As I have noted, despite our successes in identifying the overall themes that described the plot we failed to make the final connections—the “last tactical mile”—linking Abdulmutallab’s identity to the plot. We had the information that came from his father that he was concerned about his son going to Yemen, coming under the influence of unknown religious extremists, and that he was not going to return home. We also had other streams of information coming from intelligence channels that provided pieces of the story. We had a partial name, an indication of a Nigerian, but there was nothing that brought it all together—nor did we do so in our analysis.
[…]
But without making excuses for what we did not do, I think it critical that we at least note the context in which this failure occurred: Each day NCTC receives literally thousands of pieces of intelligence information from around the world, reviews literally thousands of different names, and places more than 350 people a day on the watchlist—virtually all based on far more damning information than that associated with Mr. Abdulutallab prior to Christmas Day. Although we must and will do better, we must also recognize that not all of the pieces rise above the noise level.
[…]
We established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the government’s hub for all strategic level counterterrorism intelligence assessments, which draws on collected terrorist intelligence from agencies across the U.S. Government with access to more than 30 different networks carrying more than 80 unique data repositories to produce integrated analysis on terrorist plots against U.S. interests at home and abroad.
[…]
The Intelligence Community is an adaptive, learning organization. We can and must outthink, outwork, and defeat the enemy’s new ideas. Our Intelligence Community is now more collaborative than ever before, knows how to operate as a team, and can adjust to conditions on the ground. We can and will do better, but I cannot guarantee that we can stop all attacks indefinitely. The integrated Intelligence Community as directed in the Intelligence Reform Act is essential; the basic elements of the system are sound; but we must be more flexible and anticipatory.
The hearing is on right now, catch it here. This is not the end of the story. Part II of the hearing is scheduled for January 26th at the Dirksen Senate Office Building (room 342).No word yet on the expected witnesses.
On January 18, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano, in coordination with the U.S. Department of State, announced a humanitarian parole policy allowing orphaned children from Haiti to enter the United States temporarily on an individual basis to ensure that they receive the care they need—as part of the U.S. government’s ongoing support of international recovery efforts after last week’s earthquake. Excerpt:
Humanitarian parole into the United States may be granted by the Secretary of Homeland Security to bring otherwise inadmissible individuals into the country on account of urgent humanitarian reasons or other emergencies. The humanitarian parole policy announced by Secretary Napolitano today will be applied on a case-by-case basis to the following children:
Children who have been legally confirmed as orphans eligible for intercountry adoption by the Government of Haiti and are being adopted by U.S. citizens.
Children who have been previously identified by an adoption service provider or facilitator as eligible for intercountry adoption and have been matched to U.S. citizen prospective adoptive parents.
Under applicable laws, unaccompanied minors entering the country without a parent or legal guardian are subject to special procedures regarding their custody and care. DHS coordinates with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement on the cases of these unaccompanied minors.
More information about humanitarian parole and TPS is available at http://www.uscis.gov/ or by calling USCIS toll-free at (800) 375-5283. DHS encourages U.S. citizens with pending adoption cases in Haiti to send us detailed information about their cases to HaitianAdoptions@dhs.gov.
Allows Haitians who were in US on January 12 to stay for 18 months
Last week, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano released a statement on the designation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals who were in the United States as of January 12, 2010. Note that those who attempt to travel to the US after January 12, 2010 will not/not be eligible for TPS and will be repatriated. USCIS says that to be eligible for benefits, “nationals of Haiti (or persons having no nationality who last habitually resided in Haiti) must have continuously resided in the United States since January 12, 2010.” DHS estimates that approximately 100,000 to 200,000 individuals will be eligible for TPS. Reprinted in full below:
Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano
Release Date: January 15, 2010 | Office of the Press Secretary
As part of the Department’s ongoing efforts to assist Haiti following Tuesday’s devastating earthquake, I am announcing the designation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals who were in the United States as of January 12, 2010. This is a disaster of historic proportions and this designation will allow eligible Haitian nationals in the United States to continue living and working in our country for the next 18 months. Providing a temporary refuge for Haitian nationals who are currently in the United States and whose personal safety would be endangered by returning to Haiti is part of this Administration’s continuing efforts to support Haiti’s recovery.
