Christmas Day Attack: Senate Judiciary Hearing

“Securing America's Safety: Improving the Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Tools and Inter-Agency Communication”

We almost missed this one.  The Senate Judiciary Committee held a full committee hearing yesterday related to the Christmas Day attack (January 20, 2010 | 10:00 AM | ROOM: Dirksen-226).  View Webcast

The Honorable Patrick Leahy



The Honorable Russ Feingold

Witness Testimony:

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III | PDF

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, DC

The Honorable David F. Heyman | PDF

Assistant Secretary for Policy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

The Honorable Patrick Kennedy | PDF

Under Secretary for Management

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC

Excerpt from U/S Patrick Kennedy testimony:

In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his father’s November 19 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the Washington intelligence and law enforcement community through proper channels (the Visas Viper system) that “Information at post suggests [that Farouk] may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.” At the same time, the Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab into the Consular Lookout and Support System database known as CLASS. In sending the Visas Viper cable and checking State Department records to determine whether Abdulmutallab had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his name, but entered it correctly into CLASS. As a result of the misspelling in the cable, information about previous visas issued to him and the fact that he currently held a valid U.S. visa was not included in the cable. At the same time the CLASS entry resulted in a lookout using the correct spelling that was shared automatically with the primary lookout system used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accessible to other agencies.

[…]

The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, we have revoked 51,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 1,700 for suspected links to terrorism.

[..]

In addition to revocation efforts, consular officers refused 1,885,017 visas in FY2009. We now are renewing guidance to our officers on their discretionary authority to refuse visas under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act with specific reference to cases that raise security concerns. No visa is issued without it being run through security checks against our partners’ data. And we screen applicants’ fingerprints against U.S. databases as well.

[..]

DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, containing 136 million records related to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and covering visa actions of the last 13 years. Special extracts of data are supplied to elements within DHS, including the Visa Security Units of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

[…]

We give other agencies immediate access to over 13 years of visa data, and they use this access extensively. In November 2009, more than 16,000 employees of DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the FBI and Commerce made 920,000 queries on visa records.

[…]

In 2009 we expanded use of facial recognition from a selected segment of visa applications to all visa applications. We now are expanding our use of this technology beyond visa records. We are testing use of iris recognition technology in visa screening, making use of both identity and derogatory information collected by DOD. These efforts require intense ongoing cooperation from other agencies.

[…]

In addition, we have 145 officers and 540 locally employed staff devoted specifically to fraud prevention and document security, including fraud prevention officers at overseas posts.

[…]

We fully recognize that we were not perfect in our reporting in connection with the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253. We are working and will continue to work not only to address that mistake but to continually enhance our border security screening capabilities and the contributions we make to the interagency effort.

Patrick F. Kennedy, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Under Secretary of State for Management on November 6, 2007. As Under Secretary for Management he is responsible for the people, resources, facilities, technology, consular affairs, and security of the Department of State and is the Secretary’s principal advisor on management issues. He also provides regular direction to the Bureau of Resource Management, and the Chief Financial Officer serves as a core member of the Under Secretary’s senior management team. The Bureau of Consular Affairs reports to him, and he reports to the Deputy Secretary Jack Lew.

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Christmas Day Attack: Failure at the “Last Tactical Mile”

The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has a hearing today on “Intelligence Reform: The Lessons and Implications of the Christmas Day Attack.” The three witnesses are: Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and Janet A. Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Security.  Blair and Leiter had a joint statement for the record. No prepared statement from Secretary Napolitano has been posted online. Excerpts below from the Blair/Leiter statement:  

As I have noted, despite our successes in identifying the overall themes that described the plot we failed to make the final connections—the “last tactical mile”—linking Abdulmutallab’s identity to the plot. We had the information that came from his father that he was concerned about his son going to Yemen, coming under the influence of unknown religious extremists, and that he was not going to return home. We also had other streams of information coming from intelligence channels that provided pieces of the story. We had a partial name, an indication of a Nigerian, but there was nothing that brought it all together—nor did we do so in our analysis.

[…]

But without making excuses for what we did not do, I think it critical that we at least note the context in which this failure occurred: Each day NCTC receives literally thousands of pieces of intelligence information from around the world, reviews literally thousands of different names, and places more than 350 people a day on the watchlist—virtually all based on far more damning information than that associated with Mr. Abdulutallab prior to Christmas Day. Although we must and will do better, we must also recognize that not all of the pieces rise above the noise level.

[…]

We established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the government’s hub for all strategic level counterterrorism intelligence assessments, which draws on collected terrorist intelligence from agencies across the U.S. Government with access to more than 30 different networks carrying more than 80 unique data repositories to produce integrated analysis on terrorist plots against U.S. interests at home and abroad.

[…]

The Intelligence Community is an adaptive, learning organization. We can and must outthink, outwork, and defeat the enemy’s new ideas. Our Intelligence Community is now more collaborative than ever before, knows how to operate as a team, and can adjust to conditions on the ground. We can and will do better, but I cannot guarantee that we can stop all attacks indefinitely. The integrated Intelligence Community as directed in the Intelligence Reform Act is essential; the basic elements of the system are sound; but we must be more flexible and anticipatory.

