism.

Resource Requirements

Resources available to meet requirements from FY 2010 and prior year appropriations: approximately $250 million.

McCain Delegation Visits Afghanistan

Photo from US Embassy Kabul /Flickr

 

A delegation lead by Senator John McCain which included Senator Joseph Lieberman, Senator John Thune and Senator John Barrasso traveled to the Arghandab Valley in Kandahar, Afghanistan (above) to meet with troops and commanders of both the U.S and NATO military along with the ANA and ANP.  They were accompanied by Gen. Stanley McCrystal and U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry.  More photos here from the Flickr page of US Embassy Kabul.

In Kabul the McCain delegation made remarks to the press. Excerpt below from Senator McCain: 

We believe we have the right team, the right resources, and the right strategy.  We are confident that if we stay the course that we can succeed here in Afghanistan as we have in Iraq.

As I mentioned, we just came from Baghdad.  The month of December, there was not a single United States casualty, an ample testimony to the success of the surge -- the same strategy that is being implemented here in Afghanistan with very different circumstances, but the same fundamental strategy.

We’re very proud of our team -- Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal, General Rodriguez and others -- who I think have provided outstanding leadership.

There are two concerns that I and my colleagues, who can speak for themselves, share.  One is, of course, the mid-2010 departure date… excuse me…2011 departure date.  That date, in my view, is artificial and should only be based by conditions on the ground.

I was pleased by the comments made here by Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton that this is an aspirational date and not a date that would necessarily mean withdrawal of U.S. troops.  We cannot send a message to al-Qaida and the Taliban that they can lie low for a period of time and wait for us to depart.

The other concern that we have is the issue of a sufficient number of trained Afghan troops.  Our view, and that of most experts, is that we need 400,000 trained Afghan troops to take over the security responsibilities of this nation.  So we will be seeking both the funding and the policy that would mean that the Afghan military can be built up to a total of 400,000 troops in order to fulfill the responsibilities and meet the challenges that they face.

Read the full text of the remarks to the press by Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Thune and Senator Barrasso (January 7, 2010).    

The McCain delegation also visited Baghdad on January 5.  No way to tell what the senators did in Iraq because the only thing the US Embassy Baghdad has on its website is this notice “U.S. Senators at the Press Conference at U.S. Embassy Baghdad.” Oh, yeah – it also has a “gallery” of the visit containing five thumb print sized photos. You need a magnifying glass to see who’s who in those photos, of course; so I can't tell if that is Big Foot attending the conference. Why even bother? Can't say.    

The four-member congressional delegation also made it to Islamabad late Thursday to meet with Pakistan's civilian and military leaders.  The trip must have been a secret; there was nothing on US Embassy Islamabad’s website to indicate they were even in town.  VOA and the Pakistani press, of course, confirmed the congressional visit. The bright side -- at least the embassy there did not pretend to give us news or utterly useless photos of the visit.

Video of the Week: Asher Hasan's Message of Peace from Pakistan

One of a dozen Pakistanis who came to TEDIndia despite security hassles entering the country, TED Fellow Asher Hasan shows photos of ordinary Pakistanis that drive home a profound message for citizens of all nations: look beyond disputes, and see the humanity we share.

Asher Hasan is founder and CEO of Naya Jeevan, a social enterprise that provides low-income families in emerging economies with catastrophic healthcare. Naya Jeevan won first prize in the 2008 NYU Social Entrepreneurship Business Plan competition.



Hasan was recently selected as a Draper Richards Social Entrepreneur Fellow, and is also an invited member of the Clinton Global Initiative. He has served as head of the US Medical Affairs Obesity Team for Amylin Pharmaceuticals, and joined TEDIndia in 2009 as a TEDIndia Fellow.