At this moment of tragedy in Haiti it is tempting for people suffering in the aftermath of the earthquake to seek refuge elsewhere. But attempting to leave Haiti now will only bring more hardship to the Haitian people and nation. The international community has rallied to deliver relief to Haiti. Much has already arrived and much more is on its way. The Haitians are resilient and determined and their role in addressing this crisis in their homeland will be essential to Haiti’s future.
It is important to note that TPS will apply only to those individuals who were in the United States as of January 12, 2010. Those who attempt to travel to the United States after January 12, 2010 will not be eligible for TPS and will be repatriated.
The Department of Homeland Security continues to extend sympathy to our Haitian neighbors and support the worldwide relief effort underway in every way we can. Four Coast Guard cutters have arrived in Haiti, in addition to a variety of Coast Guard assets that were already in the area to support military air traffic control, conduct damage assessments and rescue people in need of assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to work closely with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department—the lead U.S. federal agencies in the response—while coordinating the deployment of state and local Urban Search and Rescue Teams from across the country to Haiti and standing by to provide food, water and other resources as requested. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has provided aircraft to support response efforts.
Haitians in the U.S. who are eligible to apply for TPS should go to www.uscis.gov or call USCIS toll-free at (800) 375-5283.
The FBI today reminds Internet users who receive appeals to donate money in the aftermath of Tuesday’s earthquake in Haiti to apply a critical eye and do their due diligence before responding to those requests. Past tragedies and natural disasters have prompted individuals with criminal intent to solicit contributions purportedly for a charitable organization and/or a good cause.
Therefore, before making a donation of any kind, consumers should adhere to certain guidelines, to include the following:
Do not respond to any unsolicited (spam) incoming e-mails, including clicking links contained within those messages.
Be skeptical of individuals representing themselves as surviving victims or officials asking for donations via e-mail or social networking sites.
Verify the legitimacy of nonprofit organizations by utilizing various Internet-based resources that may assist in confirming the group’s existence and its nonprofit status rather than following a purported link to the site.
Be cautious of e-mails that claim to show pictures of the disaster areas in attached files because the files may contain viruses. Only open attachments from known senders.
Make contributions directly to known organizations rather than relying on others to make the donation on your behalf to ensure contributions are received and used for intended purposes.
Do not give your personal or financial information to anyone who solicits contributions: Providing such information may compromise your identity and make you vulnerable to identity theft.
Anyone who has received an e-mail referencing the above information or anyone who may have been a victim of this or a similar incident should notify the IC3 via www.ic3.gov.
On January 12, the US Embassy in Kabul held a ceremony to honor USDA employee, Steven Thomas Stefani IV who was killed when his PRT team convoy was hit by roadside bombs in 2007. USDA also announced the establishment of the Tom Stefani Award for Reconstruction and Stabilization in Fragile States. USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack made the following remarks:
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has been deploying civilian agricultural experts to Afghanistan since 2003. Among the nearly 100 who have accepted the challenge was Steven Thomas Stefani IV - "Tom" to his family, friends and colleagues at the U.S. Forest Service.
Today we are gathered to honor Tom, who until his untimely death in October 2007 was a model of how Americans and federal employees can make a positive impact on the lives of those around them.
Tom was raised in Auburn, California. His friends remember a sweet-natured kid with a sideways smile who ran around in oversized cowboy boots and a giant hat falling over his eyes.
He was the kind of boy who worked hard and made his parents proud. He raised prize-winning sheep for the local fairs where he was a standout 4-H-er. He was an Eagle Scout and an honor student. And like his parents, Barbara and Steve, Tom lent a hand to those in need in his community, helping to organize fundraisers and gatherings.