The hearing is on right now, catch it here.  This is not the end of the story. Part II of the hearing is scheduled for January 26^th at the Dirksen Senate Office Building (room 342).  No word yet on the expected witnesses.

Related Item:

Statement for the Record | Blair/Leiter

Quickie: Former US Ambassador on Those Yemen Myths

Image by eesti via Flickr

“In my experience, there is no deep-seeded affinity between Yemeni tribes and the Qaeda movement. Tribes tend to be opportunistic, not ideological, so the risk is that Al Qaeda will successfully exploit opportunities created by government neglect. There are also family affinities — cousins, linked to uncles, linked to brothers. These do matter. But what matters most is the “mujahedeen fraternity” — Yemenis with jihadist experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. Finally, what would matter — and significantly — would be innocent casualties resulting from counterterrorism operations, which could well set off a tribal response.”

“Forging an effective American counterterrorism policy in Yemen will be as difficult as it is necessary. But misreading Yemeni history and society can only complicate its conception and jeopardize its execution.”

Edmund J. Hull

United States Ambassador to Yemen (2001 to 2004)

from Al Qaeda’s Shadowland | NYT Op-ed | January 11, 2010

 

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US ConGen Jerusalem Sued by Former LES

Image by hoyasmeg via Flickr

The Jerusalem Post has a piece about a lawsuit filed by a locally hired employee (LES) against the US Consulate General in Jerusalem (Jan 9, 2010 22:53). Quick excerpt below:

Alleged terror ties are at the heart of a lawsuit the US Consulate in Jerusalem is fighting; it is being sued for NIS 250,000 by a former employee who the consulate discovered had ties with Hamas.

The plaintiff is Azam Qiq, who worked at the diplomatic mission until 2006 as a mechanic. His father was Hassan Qiq, the former head of Hamas in Jerusalem, who died in 2006.

Azam Qiq was hired by the consulate in 2003 and underwent a background check by its security teams. According to court documents obtained by The Jerusalem Post, during his hiring interview, Qiq said he had never been arrested or interrogated by the Israeli police.

For the next three years, Qiq worked in the consulate motor pool and was a good employee. He even received two awards from then counsel-general Jacob Walles for his exemplary service.

[…]

Qiq was fired by the consulate in September 2006.

In 2007, he filed a lawsuit against the consulate and the US government for unlawful dismissal and demanded close to NIS 250,000 in compensation. He claimed that his dismissal was not done in accordance with law, and that he did not receive severance pay.



The consulate, in its response, claimed that it had no choice but to fire Qiq. "We cannot exaggerate in emphasizing the sensitivity of having access to the consulate's motor pool, which doesn't just service consulate workers but also serves VIPs who come frequently to Jerusalem on official US government business," read the response filed with the court.

Read the whole thing here.

US Embassy Khartoum Issues Warden Msg Over Airline Threat

Image via Wikipedia

The US Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan issued a warden message alert on potential threat against Air Uganda transiting between Sudan and Kampala. Excerpt below:

Warden Message | January 8, 2010

This Warden Message alerts American citizens in Sudan to a potential threat against commercial aviation transiting between Juba, Sudan and Kampala, Uganda.  The U.S. Embassy has received information indicating a desire by regional extremists to conduct a deadly attack onboard Air Uganda aircraft on this route.  While the capacity of these extremists to carry out such an attack is unknown, the threat is of sufficient seriousness that all American air travelers should be made aware.  Air travelers on any airline and route should maintain vigilance at all times, and should report any suspicious behavior to the proper authorities.

The Department of State continues to warn against all travel to Sudan, particularly in the Darfur area, where violence involving government forces, rebel factions, and various armed militias continues.  American citizens who choose to travel to Sudan despite the existing Travel Warning, and those currently in Sudan, should review their security posture and take appropriate precautions.

Read the whole thing here.

Why can’t we have T-Hackers stay ahead of potential breaches?

Clark Kent Ervin, the former inspector general of the State Department (2001-2003) and of the Department of Homeland Security (2003 to 2004) who is currently the director of the Aspen Institute’s homeland security program recently wrote an op-ed for NYT excerpted below:





"Perhaps the biggest lesson for airline security from the recent incident is that we must overcome our tendency to be reactive. We always seem to be at least one step behind the terrorists. They find one security gap — carrying explosives onto a plane in their shoes, for instance — and we close that one, and then wait for them to exploit another. Why not identify all the vulnerabilities and then address each one before terrorists strike again?



Since the authorities have to succeed 100 percent of the time, and terrorists only once, the odds are overwhelmingly against the authorities. But they’ll be more likely to defy fate if they go beyond reflexive defense and play offense for a change."

It’s hard to argue with his point, for we clearly are reactive.  It’s as if our enemies have found our magic buttons, and they know exactly which button would get the desired reaction.