"[Naya Jeevan] will act as a catalytic intermediary between insurance companies and corporations in those countries, giving naya jeevan, or "new life" as it translates from Urdu and Hindi, to two large and severely underserved communities in South Asia: low-income corporate employees and their children, as well as domestic staff members of corporate employees and their children." NYU Stern School of Business

from TED.com

A Strategy for that $7.5 billion Pakistan Aid

Image by Omer Wazir via Flickr

Christopher Flavelle writes Washington to Reduce Funding for U.S. Contractors in Pakistan for ProPublica on December 22, 2009. The report quotes Stephen P. Cohen, a South Asia expert at the Brookings Institution and a former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department who praised the new report (Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report), but questioned the ability of Pakistani NGOs to handle the increase in American funding, as well as USAID's ability to monitor those projects. "We should have been addressing Pakistan's problems more effectively earlier," Cohen said. "This is a good report. They say all the right things. The question is, is it too much, too late?"

Flavelle did a follow-up report yesterday State Dept. Responds to Criticisms Over Pakistan Aid Report (Pro Publica | December 23, 2009). Report reprinted below under creative commons license:

The State Department has responded to criticisms over how it is going to spend and oversee $7.5 billion in new civilian aid for Pakistan, outlined in a plan that ProPublica reported on [1] yesterday.

That plan, which is outlined in a report [2] (PDF) the department sent to Congress last week, calls for shifting spending on U.S. aid projects away from American contractors and nongovernmental organizations and toward their Pakistani counterparts, as well as relying more on Pakistani public accounting firms to monitor that money. Development workers have raised concerns that the policy shift could make American taxpayer money more vulnerable to waste and abuse.Robin Raphel, the U.S. coordinator for economic and development assistance in Pakistan, told ProPublica today that the key point of the plan is to foster lasting development in Pakistan and help strengthen local institutions."When you don't have Pakistani buy-in, input, ownership of these programs, you might think you're gaining something fast in the short term, but it isn't sustainable," said Raphel. The emphasis on strengthening institutions in Pakistan may include allowing the Pakistani government to run the bidding process for some U.S.-funded programs. Instead of the U.S. Agency for International Development choosing the Pakistani groups that will provide goods and services for the programs it funds, Raphel said that some of those contracts may go through the Pakistani procurement process, with American oversight.Asked about the risks involved in relying on Pakistani accounting firms, Raphel said that much of the work would be done by Pakistani branches of international accounting firms like KPMG, and that accounting firms used would first be vetted by the USAID's Inspector General's office. She added that any training of accounting firms done by that office, which will have just nine staff members in Pakistan, would be contracted out.A senior administration official, who asked not to be identified, expressed frustration over the criticism of Pakistani organizations. "There's a widespread perception that every Pakistani you run into is corrupt," said the official. "I find myself a little impatient with that assumption. Pakistanis are very capable of doing this kind of work. I think it's very patronizing."

Active links added above.

Harassment of US Diplomats in Pakistan?

Jane Perletz and Eric Schmitt this week wrote on the reported harassment of U.S. diplomats in Pakistan (Pakistan Reported to Be Harassing U.S. Diplomats | NYT | December 16, 2009). Quick excerpts below:

Parts of the Pakistani military and intelligence services are mounting what American officials here describe as a campaign to harass American diplomats, fraying relations at a critical moment when the Obama administration is demanding more help to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda.[…]The problems affected military attachés, C.I.A. officers, development experts, junior level diplomats and others, a senior American diplomat said. As a result, some American aid programs to Pakistan, which President Obama has called a critical ally, are “grinding to a halt,” the diplomat said.

American helicopters used by Pakistan to fight militants can no longer be serviced because visas for 14 American mechanics have not been approved, the diplomat said. Reimbursements to Pakistan of nearly $1 billion a year for counterterrorism have been suspended because the last of the American Embassy’s five accountants left the country this week after his visa expired.[…]At least 135 American diplomats have been refused extensions on their visas, the senior American diplomat said, leaving some sections of the embassy operating at 60 percent of capacity.

One of the most harmful consequences, the diplomat said, is the scaling back of helicopter missions by the Frontier Corps paramilitary troops fighting the Taliban because of a lack of trained American mechanics.

Read the whole thing here.

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• Diplomat: Pakistan holding up some US visas (seattletimes.nwsource.com)

US Embassy Islamabad Suspends Consular Services

Image by Omer Wazir via Flickr

Routine consular services will be temporarily suspended from Monday, October 26 through Friday, October 30.