As a student, Tom studied soil salinity in the deserts of the Western United States. And as a Range Manager for the U.S. Forest Service in Nevada's Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest, everything began to fall into place - his Eagle Scout background, the 4-H accomplishments, years of helping his Dad with the family construction business, his education, and a lifetime of caring for animals.
Tom loved the Forest Service and he loved the outdoors. Naturally, the challenge of Afghanistan's beautiful, hardscrabble landscape beckoned to him.
Like so many other dedicated USDA employees, Tom requested to serve in Afghanistan because he wanted to work to improve the lives of the Afghan people who live in this great country, people who have suffered through years of strife and conflict.
While some people saw only denuded grazing lands and wasted soil in Afghanistan, Tom recognized the opportunity to restore a once legendary agricultural region. He accepted his responsibility to serve as he had so many other challenges in his life -- he embraced it in a great, big bear hug.
In Afghanistan, while Tom was developing projects he worked directly to plan a large-scale poultry farm and a cold storage facility. He worked alongside grape producers to improve trellising methods. His contributions were real and they're lasting.
Tom made the ultimate sacrifice to this nation and to our nation when his PRT team convoy was sabotaged by roadside bombs. But unlike his assailants -- who scattered into the rocky hills like shadows - Tom, even today, continues to accomplish positive things for the people of Afghanistan.
QUESTION: Alan Bjerga from Bloomberg News. Yesterday, the Administration said that it was going to be increasing civilian presence in Afghanistan. I’m wondering, from a USDA and USAID standpoint, how many more boots on the ground do you expect to be putting down?
SECRETARY VILSACK: We currently have 54 people in country and another 10 are on their way. And we’ll have an opportunity after this visit not only to thank those workers, but also to evaluate what additional assistance may be necessary. It isn’t just necessarily government boots on the ground; it’s also ways in which we can partner with the many land grant universities and other universities that are providing assistance and help, as well as working with USAID.
So we’re going to have a significant presence. I suspect and know that over the short time, all it’s going to increase. And I also know that there’s already significant work being done, from planting additional trees, up to 3 million additional trees in a forestation effort, to building storage facilities, to improving productivity, there’s good work being done.
from U.S. Government Agriculture Sector Programs in Afghanistan and Upcoming Travel to the Region Briefing with Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, and SRAP Richard C. Holbrooke Washington, DC | January 7, 2010 (link)
The four countries (Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria) designated as “state sponsors of terrorism” have a collective total population of 141 million people (2007 estimate | WolframAlpha). The ten “countries of interest” have a collective total population of 468.1 million people (2007 estimate | Wolfram Alpha).
The new directive mandates that “every individual flying into the U.S. from anywhere in the world traveling from or through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest will be required to go through enhanced screening.”
I do not know how many non-citizen travelers actually originate/transit/travel through these 14 countries en route to the United States. But I was curious at how many nationals from these countries could be impacted by the new directive. So I went digging for numbers.
Below is the grand total of nonimmigrant visa issuance and admission by nationality on the reported countries covered by the new TSA enhanced screening directive. The “ISSUED” data come from published statistics of the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the State Department, covering the period October 2007-September 2008. (See the FY2008 NIV Detail Table on nonimmigrant visa issuances by visa class and by nationality). Issued visas can be as short as 3 months with one entry or can have the maximum validity of 10 years with multiple entry. Which actually means, you can use it to travel to any US port of entry or border crossing and apply for temporary admission into the country while it is valid. The validity of the visa is not the length of authorized stay in the United States. Read more here.