On December 2001, shoe-bomber Richard Reid made an unsuccessful attempt to blow up American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami with PETN as explosive.   According to Wikipedia, pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) is one of the most powerful high explosives known, with a relative effectiveness factor (R.E. factor) of 1.66. It is also used as a medical drug to treat heart conditions.

Soon after that, we all had to take off our shoes, get wand screenings and pat downs at security points in our airports and at airports overseas. Shoes have become weaponized; they might as well join those box cutters and a whole lot of items now enshrined in the list of prohibited items when we fly.  Some funnies and some not so funny stories here. 

In 2006, the transatlantic aircraft terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives carried on board at least 10 airliners travelling from the United Kingdom was discovered which resulted in chaos on how much liquids one can carry onto commercial aircrafts.



Imagine if you were breastfeeding or pumping milk the day those restrictions took effect? TSA says air travelers may now carry liquids, gels and aerosols in their carry-on bag when going through security checkpoints but “all liquids, gels and aerosols must be in 3.4 ounce (100ml) or smaller containers. Larger containers that are half-full or toothpaste tubes rolled up are not allowed. Each container must be 3.4 ounces (100ml) or smaller.” Somewhere, some not so nice folks are laughing.   

What are they going to think of next?

According to this report from Stratfor, when suicide-bomber Abdullah Hassan al Asiri attempted to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayef  this past August, al Asiri who was described as a human Trojan horse activated a small improvised explosive device (IED) he was carrying inside his anal cavity. (Eww!)  PETN was reportedly the explosives used. The minister survived, the bomber did not.

Then on 25 December 2009, PETN was also found in the possession of Underpants Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 while approaching Detroit from Amsterdam. Abdulmutallab allegedly tried to detonate PETN sewn into his underwear, by adding liquid from a syringe.

In the aftermath of these recent failed attempts, especially the latter, it looks like we are now faced with the distinct possibility of 1) a full body security scan which uses high frequency radio waves to produce an image of the human body to determine if passengers are smuggling items (such as drugs, cash or diamonds) in or underneath their clothing or 2) a full body scan which uses X-rays that pass through the body to trace swallowed items. Here is a good article on what Spiegel Online calls “strip search scanners.”

What are they going to think of next?  What if they succeed in putting explosives in ..... um, never mind. 

Banks hire the best hackers money can buy to steal from them—and then show them the holes in their defenses; by compromising their systems, they are able to protect their systems.  Have we done that?  According to this September 2009 GAO report on aviation security, TSA has implemented activities to assess risks to airport perimeters and access controls but has not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the nation's approximately 450 commercial airports or any consequence assessments.  We're talking just aviation here, what about the rest?



Why can’t we do the equivalent of hackers when it comes to terrorism and stay one step ahead of potential breaches? The thing is we can't pretend to seal the holes in the boat when we don't know where we are leaking.  Until we know which parts of “us” are vulnerable, we will always play catch up.  And while we are stuck with protecting ourselves for the next shoe-bombing or underpants assault, the enemy may have already imagined other more creative ways to do us harm. The attack may not even have to blow anything up -- just throw us into chaos; at significant costs to our peace of mind and sense of security, and to the taxpayers’ pockets.



You’re going to start thinking Domani Spero has gone bat crazy …

Well, okay, maybe – but hiring T-hackers, for lack of a better word, would be no more expensive than what was already spent on security screenings since 2002, or the inevitable body scanners.  For all that expense and inconvenience, we only get the perception of security.  The shoe bomber was the reason we now take off our shoes at security checkpoints in airports but PETN is a plastic explosive that is not picked up by metal detectors. So... why are we  taking off our shoes, again?

According to another GAO report, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have invested over $795 million in technologies to screen passengers at airport checkpoints since fiscal year 2002. News reports indicate that the cost of body scan machines range from 175,000-250,000 each. 

How many airports are there?  According to the Airports Council International, the United States has over 19,847 airports based on the Department of Transportation’s 2007-2011 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS). More than 3,364 of those airports are recognized by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as being open to the public.  382 are Primary Airports, defined as having more than 10,000 annual passengers.



I don’t even want to do the math. My head already hurts.

See what I like about those T-hackers? A squad of dark rangers, brainiacs who can imagine the most dastardly attacks, the most unimaginable chaos and destruction, the dark days we do not want to see in the future – they could poke holes at our security portals and blankets now before a lone wolf or some real bad guys get lucky with poking around. 

  

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On Abdulmutallab: The Dots Were Never Connected

Image by Mel's ATCs via Flickr

The White House released yesterday the preliminary review of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack of flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. Excerpted below.