Its latest warden message says that the Embassy will continue to provide emergency services to Americans requiring such assistance. Americans interested in routine services such as passport applications are requested to contact the Embassy on Monday, November 2. Immigrant and non-immigrant visa interviews will be rescheduled.

Earlier yesterday, a separate warden message advised American citizens that the Diplomatic Shuttle into the Diplomatic Enclave would be closed for the day. Due to this, the American Citizens Services unit was also closed except for emergency services (arrests, death or injury, victims of crime, etc.).

PD Rapid Response Team to Pakistan?

HRC delivered the Second Annual Dean Acheson lecture yesterday at Renaissance Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC (Remarks | October 21, 2009 | Video). Last year, DOD Secretary Robert Gates delivered the inaugural lecture for the U.S. Institute of Peace.

During the Q&A, a Pakistani who apparently is a fellow at USIP said that “the overwhelming majority of the people believe that the U.S. presence in the region is all about the Pakistan nukes; that the Administration has made efforts, yet these efforts are countering to – the propaganda. And the widespread impression on the ground is that the Blackwaters are there, the Marines are in the Embassy, and they’re all just to take the Pakistani nukes.” He further states, “I understand that the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan and special envoy, from time to time, they interact with the Pakistani media. But by the time they interact with the media, the conventional wisdom had solidified.” On that landmark Kerry-Lugar bill, he says “You may call it a historical step towards enhancing relationship with Pakistan, but the bitter reality is that back home, it is considered a big fiasco.”

So then he asked, “How to increase the speed of your counter-propaganda in Pakistan, and second is to coordinate across the whole government to ensure continuity and cohesion of approach?”

The USG in recent months supported a young entrepreneurs' “Incubation Center,” provided bomb disposal equipment, donated ambulances, sent Pakistani students for US exchange visits and more. None of these seemed to have penetrated the very crowded traditional press that is considered among the most outspoken in South Asia. BBC reported that there were 17.5 million internet users in the country as of March 2008. A growing number of bloggers and social networkers write about politics. These users of new media have been vocal and quite active not only about the expansion of the US Embassy in Islamabad but also about the Kerry-Lugar bill. Check this one here, here and here.

The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, in the meantime, lacks a vigorous presence online. Except for that template website that we see in most embassy websites, and the videos piggybacking on materials provided by America.gov, its only other online engagement appears to be its connection to Co.Nx for its webchats, also via America.gov. I have not seen any material specifically geared towards an online dialogue addressing hearts and minds issues in that country.

In response to the questions above, here is what Secretary Clinton said:

Well, I’m actually very glad that you raised your questions and made your comment, because I think we have, as a government, not done a very good job in responding to what you rightly call propaganda, misinformation, even in some instances disinformation, about our motivations and our actions in Pakistan. That became clear to me as we were doing our review, and I saw how often there were stories in the Pakistani media that were totally untrue, but we were not responding as effectively as we need to.

We have, under Judith McHale, our Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, undertaken a very thorough analysis of what better we could do, and we are moving very rapidly to try to fill that void. We have a new team going in to Pakistan. A Public Affairs officer may be already there. We have adopted a new approach, which is we do not leave any misstatement or inaccuracy unanswered. It may be that people won’t believe it at first, but we intend to counter a lot of this propaganda with the best weapon we have; namely, the truth. And we’re going to be much more aggressive in interacting with the Pakistani media.[…]This is going to take time. This is not something you can fix in a news cycle or by just snapping your fingers and asking people to believe you. You have to go at it day in and day out. And I was, frankly, quite surprised that we had not done much of this in an effective manner. But we’re going to remedy that. And there’s no guarantee that people will pay more attention to what we say, but at least we’re going to be in the mix and we’re going to be in the mix every day in getting out information that can be used by those who understand that the United States is hoping to be a good partner for not just the Government of Pakistan, but more importantly, the people of Pakistan.

We’ll be in the lookout on what changes the new public diplomacy team makes when they get to Islamabad.