The “ADMITTED” column below comes from the Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains the records of admittance to the United States of foreign visitors by citizenship, country of residence, gender, age, etc. Even with a visa, the authority to admit an alien into the US is still under DHS. The length of stay that immigration officers grant foreign visitors can vary, but the normal length of stay authorized as I understand it is usually six months. Check out its Yearbook of Immigration Statisticshere. You might also want to check out this April 2009 Annual Flow Report from DHS on admission. The DHS numbers below are extracted from Table 26(XLS, 54 KB Nonimmigrant Admissions (I-94 Only) by Region and Country of Citizenship: Fiscal Years 1999 to 2008).
It is important to note that the number of issuance and number of admission above have no real correlation because an applicant issued a visa in 2008 may have decided to travel/apply for admission at a port of entry in the United States in 2009. Or a visitor who applied for admission for entry in the United States in 2008 may have been issued a visa a year or two previously. To see the trends in the number of admission to the United States, check out DHS’s Table 26, an excel spreadsheet that details total admission by country from FY 2009 FY 1999 – FY 2008.
Today, the Transportation Security Administration issued new security directives to all United States and international air carriers with inbound flights to the U.S. effective January 4, 2010.
The new directive includes long-term, sustainable security measures developed in consultation with law enforcement officials and our domestic and international partners. Because effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders, and as a result of extraordinary cooperation from our global aviation partners, TSA is mandating that every individual flying into the U.S. from anywhere in the world traveling from or through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest will be required to go through enhanced screening. The directive also increases the use of enhanced screening technologies and mandates threat-based and random screening for passengers on U.S. bound international flights.
WaPo reports that TSA officials declined to name all the "countries of interest" on Sunday, but confirmed that the directive applies to the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The department's Web site lists Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. The report also says that “a senior administration official identified the following as terrorism-prone nations or countries of interest to U.S. intelligence agencies: Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen.”
The NYT on its coverage (U.S. Intensifies Air Screening for Fliers From 14 Nations) points out that these new changes will mean that “any citizen of Pakistan or Saudi Arabia will for the first time be patted down automatically before boarding any flight to the United States. Even if that person has lived in a country like Britain for decades, he now will be subject to these extra security checks.”
Nigeria has already criticized its inclusion under the new air passenger screening saying "It is unfair to discriminate against 150 million people because of the behaviour of one person."
United States District Judge Ricardo Urbina in dismissing the indictment of Paul Slough, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, Donald Ball and Nicholas Slatten [USA v. Paul A. Slough et al. | Criminal Action No.: 08-0360 (RMU)] (security guards employed by Blackwater Worldwide/Xe to provide security services to U.S. government employees operating in Iraq) -- on the Nisour Square Baghdad incident writes:
"Before the beginning of jury deliberations, a judge instructs the jury that it must perform its duty to deliberate “without prejudice, fear, sympathy or favoritism.” A judge has a concomitant obligation. When a judge, upon close examination of the procedures that bring a criminal matter before the court, concludes that the process aimed at bringing the accused to trial has compromised the constitutional rights of the accused, it behooves the court to grant relief in the fashion prescribed by law. Such is the case here."
Perhaps cognizant of the possible impact of this ruling beyond our borders, the judge prefaced his memorandum opinion with this:
[T]he basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution shoulder the entire load.
In its decision the Court did not minced words: “[T]he government has utterly failed to prove that it made no impermissible use of the defendants’ statements or that such use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court must dismiss the indictment against all of the defendants.”
The Court also faulted the prosecutors’ excessive fervor and disregard of warning that lead to the collapse of the prosecution's case:
What a great idea! Fire the head of homeland security, and wait for the nomination and vetting process to start from scratch with a new candidate. Which, of course, can’t be done in days, or weeks, but months because you know – the candidate has to be scrupulously scrutinized to ensure there are no skeletons in his/her closets or no unpaid jaywalking tickets. Oh, and god forbid, a nanny problem!
And when all that is done, the new nominee, unless deminted in Congress like the TSA nominee must transition into his/her new role as top honcho of homeland security, and provide leadership to 225,000 employees in 7 sub-agencies, and 11 other components, plus tackle its $52 billion budget.