The preliminary White House review of the events that led to the attempted December 25 attack highlights human errors and a series of systematic breakdowns failed to stop Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab before he was able to detonate an explosive device onboard flight 253. The most significant failures and shortcomings that led to the attempted terror attack fall into three broad categories:

• A failure of intelligence analysis, whereby the CT community failed before December 25 to identify, correlate, and fuse into a coherent story all of the discrete pieces of intelligence held by the u.s. Government related to an emerging terrorist plot against the U.S. Homeland organized by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and to Mr. Abdulmutallab, the individual terrorist;
  
  

• A failure within the CT community, starting with established rules and protocols, to assign responsibility and accountability for follow up of high priority threat streams, run down all leads, and track them through to completion; and
  
  

• Shortcomings of the watchlisting system, whereby the CT community failed to identify intelligence within u.S. government holdings that would have allowed Mr. Abdulmutallab to be watchlisted, and potentially prevented from boarding an aircraft bound for the United States.

The most significant findings of our preliminary review are:

• The U.S. Government had sufficient information prior to the attempted December 25 attack to have potentially disrupted the AQAP plot-i.e., by identifying Mr. Abdulmutallab as a likely operative of AQAP and potentially preventing him from boarding flight 253.
  
  

• The Intelligence Community leadership did not increase analytic resources working on the full AQAP threat.
  
  

• The watchlisting system is not broken but needs to be strengthened and improved, as evidenced by the failure to add Mr. Abdulmutallab to the No Fly watchlist.
  
  

• A reorganization of the intelligence or broader counterterrorism community is not required to address problems that surfaced in the review, a fact made clear by countless other successful efforts to thwart ongoing plots.

FAILURE TO WATCHLIST

Although Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was included in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), the failure to include Mr. Abdulmutallab in a watchlist is part of the overall systemic failure. Pursuant to the IRTPA, NCTC serves "as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups.,,4 As such, NCTC consolidates all information on known and suspected international terrorists in the Terrorist Identities Datarnart Environment. NCTC then makes this data available to the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which reviews nominations for inclusion in the master watchlist called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The TSC provides relevant extracts to each organization with a screening mission.

Hindsight suggests that the evaluation by watchlisting personnel of the information contained in the State cable nominating Mr. Abdulmutallab did not meet the minimum derogatory standard to watchlist. Watchlisting would have required all of the available information to be fused so that the derogatory information would have been sufficient to support nomination to be watchlisted in the Terrorist Screening Database. Watchlist personnel had access to additional derogatory information in databases that could have been connected to Mr. Abdulmutallab, but that access did not result in them uncovering the biographic information that would have been necessary for placement on the watchlist. Ultimately, placement on the No FIy List would have been required to keep Mr. Abdulmutallab off the plane inbound for the U.S. Homeland.

VISA ISSUE

Mr. Abdulmutallab possessed a U.S. visa, but this fact was not correlated with the concerns ofMr. Abdulmutallab's father about Mr. Abdulmutallab's potential radicalization. A misspelling of Mr. Abdulmutallab's name initially resulted in the State Department believing he did not have a valid U.S. visa. A determination to revoke his visa, however, would have only occurred ifthere had been a successful integration of intelligence by the CT community, resulting in his being watchlisted.

Read the whole thing here.

A couple of senior State Department officials also conducted a background briefing yesterday following the release of the WH security review. You can read it here. 

I’m sure this is not the end of it. There will be hearings on Capitol Hill.  This being an election year, well -- who knows what surprises are in the cookie jar for us.  But I expect we’ll see some of the following officials over State’s role on this and the visa angle before too long.

• HRC (maybe)
  
  


• Jacob J. Lew: Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources; he oversees “M” which has direct oversight of the Bureau of Consular Affairs.


• Patrick F. Kennedy: Under Secretary for Management or “M”; the Bureau of Consular Affairs reports to him.


• Janice L. Jacobs: Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Consular Affairs; top boss of BCA


• David T. Donahue: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services

Abdulmutallab Radicalized in London, Sana’a, where else?

The Sunday Times last week reported that Abdulmutallab had come onto MI5’s radar because of his “multiple communications” with extremists in the UK, including several radical figures at mosques.  The report quotes one Whitehall official: “This was a young man who while he was in the UK was starting his journey and was exploring an interest in radical Islam. He was making contact and reaching out to people who were MI5’s targets of interest.”

Apparently UK’s MI5 concluded that Abdulmutallab did not pose a threat to national security.  The report also says that British officials believe Abdulmutallab decided to become a suicide bomber only after leaving UCL last year and travelling to Yemen. They also think that up to a dozen young British Muslims are receiving terrorist training in that country.

The Associated Press reported yesterday that Rashad al-Alimi, Yemen’s deputy prime minister for defense and security has told reporters that Abdulmutallab was first recruited by Al-Qaida when he lived in London from 2005-2008: "During the period he was living in Britain, I believe he was recruited by radical groups in Britain."

What do we make of this?

If what the Yemini minister says is true, Abdulmutallab joins UK-born, Richard Reid, the shoe bomber who was also radicalized in London. Which makes one wonder -- how did MI5 miss these two and how many more young men starting their “journeys” have also been missed across the pond.

If what MI5 says is true, then we are faced with an equally disturbing truth – Al Qaeda could recruit, train and deploy a suicide bomber in 3-4 months.