Dissent Channel: USAID/Pakistan Program

Image by jim.greenhill via Flickr

This Pakistani woman is using a sewing machinethat was provided by USAIDPhoto USAID/Pakistan

Ken Dilanian of USA TODAY (October 12, 2009) has a piece on possibly the first, and certainly the first publicly reported dissent on the USAID program in Pakistan. He writes:

“Special representative Richard Holbrooke's bid to rapidly shift U.S. aid from American contractors to local Pakistani organizations will "seriously compromise" the effort to stabilize Pakistan, a U.S. diplomat says in a "dissent channel" message to senior State Department officials.”

Pakistan's government also has complained about the use of U.S. companies to run aid programs, and USA TODAY reported Oct. 2 that Holbrooke has been moving to overhaul the aid regime so that more of the money goes to the Pakistani government and local organizations.

The problem — according to the memo by C. Stuart Callison, an economist with the U.S. Agency for International Development — is that Holbrooke is canceling successful programs run by U.S. contractors and preparing to bypass them by giving large sums to local organizations with shaky financial track records.

Dr. C. Stuart Callison is a Sr. Development Economist in USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade, Office of Economic Growth.

Read the whole thing here.

Related Items:

• USAID economist's memo through the Dissent Channel
• 2 FAM 070: Dissent Channel | PDF
• Wanted: Patron Saint for Dissenting Diplomats

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• Pakistan Aid: Is Development Money Being Well Spent? (time.com)

Owlers: "Particularly Qualified" Letters Sent to Diplomats

Image via Wikipedia

Last week, President Obama signed the Presidential Memorandum on Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, followed by Secretary Clinton’s statement on the granting of benefits to same-sex partners of Foreign Service employees. H.R. 2346 (which grants overseas comparability pay to Foreign Service employees class 1 or below) also cleared Congress late last week and just awaiting the President’s signature …

In related news that might just be as interesting …

I understand that the owl mail started hitting workstations last week. I received a tip that Career Development Officers (CDOs) have sent out DG-drafted letters late last week to Foreign Service officers deemed “particularly qualified” for service in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

One officer who received the targeted recruitment letter was quite surprised. Why? Well, because the job this officer was targeted for requires a specific language proficiency (which this FSO does not have) and reporting on economic conditions (FSO had no previous experience in the country nor in writing economic reports). The last time we’ve seen similar letters was about two years ago when State was staffing the diplomatic surge in Iraq, and diplomats were under threat of being sent on directed assignments.


The letter was received via unclassified email with no other restriction; it says in part:

[...]I am writing to inform you that the Department considers you among those particularly well qualified for the following XX positions and is asking you to seriously consider volunteering for an opportunity to tackle one of our nation’s top foreign policy priorities by bidding on:

XXXX (Country)(Post) XXX XXXX

[...] You are considered well qualified because your record of achievement indicates that you have the knowledge, skills and experience, as defined by the Embassy, to be successful in these positions.[...]

The targeted recruitment letter says that the goal is 100% volunteer but it includes a short blurb -- if positions remained unfilled, the recipient would be in a pool of qualified individuals potentially subject to identification. Identification for a directed assignment, that is, although those two words are not found anywhere in the letter.


I don't know if anyone should really be surprised by this. The military is expected to draw down soon in Iraq but there is no corresponding expectation for the draw down of US diplomatic presence there. So even as the State Department ramps up its diplomatic surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the demand for FS personnel in Iraq will not abate.


As an aside -- I am presuming that the push is still there to staff these critical posts first before all other mission staffing will be considered. So now -- you have the Iraq tax, and the Af/Pak tax. Personnel destined for assignments to other missions now have also reportedly either curtailed or have changed assignments to go to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan this summer. Which is good, except that the losing posts won't necessarily find replacements for those personnel even with projected increased hiring this summer/fall. I am told that in a couple of posts, an FSO is quad-hatted (is that the term?) working as the human resource officer, financial management officer, and general services officer in addition to his/her full-time job.