I don’t care if that candidate is a genius. The fact is, transitioning into that leadership role won’t happen overnight as we might like to think. And while he/she is transitioning, Al Qaeda is rolling in their caves, laughing at how quickly we pick up their bait and diversion. They will send their agents of chaos on to our commercial airlines (we’re not even talking about the land borders yet!) and expect these knee jerk emotional reactions from us. Why else would they claim ownership over Mr. Underpant’s failed attack? To sow fear and terror, and more fear and terror; and to watch us, most especially our politicians as they tear each other down -- until we get so foul and twisted in our fears, we won’t know our heads from our tails.
NO MORE!
The politicians who are using this incident as rocket boosters for their own ambitions should be lined up on the steps of the Capitol; and we should call on their mothers to publicly scold them for such shameful behavior.
In a related note, Thomas Lipscomb, a Senior Fellow at the Annenberg Center for the Digital Future also pens, The Trouser Bomber Effect: Watching Government Cure Incompetence with Idiocy for Huffington Post: “Incompetent State Department consular officials and poor enforcement of visa procedures that have been in place long before the personal computer, the Xerox machine or even the jet airliner are the problem here.”
Ugh!
I supposed that is the easiest trick in the book -- to scream “incompetence” when something like this happens. But it shows a deep misunderstanding of the consular trade. There are over 1500 consular officers in the Foreign Service. They are some of the hardest working folks I know. Most work more than 8 hours or weekends and are on call 24/7 with no additional compensation. Perhaps, more than anyone else in a US mission, consular officers are dictated by manuals, guidelines, SOPs, and regulations. They are not freelancers, and the work that they do have almost zero optional parts.
I wonder what he meant by “poor enforcement of visa procedures?” That the suspect was issued a visa two years before his Detroit attack? That State did not know the Brits did not renew the suspect’s visa? US visa sections in over 200 embassies and consulate refuse visa applications every single work day, and as far as I know, we don’t tell the Brits about them. Why should they tell us about their refusals or nonrenewals? Now, it would have been much simpler if the father’s report was transmitted with an automatic “arrest” or "kill" button, right? But we still live by the rule of law.
As one the U.S. intelligence official puts it to Spencer Ackerman -- “Realistically, a lot of guys call every day and say their relative or former friend is dangerous,” the official explained. To use that level of information to revoke someone’s visa or stop someone from flying would be “unmanageable. We’d probably shut down air traffic.”
I don’t think folks really have an idea how much poison pen letters visa sections overseas get. If you take every single poison pen letter from jealous neighbors, ex-spouses, cranky relatives, broken families, old lovers, ditched boyfriends, mistresses, third wives, business competitors, etc, etc. as “word from god” commercial travel as we know it would stop. Really. No more Disneyland trips, no more shopping in New York, no more students for American universities and colleges, etc. etc. And congressional constituencies, even those still unable to vote would run to "their" representatives to complain, and senators and congressmen would send out congressional inquiries to embassies and consulates as to why so and so was refused a visa.
Finally, one more former Bushie has called for the visa function to be removed from the State Department to DHS saying that: “Granting visas is a function that most people at State relegate to the margins of their activities. State’s mandarins — foreign service officers or “FSOs” — look down at the consular officials who handle visas. This is considered a third-rate assignment, something young FSOs have to suffer through for a few years at the very start of their careers.”
He added that “Moving visa functions to DHS is no panacea, obviously, but the case of the would-be airline bomber Abdul Mutallab is perhaps suggestive. His multiple-entry visa to the U.S. was not cancelled by State, not even after his own father alerted U.S. Embassy officials in Nigeria of the danger he might present. His visa to enter the United Kingdom was cancelled, however, months ago.”