    

Various documents on USA v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab including the 12/26/09 complaint and the 1/6/10 indictment have now been posted in cryptome.org.   

Senator Lugar on Twitter vs. Terror

Image via Wikipedia

Is the State Department ready for this brave new world?



The ranking member on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar writes a piece for Foreign Policy on “How the U.S. State Department should enable and encourage social-networking sites in the global fight for freedom (FP | Argument | January 6). Excerpts below:  

The adroit use of social networking sites, such as Twitter, Facebook, and others, coupled with text messages and increasingly widespread mobile-phone technology, can help lend support to existing grassroots movements for freedom and civil rights, connect people to information, and help those in closed societies communicate with the outside world. It also promises to give a strong economic boost to small entrepreneurs and the rural poor. The World Bank estimates that for every 10 percent increase in the number of mobile-phone users in a developing country, there is nearly a 1 percent increase in its economic output.

[…]

But social networking technologies are more often used to enable individuals across a country, or across the globe, to interact, engage, and become empowered. Although this means that our government will not be able to control the message as well as it might with conventional public diplomacy tools, I believe it is a risk worth taking. Terrorists and other anti-American propagandists have for some time been using the Internet and other techniques to communicate and recruit. America needs to beat them at their own game, especially since we invented most of the technology.

I would encourage the administration and our diplomats to be nimble, flexible, and innovative as they pursue a wide range of foreign-policy initiatives that use these new communication and connection techniques. Diplomacy and development are our best means of winning the global war of ideas, and we must come to the battle armed with the most modern tools at our disposal.

Read the whole thing here.

In 1975, Donald Warwick of Harvard University wrote "A Theory of Public Bureaucracy" a 252-page book on the Politics, Personality and Organization in the State Department where he says:  

The motivational mix in federal agencies varies, but in most cases includes heavy emphasis on security. The rewards are job tenure, regular promotions, adequate salaries, a clean work place, and better-than-average retirement benefits. Many positions, particularly at higher levels, involve inherently interesting work and offer the employee ample opportunities to express his talents. But in most established agencies, there is little call for entrepreneurship, creativity,  innovation and risk-taking. These qualities are neither solicited nor rewarded, and may be punished.

The book, by the way, is an excellent study on the oldest executive department in the union.  Although written over 30 years ago, many of the problems and organizational issues that he talks about in the book are familiar as day.

One of the reports he cited in the book is called the State Department's Task Force on the Stimulation of Creativity (can you believe that?) which concluded that "conformity is prized in the Foreign Service above all qualities." 

... The pressures to avoid rocking the boat, to avoid dress and behavior which depart from the norms of the group, to avoid expression of controversial views are of the subtle, unspoken kind which are hard to document. But we have the testimony of a broad cross section of the officers whose views we sought that they are a powerful, all pervasive influence. Such pressures, of course, are the death of the creative impulse (U.S. State Department, 1970, p.310). 

Senator Lugar in his piece makes two important points in this new engagement: 1) less control of the message and 2) nimbleness, flexibility and innovation in engagement. Both points are still kind of "foreign objects" in the State Department's galaxy.

I have no doubt that the desire to control the message is what cause the demise of Madam le Consul's blog.  The "tried and true" in the bureaucracy is often preferable than "wild ideas" or even simple new ideas.  The prevailing wisdom might be that shutting her down "protects" her and of course, by extension the mother ship.  But how can an organization presume to "beat the enemies" at their own game when it has low tolerance for  employees engaging with "friendlies" on the web.  And if you can get in trouble for saying something that has not been cleared through the 12-steps program within the mission and the bureaus, how can you encourage flexibility and innovation?        

Senator Lugar says "we must come to the battle armed with the most modern tools at our disposal."  I hate to tell Senator Lugar this.  The tools are here alright.  Bright and shiny and ready for razzle dazzle.  But "control" and "culture" have not shown up for the party.  It remains to be seen if they'll make it here before 2050.           

     

        

Quickie: Is This Really An Intelligence Failure?

This one excerpted from one of Spencer Ackerman’s recent posts: 

… And the rationale for the all-source, multi-agency NCTC is all about intelligence sharing. But remember: the inputs are that the guy’s dad says he’s dangerous; he’s Nigerian; he might be in Yemen; and al-Qaeda in Yemen may be looking to use a Nigerian in a forthcoming attack. Is that really enough?

The answer to that question most certainly requires a policy decision, not an intelligence decision. The intelligence community is drinking from a fire hose of data, a lot of it much more specific than what was acquired on Abdulmutallab. If policymakers decide that these thin reeds will be the standard for stopping someone from entering the United States, then they need to change the process to enshrine that in the no-fly system. But it will make it much harder for people who aren’t threatening to enter, a move that will ripple out to effect diplomacy, security relationships (good luck entering the U.S. for a military-to-military contact program if, say, you’re a member of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, since you had contacts with known extremists), international business and trade, and so on. Are we prepared for that?