This is of course, for next year's assignment cycle. But would volunteers continue to step up year after year? We're on Year 6 going on 7 in Iraq, plus Year 1 going on 4, at least in Af/Pak (under new policy). I'm not sure how long you can keep recycling the same volunteers (who are language qualified or with reporting or stabilization experience) into the war zones or into critical post. Aren't there folks doing their third tour in Iraq? (I should note that the most recent DCM coming out of Iraq is tapped for Sri Lanka; and the most recent DCM coming out of Kabul is going to Kosovo).

In the big hullabaloo back in 2007, the outgoing Director General, Harry Thomas was quoted by TWP as saying that in the future, "everyone in the Foreign Service is going to have to do one out of three tours in a hardship post." Those who have not served in hardship assignments in the past will not be punished, but they all have to realize that there are "different conditions" now than in the past, he said.

If what he said holds true, that'll be 3 years every 9 years spent in a hardship post. The problem with that calculation is from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, the number of hardship posts seems to be expanding year after year.

What’s next - a diplomatic surge for Pakistan?

During his testimony at the HFAC on May 5, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said that “Our assistance should support Pakistani efforts to “hold and build” in western Pakistan as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended. We must also do our part to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) and encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors, such as energy. The Administration supports Congressional passage of ROZ legislation as a key way to boost private investment and sustainable economic development in targeted areas of Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan."

He repeated the same thing at his testimony at the SFRC yesterday. Are you thinking what I’m thinking? Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. What’s next - a diplomatic surge for Pakistan?

Related Items:

HFAC Hearing – Richard Holbrooke’s Testimony │ May 5, 2009

SFRC Hearing – Richard Holbrooke’s Testimony │ May 12, 2009

Holbrooke on the Pak Side of Af/Pak

Today, Wednesday, April 29,This has been moved to Tuesday, May 05, 2009, 12:00 PM. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard C. Holbrooke will be at the Rayburn House answering questions from the full House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) members. HFAC chairman, Howard L. Berman (D-CA) is holding an open hearing on the Pak side of Af/Pak -- From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship.

Tomorrow, April 30, Ambassador Holbrooke will be at the Dirksen Senate Building to testify at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). Senator John Kerry is also holding a hearing on the Pak part of Af/Pak -- US Strategy Toward Pakistan. (Update 4/29 @ 8:50 pm: It seems only a matter of time; this one has also been postponed. Will update when this is rescheduled).

You know CSPAN will be covering it as well as a few more media outlets because like Strobe Talbott says, he’s “the diplomatic equivalent of a hydrogen bomb,” okay? And speaking of Holbrooke -- In the Loop’s Al Kamen has written earlier this week about Holbrooke’s Growing Orbit.

I will not repeat the joke that has migrated from the Balkans to Foggy Bottom , but Holbrooke is reported to “have announced to a meeting of career Foreign Service folks in the South and Central Asia bureau (SCA) that they were now working for him, something that stunned more than a few of them.”

If true, boy oh boy -- does that mean the incoming Assistant Secretary for SCA, Ambassador Robert Blake, also works for him? Hmmn….hmmnnn..


Ambassador Blake has just been announced as the Assistant Secretary nominee for the SCA bureau. If you look at this map, you’ll see that Af/Pak runs right at the center of the South Central Asian region, and some have pointed out that without Afghanistan and Pakistan, the SCA bureau has a shrunken domain. Even then, I thought, well, at least SCA still has India and Kazakhstan, two of the largest countries in the region with their own sets of challenges. But now … one wonders.


It would be interesting to hear how Ambassador Blake sees his role in the big picture; after all he’ll be the one facing a confirmation hearing, not the special envoy. Blake’s nomination has been sent to the Senate and is currently pending at the SFRC (15 nominations in the queue ahead of him at the moment).

I did say back in February that I could not imagine the org boxes to stay the same with Ambassador Holbrooke on the scene. I’m sure there will be more on this later…

Related Post:

• Officially In: Ambassador Robert Blake to the SCA Bureau
• Richard Holbrooke: Our Af/Pak Man and Diplomatic H-bomb
• HRC on Special Representative Holbrooke's Role in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Related Item:
Matthew Kaminski: Holbrooke of South Asia

FY09 Supplemental Request: Expanded Embassies in Af/Pak

(Source: Published OIG Report ISP-I-06-13A, Jan.18.2006 - State Department)

The White House recently sent to the Congress a supplemental appropriations request totaling $83.4 billion that will fund our ongoing military, diplomatic, and intelligence operations. The State details are excerpted below. Read the whole thing here.