Of course, DHS is responsible for American’s homeland security and border control. Maybe DHS wants the visa adjudication function, maybe not. No offense to our friends at DHS but I understand that there are 12 million illegal aliens in the United States that we have not caught or deported yet. DHS has records of aliens entering the United States but there’s no one out there who actually knows when or if these aliens depart because DHS has no tracking system for them. Further, according to the Center for Immigration Studies, USCIS, one of DHS’s sub-agencies that deal with immigration is “actually still deep in the weeds and unable to keep up with the existing workload”. CIS reports that as of the end of June 2009, the agency had a backlog of nearly 2.7 million applications and petitions that were pending review, above and beyond the 1.8 million that had been completed that quarter.
So yes -- instead of figuring out what went wrong this time, so it won’t happen again next time -- let’s just forgettaboutallthat and shuffle the decks, move this function from here to there. It's all rather very simple, isn't it? We would, of course, all sleep like babies at night knowing that the same agency that could not get a handle on 12 million illegal aliens within our borders would now be tasked with issuing visas to all foreigners coming into the United States. You would find that exceptionally comforting, yes?
Let’s pretend for a moment that the visa function was with DHS this past year. That when the suspect’s father went to the US Embassy to report his concern about his son, he talked to a DHS officer. As I understand it under current regulations, the DHS officer would have brought this to the attention to the Visas Viper Committee normally chaired by the Deputy Ambassador. A Visas Viper cable would be transmitted to the US as it happened in this case. The information would go to NTC, and an interagency committee decides to put the suspects name in the half-a million name database. Would it have made a difference in the airport screening of this case? Given the same information, provided by DHS this time, instead of State, would they have decided to revoke the suspect’s visa? If the information was not significant enough to put subject in the more restrictive “No-Fly” list, would it have been significant enough for visa revocation?
Let’s presume that the revocation occurred. It is not as simple as stamping the visa “revoked” or “cancelled.” A report has to be made out, a "lookout" created and submitted, actual revocation documents drafted and approved by a responsible official, the subject of revocation had to be notified and asked to present his visa at the embassy for physical cancellation, the information had to be sent by DHS to other agencies including its child agency, CBP to warn them of possible entry, and its other child agency, ICE to locate, apprehend and remove subject if he was inside the United States.
In an alternate universe this might work, in a real world, I doubt it.
We need to find out what happened in this case without the hysteria or the urge to convene the circular firing squad. We need everyone’s help to get to the bottom of this, without the constant fear that their jobs are on the line -- whether in the airports, the airlines, or any of our relevant agencies, including the CIA and other intel agencies. We must refuse to let mob mentality drive this issue, let our people do their work and hope that they are now, learning more quickly to connect the dots before another incident happens. What we don't want to happen is for officials to lower the threshold for inclusion as CYA, and in so doing presents our analysts with more haystack than they can manage.
2009 IG Inspection Says No Fly List Reduce Vulnerabilities, but Additional Vulnerabilities May Exist
The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security this past July released a redacted report on the Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation. The report includes background on the Secure Flight Program Implementation, Terrorist Screening Database, the No Fly and Selectee Lists and other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database. The OIG in its review writes that the No Fly and Selectee Lists reduce vulnerabilities to commercial aviation security, but that additional vulnerabilities may exist:
“The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the TSDB, the federal government’s consolidated watch list. The name inclusion criteria for these two lists are more narrowly focused and restrictive than the inclusion criteria for the entire TSDB. Specifically, the No Fly and Selectee lists focus on aviation security and concentrate on [REDACTED].
Although the No Fly and Selectee lists are largely successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, some individuals not included on the lists may also present threats to aviation security.”
Below is an excerpt from the report on the No Fly and Selectee Lists section:
No Fly and Selectee Lists
The No Fly and Selectee lists, two TSDB derivative watch lists, are unique among all watch lists derived from the TSDB. They are the only derivative watch lists that have their own minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements. These requirements are considerably more stringent than the TSDB’s known or reasonably suspected standard. Additionally, the No Fly and Selectee lists have the narrowest minimum biographic inclusion criteria of all TSDB watch lists.