Active links added above. Continue reading Spencer Ackerman’s post, Is This Really an Intelligence Failure? Real Talk on Abdulmutallab

The Christmas Day Airliner Attack and the Intelligence Process

By George Friedman

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

As is well known, a Nigerian national named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to destroy a passenger aircraft traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009. Metal detectors cannot pinpoint the chemical in the device he sought to detonate, PETN. The PETN was strapped to his groin. Since a detonator could have been detected, the attacker chose — or had chosen for him — a syringe filled with acid for use as an improvised alternative means to initiate the detonation. In the event, the device failed to detonate, but it did cause a fire in a highly sensitive area of the attacker’s body. An alert passenger put out the fire. The plane landed safely. It later emerged that the attacker’s father, a prominent banker in Nigeria, had gone to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria to warn embassy officials of his concerns that his son might be involved with jihadists.

The incident drove home a number of points. First, while al Qaeda prime — the organization that had planned and executed 9/11 — might be in shambles, other groups in other countries using the al Qaeda brand name and following al Qaeda prime’s ideology remain operational and capable of mounting attacks. Second, like other recent attacks, this attack was relatively feeble: It involved a single aircraft, and the explosive device was not well-conceived. Third, it remained and still remains possible for a terrorist to bring explosives on board an aircraft. Fourth, intelligence available in Nigeria, London and elsewhere had not moved through the system with sufficient speed to block the terrorist from boarding the flight.

An Enduring Threat

From this three things emerge. First, although the capabilities of jihadist terrorists have declined, their organizations remain functional, and there is no guarantee that these organizations won’t increase in sophistication and effectiveness. Second, the militants remain focused on the global air transport system. Third, the defensive mechanisms devised since 2001 remain ineffective to some degree.

The purpose of terrorism in its purest form is to create a sense of insecurity among a public. It succeeds when fear moves a system to the point where it can no longer function. This magnifies the strength of the terrorist by causing the public to see the failure of the system as the result of the power of the terrorist. Terror networks are necessarily sparse. The greater the number of persons involved, the more likely a security breach becomes. Thus, there are necessarily few people in a terror network. An ideal terror network is global, able to strike anywhere and in multiple places at once. The extent of the terror network is unknown, partly because of its security systems and partly because it is so sparse that finding a terrorist is like finding a needle in a haystack. It is the fact that the size and intentions of the terror network are unknown that generates the sense of terror and empowers the terrorist.

The global aspect is also important. That attacks can originate in many places and that attackers can belong to many ethnic groups increases the desired sense of insecurity. All Muslims are not members of al Qaeda, but all members of al Qaeda are Muslims, and any Muslim might be a member of al Qaeda. This logic is beneficial to radical Islamists, who want to increase the sense of confrontation between Islam and the rest of the world. This not only increases the sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the rest of the world, it also increases hostility toward Muslims, strengthening al Qaeda’s argument to Muslims that they are in an unavoidable state of war with the rest of the world. Equally important is the transmission of the idea that if al Qaeda is destroyed in one place, it will spring up elsewhere.

This terror attack made another point, intended or not. U.S. President Barack Obama recently decided to increase forces in Afghanistan. A large part of his reasoning was that Afghanistan was the origin of 9/11, and the Taliban hosted al Qaeda. Therefore, he reasoned the United States should focus its military operations in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, since that was the origin of al Qaeda. But the Christmas Day terror attempt originated in Yemen, a place where the United States has been fighting a covert war with limited military resources. It therefore raises the question of why Obama is focusing on Afghanistan when the threat from al Qaeda spinoffs can originate anywhere.

From the terrorist perspective, the Yemen attack was a low-cost, low-risk operation. If it succeeded in bringing down a U.S. airliner over Detroit, the psychological impact would be massive. If it failed to do so, it would certainly increase a sense of anxiety, cause the U.S. and other governments to institute new and expensive security measures, and potentially force the United States into expensive deployments of forces insufficient to dominate a given country but sufficient to generate an insurgency. If just some of these things happened, the attack would have been well worth the effort.

TSA’s New Security Directive for Enhanced Screening

Here’s a new announcement from TSA:

Today, the Transportation Security Administration issued new security directives to all United States and international air carriers with inbound flights to the U.S. effective January 4, 2010.

The new directive includes long-term, sustainable security measures developed in consultation with law enforcement officials and our domestic and international partners. Because effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders, and as a result of extraordinary cooperation from our global aviation partners, TSA is mandating that every individual flying into the U.S. from anywhere in the world traveling from or through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest will be required to go through enhanced screening. The directive also increases the use of enhanced screening technologies and mandates threat-based and random screening for passengers on U.S. bound international flights.

WaPo reports that TSA officials declined to name all the "countries of interest" on Sunday, but confirmed that the directive applies to the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The department's Web site lists Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. The report also says that “a senior administration official identified the following as terrorism-prone nations or countries of interest to U.S. intelligence agencies: Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen.”