Congress will review the request in the coming weeks and the Speaker said it "will engage in a dialogue with the Administration on appropriate benchmarks to measure the success of our investments." Remains to be seen what makes it through Congress. But it looks like from these numbers that a larger personnel “surge” should be expected not just for Afghanistan but also for all posts in Pakistan. It is hard to imagine that Congress would withhold funds for Afghanistan this time after years of shoveling funds into Iraq. And since Af is tied to Pak in more ways than one, well, you get the picture ...

For an additional amount for "Diplomatic and Consular Programs", $594,315,000, to remain available until September 30, 2010, of which $117,983,000 is for worldwide security protection and shall remain available until expended: Provided, That the Secretary of State may transfer up to $137,600,000 of the total funds made available under this heading to any other appropriation of any department or agency of the United States, upon the concurrence of the head of such department or agency, to support operations in and assistance for Afghanistan and to carry out the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

This proposal would provide $594.3 million for Diplomatic and Consular Programs as follows: $150 million for the U.S. Mission in Iraq to meet the increased costs of security and operations; $363 million for the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan for increased staffing levels, support operations, and security programs throughout the provinces and in Kabul; $52.9 million for operating and security costs for the U.S. mission in Pakistan; and $28.4 million to support additional counterterrorism and diplomatic operating costs for the Department of State.

Funds for SIGAR:

For an additional amount for "Office of Inspector General", $7,201,000, to remain available until September 30, 2010, which shall be transferred to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction for reconstruction oversight. This proposal would provide $7.2 million to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to support SIGAR's authorized responsibilities.

Funds for Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance

For an additional amount for "Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance", $898,728,000, to remain available until expended, for worldwide security upgrades, acquisition, and construction as authorized.

This proposal would provide a total of $898.7 million for Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance. Of this amount, $893.2 million is provided to meet secure diplomatic facility and housing needs for U.S. Mission staff in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including $87.0 million to acquire additional property to support expanded diplomatic facilities in Kabul, Afghanistan; and $806.2 million to construct new secure and safe facilities in Pakistan, including construction of a new U.S. embassy building in Islamabad and other secure diplomatic facility needs in Pakistan.

Of the $806.2 million for Pakistan, $736.5 million would fund a major upgrade of facilities in Islamabad to meet security and building infrastructure needs. This includes: $111 million for the construction in Islamabad of a new annex to accommodate approximately 330 personnel; $405 million for the renovation or replacement of the existing chancery to accommodate approximately 645 personnel; $108 million for permanent New Embassy Compound (NEC) housing (156 units); $112.5 million for construction of U.S. Marine Corps security guard quarters, and general office facilities.

In addition, $29.6 million would support site acquisition for future construction of new consulate facilities in Lahore, and $40.1 million would support diplomatic facilities in Peshawar.

This request would also provide $5.5 million to deploy mobile mail screening units to protect U.S. Government employees at various high risk facilities. Approximately 73 mail screening units will be deployed to posts worldwide based on threat level (as determined by the Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security). This is an unanticipated need based upon security threats directed at many individual embassies and consulates worldwide.

Hillary on Holbrooke's Role in AfPak

Okay, Secretary Clinton is off to East Asia this week, but the week before she sat with Jodi Kantor of NYT for a brief interview. In case you've missed this one, I am excerpting the relevant portion about Richard Holbrooke's role in AfPak from the Secretary herself.

QUESTION: Okay. Yeah, well, let’s do a couple of sort of fact-checky type things. These are things that I’ve been reporting that I would love your read on. Can you explain a little bit how control of the embassies in Islamabad and Kabul will work? I mean, does – essentially, does he have direct control over those embassies? Or will they work through the regular State Department machinery?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, you know, they’ll work through the regular State Department machinery, but in collaboration. You know, we have many Foreign Service and Civil Service professionals, you know, at State and in the countries, who have been and will continue to be, fully engaged on Afghanistan and Pakistan. You know, they are among the best we have. There are a lot of people of deep experience and expertise. They’ve been dedicated, often at great peril and personal sacrifice, and they’re going to be the underpinning of everything that our government does to achieve peace and stability in the region.