Minimum Inclusion Criteria
The No Fly and Selectee inclusion criteria were initially established in October 2004 by the Homeland Security Council. This council is a cabinet-level body that coordinates homeland security–related activities and promotes effective homeland security policy development and implementation. The No Fly and Selectee Lists Implementation Guidance accompanying the inclusion criteria was released in January 2005. When establishing the initial criteria, responsibility for maintenance and export of the lists was transferred to the TSC. Prior to this time, TSA maintained the No Fly and Selectee lists. The lists were created in September 2001, before TSA was established, when the Federal Aviation Administration received 125 names from the FBI for inclusion on a No Fly list.
No Fly List Criteria
The TSC updated and supplemented the implementation guidance in July 2006. Recently, the Homeland Security Council [REDACTED] to allow for inclusion of more individuals on the No Fly list. The TSC’s Policy Board Working Group followed suit with new implementation guidance, all of which went into effect in June 2008. Appendix D provides more detail on the No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance (DS note: guidance extensively redacted).
Two paragraphs [REDACTED]
Selectee List Criteria
The derogatory information criteria for including an individual on the Selectee list require that an individual who is ineligible for inclusion on the No Fly list meet [REDACTED] the Selectee list criteria. Specifically, the Selectee list should include any person, regardless of citizenship, who is: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
In applying more narrow requirements than the TSDB’s minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements, the No Fly and Selectee lists are intended to prevent specific categories of terrorists from boarding commercial aircraft or subject these terrorists to secondary screening prior to boarding, and are not for use as law enforcement or intelligence-gathering tools. Past and present implementation guidance emphasizes that the criteria for the No Fly list require a [REDACTED] and that the Selectee list is not a default for those who do not qualify for inclusion on the No Fly list.
The current minimum biographic inclusion criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were not changed during the June 2008 policy revisions, require a [REDACTED] for a TSDB record to export to either list. [REDACTED] Given the restrictive derogatory and biographic criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists, these lists combined comprise the smallest exported subset of the TSDB. As of May 2008, the No Fly list contained approximately [REDACTED] records, and the Selectee list contained approximately [REDACTED] records, collectively comprising of the TSDB’s records. Additionally, the combined number of No Fly and Selectee records represents approximately [REDACTED] distinct identities, of which are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.
Process for Inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee Lists
Redundancies in the process through which individuals are added to the No Fly or Selectee list ensure that the proper individuals are watch-listed. For international terrorists, this process starts with a federal agency, usually a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, nominating an individual for inclusion in TIDE. The NCTC’s Terrorist Identities Group reviews nominations for the reliability of derogatory information and the sufficiency of biographic identifying information.
Nominating agencies can recommend an individual for inclusion on specific TSDB derivative watch lists, such as the No Fly and Selectee lists. Additionally, although the NCTC is not a nominator, its Terrorist Identities Group analysts, after reviewing all source intelligence information, may identify eligible individuals for watch-listing and contact the originator of the intelligence to request that the individual be nominated for inclusion in TIDE with specific watch list recommendations. Domestic terrorists are nominated to the TSDB via the FBI’s Terrorist Review and Examination Unit, by FBI case agents, and by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division; also, each of these can make specific watch list recommendations.
[REDACTED] the NCTC transmits to the TSC an export of additions and modifications of biographic and biometric identifiers from TIDE, resulting in additions, modifications, and deletions to the TSDB. These transmissions are collectively referred to as nominations. Analysts in the Nominations and Data Integrity Unit at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of each nomination for inclusion eligibility in the TSDB and for appropriateness of export to the various watch lists. As part of this review, TSC analysts review specific recommendations for initial No Fly or Selectee watch-listing, as well as follow-up recommendations for changes to an individual’s No Fly or Selectee status. This review ensures that recommendations are consistent with the biographic and derogatory inclusion criteria. Appendix E provides a graphic representation of the No Fly and Selectee list nomination process.
When TSC analysts recommend a change to an individual’s No Fly or Selectee status, the nomination is forwarded to TSA subject matter experts (SME), who are detailed to the TSC from TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). The SMEs review the previous analyst’s notes and all accessible derogatory information associated with the nomination. When SMEs determine that a change to the No Fly or Selectee status is warranted, TSA coordinates the change with the FBI’s Terrorist Review and Examination Unit and case agents for FBI investigative subjects, or with the NCTC for nominations from other federal agencies.
Domestic terrorism nominations go through a similar process. TSC domestic terrorism SMEs also review nominations for TSDB inclusion eligibility and for appropriateness to export to various watch lists, including the No Fly and Selectee lists. The SMEs coordinate with the Terrorist Review and Examination Unit to resolve any issues with a nomination or its watch-listing recommendation.
Other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database
In addition to the No Fly and Selectee lists, the TSDB exports daily to three other federal watch lists that are also used to conduct terrorism screening. Although none of these databases has its own minimum substantive derogatory criteria beyond the known or reasonably suspected standard, each has minimum biographic criteria requirements and some have additional restrictions.
The databases include: 1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s TECS Database,
2) Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System |The Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is a name-checking system used to screen visa applications for travel to the United States. A visa allows a foreign national to travel to a U.S. port of entry to request admittance into the country. Administered by the Visa Office within the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, CLASS is used by consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants against a number of government watch lists, including an exported subset of the TSDB. Once a CLASS name search identifies an individual, and that identity is verified, Department of State consular officers make a determination of visa eligibility according to federal law. 3) Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File and one other list: Additional Non-Federal Watch List Terrorist Screening Database Exports.
The OIG report provided one recommendation to TSA:
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration:
Recommendation #1: Determine whether it is appropriate to [REDACTED] to No Fly restrictions or additional screening prior to boarding an aircraft.
TSA Response: TSA concurred in part with this recommendation. In its response, TSA management said the nomination criteria for each list produced from the TSDB are developed and approved by a multiagency working group overseen by the Homeland Security Council. Each individual nominated to a terrorist watch list must independently meet the nomination criteria in order to be watch-listed. [REDACTED] would require an amendment to the nomination criteria.
[REDACTED] on the No Fly and Selectee lists, TSA said the only apparent and effective way to ensure that these individuals are restricted from boarding an aircraft or undergo additional screening would be to add them to the No Fly or Selectee list. TSA management said this would [REDACTED], and raises privacy and other concerns. [REDACTED] listed on the No Fly or Selectee list meet the criteria for nomination to either list, these individuals will be placed on the list.
TSA management responded further that it will need to explore this issue with other interested agencies to determine whether [REDACTED] on the No Fly and Selectee lists to these lists is a prudent step that would enhance security. However, given the privacy and rights issues involved in this recommendation, TSA management said that it is highly unlikely the lists would be [REDACTED] in this manner.
Worldwide/Xe to provide security services to U.S. government employees operating in Iraq) -- on the Nisour Square Baghdad incident writes: 
is rolling in their caves, laughing at how quickly we pick up their bait and diversion. They will send their agents of chaos on to our commercial airlines (we’re not even talking about the land borders yet!) and expect these knee jerk emotional reactions from us. Why else would they claim ownership over Mr. Underpant’s failed attack? To sow fear and terror, and more fear and terror; and to watch us, most especially our politicians as they tear each other down -- until we get so foul and twisted in our fears, we won’t know our heads from our tails. 
. They are some of the hardest working folks I know. Most work more than 8 hours or weekends and are on call 24/7 with no additional compensation. Perhaps, more than anyone else in a US mission, consular officers are dictated by manuals, guidelines, SOPs, and regulations. They are not freelancers, and the work that they do have almost zero optional parts. 