The NYT on its coverage (U.S. Intensifies Air Screening for Fliers From 14 Nations) points out that these new changes will mean that “any citizen of Pakistan or Saudi Arabia will for the first time be patted down automatically before boarding any flight to the United States. Even if that person has lived in a country like Britain for decades, he now will be subject to these extra security checks.”

Nigeria has already criticized its inclusion under the new air passenger screening saying "It is unfair to discriminate against 150 million people because of the behaviour of one person."

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Pete Hoektra’s Exquisite Art of the Non-Answer

This Week had Terry Moran with Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan and a congressional panel with Representative Jane Harman, Sens. Susan Collins, Joe Lieberman and Representative Pete Hoekstra who is currently running for Governor in Michigan. You have to give it to Terry, for trying. Excerpted from the transcript.  

MORAN: One more note on politics, Congressman Hoekstra. Once upon a time, there was a tradition of solidarity in refraining from criticizing the president at the time the nation was under attack. Three days after this attempt to kill 300 people over the skies of Detroit, you sent out a fundraising letter, and I'd -- I'd like to read a portion of it so our audience gets the full flavor of it.

You said, "I have pledged that I will do everything possible to prevent these terrorists from coming to Michigan, but I need your help. If you agree that we need a governor who will stand up to the Obama-Pelosi efforts to weaken our security, please make a most generous contribution of $25, $50 or $100, or even $250, to my campaign." Given that tradition, that once was part of this country, are you proud of that, of fundraising off of a national crisis like that?

HOEKSTRA: Well, I've been leading on national security for the last nine years that I've been on the Intelligence Committee. You know, over the last two to three months, I've been very concerned about where there administration has taken us on national security issues.

The refusal to acknowledge that the Fort Hood attack was a terrorist attack...

MORAN: But I'm asking about raising money off the attempted murder of 300 people three days after it occurred.

HOEKSTRA: I -- I am proud of the role that I have played in making sure that America is safe.

MORAN: And raising money off it?

HOEKSTRA: I've been right on the facts all along on this -- on the recent attacks, the connections with Yemen. The -- the differences between this administration and myself have been purely substantive. They have been policy. I've been trying to drive this administration in a policy direction that keeps America safe.

I think if you listen to the language that we have heard over this -- this morning, with the guests that you've had on the program, we are now at a point where we have come back. We've got -- we've got some political disagreements or policy -- excuse me -- we've got some policy agreements, but we also have a recognition that this threat is real, it is imminent, and that we need to come together in a bipartisan basis to fix it.

MORAN: All right.

Ah, shame on you, Terry Moran! How dare you question that somebody who has been leading on national security for years?  Just because he’s running for governorship in a state with over 15% unemployment, raising funds off the attempted murder of 300 people three days after it occurred doesn’t mean he is an opportunistic loaf of bread ... or does it? We need more people like him who can scare us out of our wits; because if not him, who will? If not now, when?

No better time than now to say boo!

Watch out! This is going to get louder, folks...

This Week had Terry Moran with Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan and a congressional panel with Representatives Pete Hoekstra and Jane Harman, Sens. Susan Collins, and Joe Lieberman. Excerpted from the transcript.  

COLLINS: The problem with profiling is, if you take that approach, you're going to miss the Richard Reids, who do not fit the profile. But what we have in this case was a failure to act on a very credible report from the terrorist's father that should, at the very least, have caused the State Department to revoke his visa.

To me, that is the biggest question. Why wasn't this individual's visa revoked once we had such a credible report that he posed a threat? That, to me, is an even bigger failure than the failure to screen him effectively.

LIEBERMAN: We know from past experience that some of them will be back in the fight against us. The leader of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula broke out of a jail there until we killed him, apparently, in the raid Christmas week.

So we've -- we've got a lot to investigate. But I think we've learned a lot already about how to close some of the holes. I believe, incidentally, that we ought to take a look at taking that visa application and admission responsibility from the State Department. It doesn't really fit with foreign policy anymore. And in an age of terrorism, I think the Department of Homeland Security ought to be handling visas abroad.

I also think that we ought to be very much tougher about terrorism watch list. If somebody -- somebody's father comes in and -- and says he may be an extremist, he ought to go on a list that is -- is alerted any time he approaches, as Abdulmutallab did...

Vroom…vroom….

US Embassy Sana’a Closes Over Al Qaeda Threats

Image via Wikipedia

The US Embassy in Yemen has released the following statement on its temporary closure:

The U.S. Embassy in Sana’a is closed today, January 3, 2010, in response to ongoing threats by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to attack American interests in Yemen.

On December 31, the U.S. Embassy sent a warden message to Americans citizens in Yemen to remind them of the continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against American citizens and interests throughout the world.

Excerpt from the December 31 Security Warden Message:

"The U.S. Embassy in Yemen encourages U.S. citizens to follow good security practices and maintain situational awareness. Following the attempted attack aboard Northwest Airlines flight 253, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) publicly claimed responsibility for the incident and stated that it was in response to American interference in Yemen. In the same statement, the group made threats against Westerners working in embassies and elsewhere, characterizing them as “unbelievers” and “crusaders.” The U.S. Embassy would like to take this opportunity to remind Americans of the continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against American citizens and interests throughout the world and urge U.S. citizens to maintain a high level of vigilance."

The embassy is normally open from Saturday through Wednesday.  For updates on the embassy’s warden message, check out the Citizen Services page here.

Updated: January 4

The US Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen remains closed today, Monday, January 4, 2010, in response to ongoing threats by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to attack American interests in Yemen.  According to the embassy "all American Citizens Services and visa appointments for both yesterday and today have been cancelled and will be rescheduled."  Check out the Citizen Services page for updates here.

Quickie: Suicide Bomber Kills Eight at FOB Chapman

Worst single-day
casualty toll Since Beirut

Joby Warrick in
today’s issue of the Washington Post writes about a suicide attack that killed
8 American civilians in Afghanistan (Suicide
bomber attacks CIA base in Afghanistan, killing at least 8 Americans
| WaPo | December 31, 2009). Quick excerpts below:

A suicide bomber
infiltrated a CIA base in eastern Afghanistan
on Wednesday, killing at least eight Americans in what is believed to be the
deadliest single attack on U.S. intelligence personnel in the eight-year-long
war and one of the deadliest in the agency's history, U.S. officials said.

The attack
represented an audacious blow to intelligence operatives at the vanguard of
U.S. counterterrorism operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan,
killing officials whose job involves plotting strikes against the Taliban, al-Qaeda
and other extremist groups that are active on the frontier between the two
nations. The facility that was targeted -- Forward Operating Base Chapman -- is
in the eastern Afghan province of Khost, which borders North Waziristan, the
Pakistani tribal area that is believed to be al-Qaeda's home base.

[…]

A former senior
agency official said it was the worst single-day casualty toll for the agency
since eight CIA officers were killed in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut in April 1983.

Read the whole
thing here.

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US Embassy Jakarta Issues Warden Message on Bali Warning

Image by FriskoDude via Flickr

On December 31, 2009,
the US Embassy in Jakarta issued the following Warden Message on Bali. Reprinted
in part below:

The Bali Tourism Board widely distributed this message: “The
Governor of Bali Mr. Mangku Pastika wishes to share a message with all of us:
‘There is an indication of an attack to Bali tonight,’ but please don’t panic,
but put your security system to full alert.”  This message is shared
verbatim for your information. The safety and security recommendations in our
Consular Information Sheet, quoted below, remain valid.

“Indonesian police and security forces take active measures
against both ongoing threats posed by terrorist cells, including Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization that
carried out several bombings at various times from 2002 to 2009 and outbreaks
of violence elsewhere.  While Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts have
been ongoing and partly successful, violent elements have demonstrated a
willingness and ability to carry out deadly attacks with little or no warning. 
Most recently, in November 2009, unknown assailants shot at foreigners in Banda
Aceh, North Sumatra, an area that was devastated by the 2004 tsunami and the
scene of a long-running separatist conflict that ended in 2005.  The
gunfire wounded a European development worker.  A house occupied by U.S.
citizen teachers was targeted and hit by gunfire, but there were no U.S.
citizen casualties.  In July 2009, attacks by armed assailants in Papua
resulted in several deaths, including security personnel and one Australian
national.  Also in July, suspected JI elements bombed two Western hotels
in Jakarta, killing nine Indonesians and foreigners and injuring over 50,
including six U.S. citizens.  U.S. citizens in Indonesia must be
physically and mentally prepared to cope with future attacks even as they go
about their normal daily routines.

Extremists may target both official and private interests,
including hotels, clubs and shopping centers.  While it may be difficult
to modify one’s behavior to counter risks in a country where places in which
U.S. citizens and other Westerners must congregate to live and work are well
known and few in number, it is also extremely necessary.  In their work
and daily living activities, and while traveling, U.S. citizens should be vigilant
and prudent at all times.  We urge U.S. citizens to monitor local news
reports, vary their routes and times, and maintain a low profile.  U.S.
citizens must consider the security and safety preparedness of hotels,
residences, restaurants, and entertainment or recreation venues that they
frequent.”

Americans living and traveling in Indonesia are urged to register and update
their contact information with the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, U.S. Consulate
General in Surabaya, U.S. Consulate Medan or U.S. Consular Agency in
Bali.  Registration facilitates the U.S. Mission’s contact with Americans
in emergency situations, and may be done on line and in advance of
travel.  Information on registering can be found at the U.S. Department of
State’s Consular Affairs website at http://travelregistration.state.gov
and at the Embassy’s website at http://jakarta.usembassy.gov.  All Travel Warnings,
Travel Alerts, Worldwide Cautions, and recent warden messages are posted on the
Embassy website.

Read the whole thing here.

Note that Warden
Messages are not easily visible on the main page of the US Embassy’s website.  When checking for updates, click on American Citizen Services,
and select Notices
to Americans.