Obviously, I expect everyone to work together. And you know, we’re going to be, you know, looking to, you know, Richard to provide, you know, leadership. But we also will be, you know, seeking out the advice and opinions of others who have roles that are important in helping us determine our way forward.

Special Representative Holbrooke's Role in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Hillary Rodham Clinton
Interview With Jodi Kantor of the New York Times
Washington, DC / February 6, 2009

Related Post:
Richard Holbrooke: Our AfPak Man and Diplomatic H-bomb

Weapons Accountability in Afghanistan

The GAO released last week its report on Afghanistan Security saying “Corrective Actions Are Needed to Address Serious Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).”

During fiscal years 2002 through 2008, the United States spent approximately $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces in order to transfer responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, Defense—through the U.S. Army and Navy—purchased over 242,000 small arms and light weapons, at a cost of about $120 million. As illustrated in figure 1, these weapons include rifles, pistols, shotguns, machine guns, mortars, and launchers for grenades, rockets, and missiles. The report has two main findings:

Defense Could Not Fully Account for Weapons
GAO: We found that the U.S. Army and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for an estimated 87,000—or about 36 percent—of the 242,000 weapons Defense procured and shipped to Afghanistan for ANSF.

ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and Account for Weapons due to the following:

• Lack of functioning property book operations. Many Afghan army and police units did not properly maintain property books, which are fundamental tools used to establish equipment accountability and are required by Afghan ministerial decrees.
  
  
• Illiteracy. Widespread illiteracy among Afghan army and police personnel substantially impaired equipment accountability.
  
  
• Poor security. Some Afghan National Police units did not have facilities adequate to ensure the physical security of weapons and protect them against theft in a high-risk environment.
  
  
• Unclear guidance. Afghan government logistics policies were not always clear to Afghan army and police property managers […] logistics officers often carried out property accountability functions using Soviet-style accounting methods and that the Ministry was still auditing army accounts against those defunct standards.
  
  
• Corruption. Reports of alleged theft and unauthorized resale of weapons are common, including one case in which an Afghan police battalion commander in one province was allegedly selling weapons to enemy forces.
  
  
• Desertion. Desertion in the Afghan National Police has also resulted in the loss of weapons.
  
  

One of the examples cited by the GAO report refers to night vision devices: In July 2007, Defense began issuing night vision devices to the Afghan National Army. These devices are considered dangerous to the public and U.S. forces in the wrong hands, and Defense guidance calls for intensive monitoring of their use, including tracking by serial number. However, we found that CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the use of these sensitive devices until October 2008—about 15 months after issuing them. […] After we brought this to CSTC-A’s attention, it conducted an inventory and reported in December 2008 that all but 10 of the 2,410 night vision devices issued had been accounted for.

Would anyone be surprised if the 10 night vision devices are found in Sitara Market? Shahan Mufti who covers Pakistan for GlobalPost and as correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor since 2007 recently reported “In the wrong hands,” about Peshawar’s black market for stolen goods:

I was recently able to purchase a U.S. military laptop for $650 from a small kiosk, which is known as the “Sitara Market,” on the western edge of the sprawling open-air markets on the edge of Peshawar. […] The laptop, which has clear U.S. military markings and serial numbers, contained restricted U.S. military information, as well as software for military platforms, the identities of numerous military personnel and information about weaknesses and flaws in American military vehicles being employed in the war in Afghanistan.

The GAO made several recommendations in its report to help improve accountability for weapons and other sensitive equipment that the United States provided to ANSF. As talks about a military surge in Afghanistan becomes louder, this also becomes more crucial – the weapons targeting our troops there may no longer just be remnants from the Soviet-Afghan war, but procured and paid for by the U.S.A. Links to the reports below in pdf files.

Related Items

• GAO Afghanistan Security: Corrective Actions Are Needed to Address Serious Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces
  
  
• GAO Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces