Front Office: Exhibit A for Poor Behavior and Bad Management

NDS had this piece up last week If Something Looks Wrong, It Invariably Is. A good must read, especially if you are a consular officer.  One of the anonymous comments from that post said:  "The real problem is the fact that the State Department does not want to enforce its own rules. If you don't believe me, please go to www.fsgb.gov and look at grievance case 2004-061, from Sana'a, Yemen. This one should have been resolved in the grievant's favor at the agency level instead of having been appealed to the FSGB."

We have always been a curious cat; it’s a surprise we still have all our appendages together.  In any case, we went digging up the case from the FSGB or the Foreign Service Grievance Board.  And ta-da – you can read the PDF file of this case here (original word document converted to PDF for accessibility).  Of course, like all cases in the FSGB website, this one is also scrubbed of post names, dates, or the names of the individuals involved (except in one page, where we have a first name as a clue).

The FSGB document made mention that the “Grievant was Chief of the Consular Section at the American Embassy in {Host City}, {Host Country} during the bombing of the {Terrorist Event} and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.”  The immediate terrorist event prior to 9/11 was the bombing of USS Cole at the port of Aden, in Yemen in 2000.  It also cited the US attack on Afghanistan on October 8 (2001) when “core staff stayed in the Embassy 24 hours a day for 3 days.”  Further, it mentions Mildred Patterson “[O]n February 9, grievant’s Career Development Officer informed her that Mildred Patterson (Director, CA/EX) was willing to call the DCM or Ambassador to discuss the leave situation, since grievant was now talking about curtailing over the DCM’s micro-management, perceived harassment, and the annual leave controversy.” Are these good enough clues?

So-- from best I could tell this case came about from an EER covering the rating period around 2000-2002. Now, the folks who are Exhibit “A” for poor behavior and bad management here are senior rank career Foreign Service officers (although I won’t be surprised if the DCM is an FS-01 on stretch assignment).  The grievant was an FS-02 Consular Officer, and the controversial Excursion Tour Civil Servant (ETCS) filled-in an FS-03 position, a four-grade stretch position. An FS-03 is equivalent to a GS-12.  This one went from what -- GS-8 to like GS-12? Holy mother of goat and all her crazy nephews! How’d that happen, I wonder?

I should note that no political appointee ever served as US Ambassador to Yemen. But after reading this case -- makes one think – you know, at least bad behavior from political appointees lasts no more than 4-8 years tops; career officers who are bad managers just get recycled from one post to the next. I wonder where these folks went?  Not all Front Office are like this, of course, but this one is so utterly dreadful and not just because of that Superior Honor Award.   

       

Record of Proceedings | FSGB No. 2004-061

Date:  June 8, 2005 | DECISION - EXCISION

Overview:

Grievant, an FS-02 Consular Officer, appeals the Department of State’s denial of her grievance alleging that her April {Year} to April {Year} Employee Evaluation Report (EER) is inaccurate and falsely prejudicial, causing the Selection Board to low rank her in {Year}.  For relief she requests removal of the contested language from the EER, replacement of the low-ranking with a mid-ranking, a reconstituted Selection Board and an additional year of time-in-class (TIC).

Grievant was Chief of the Consular Section at the American Embassy in {Host City}, {Host Country} during the bombing of the {Terrorist Event} and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.  The DCM and Ambassador were her rating and reviewing officers.  For security reasons, the Consulate was closed to the public for all but emergency citizen services for most of the rating period.  However, work continued and grievant was assisted in the Consular Section by TDY officers and local staff.  In late August {Year} an Excursion Tour Civil Servant (ETCS) arrived at post to fill an FS-03 position.  She was in a four-grade stretch position with almost no prior consular experience.  Five of the critical statements in the EER concerned grievant’s integration and management of the ETCS and designating an acting head of section.  The other two dealt with grievant’s need to be more responsive and sympathetic to services required by her colleagues.

Grievant contends that her relations with the DCM were tense because of his attempts to micromanage the Consular Section and Front Office attempts to circumvent visa referral procedures.  The situation deteriorated after arrival of the ETCS because, although she had a difficult personality, shouted at other officers, did not follow orders, etc., she had a special relationship with the Ambassador and unrestricted access to the Front Office, where she complained about grievant.  Grievant alleges that the Ambassador assisted the ETCS with aspects of her EER and directed grievant’s successor to nominate the ETCS for a Superior Honor Award, which she later received.  She asserts that though she consulted with the DCM on matters pertaining to the ETCS, she was never counseled on better integrating her into her section.  Grievant asserts that in early January {Year} she requested annual leave in late February.  Numerous times grievant discussed with the DCM naming the newly arrived Junior Officer who showed promise as acting head of section over the higher ranking, but inexperienced and unreliable ETCS, but he offered no guidance.  Later, he conditioned approval of her leave on her designating the acting head first, as well as insisting that a consular officer be on duty during part of her leave (in addition to the Embassy duty officer).

The Department solicited statements from a number of individuals present at the Embassy during the rating period, but chose to rely on and quote extensively from lengthy statements by the DCM and Ambassador in support of their EER criticisms in reaching its decision to deny the grievance.  Despite the fact that grievant’s counseling certificate was not drafted and signed by the DCM until four months after the session, the agency asserts that grievant was counseled on managing the ETCS.  It contends that even if an inappropriate relationship existed between the Ambassador and ETCS, a skilled supervisor would have been able to rise to the challenge and handle the difficult situation effectively.  It discounts grievant’s claims that it neglected to give any weight to statements from colleagues about the ETCS or grievant’s responsiveness to Country Team needs by maintaining that the statements do not support a conclusion that the relationship was not solely professional and that in a previous decision this Board found that a supervisor has a stronger vantage point from which to evaluate an employee’s performance, having knowledge of the broader picture and the impact of employee actions on the organization.

The Board determined that the grievant had carried her burden of proof.  In contrast to statements by the DCM and Ambassador, whether solicited by grievant or the Department, numerous statements in the record offered by Embassy colleagues, staff and local employees, overwhelmingly support grievant’s positions on the issues.  The Board found that the relationship between the ETCS and Ambassador made it impossible for grievant to adjust her management style to better integrate the officer into the unit.  By all accounts, grievant was an extremely hard-working, discreet, nurturing supervisor who provided guidance and training for her staff.  She was placed in an untenable position of supervising an inexperienced, temperamental employee who did not follow instructions and who was unhappy with the work and restricted security environment.  The Department has offered nothing in support of its position that a skilled supervisor would be able to successfully rise to meet the management challenge presented here.

Criticisms of grievant’s non-responsiveness to Country Team visa referral requests are equally unsupported.  Security checks and visa processing requirements changed drastically in the wake of the terrorist attacks.  Grievant could not issue visas any sooner than when authorization was received from the Department.  Once again, statements by grievant’s colleagues were specific in mentioning the lack of understanding by the Front Office in grievant’s attempts to do things right.

Likewise, the Board found criticisms for failure to more timely designate her back-up or more adequate explanations for the delay to be falsely prejudicial.  The DCM never indicated how far in advance he considered reasonable.  Grievant apparently named her back-up and the DCM approved her leave request one week in advance.  It is uncontested that there were numerous discussions on this difficult issue, yet instead of offering guidance, the DCM conditioned approval of her leave on inappropriate demands, which precipitated Department intervention.

The Board was not persuaded that grievant had been counseled on her management of the ETCS, but even were she counseled, the Board would have found the criticism falsely prejudicial because of the special relationship between the Ambassador and ETCS.  The Board held that it was patently unfair to criticize grievant for a situation the Ambassador created and which the DCM allowed to continue.

The Board found that the EER did not meet reasonable standards of completeness, balance, accuracy and documentation.  The rater and reviewer were biased against grievant to the point that they were unable to give a fair and reasonable assessment of her performance or potential.  The Department was directed to expunge the EER, nullify the low-ranking, replace it with a gap memo and mid-ranking, and extend grievant’s TIC by one year.

Related Items:

Foreign Service Grievance Board: Case 2004-061 | DECISION - EXCISION | Date:  June 8, 2005 | PDF

Foreign Service blog:  Jen and Michael Kolodner's Yemen Stories and Pics (2001-2002)

Af/Pak Stabilization Strategery: The Missing Number

The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan released its Af/Pak Regional Stabilization Strategy (January 2010) last week.  Briefly -- nearly 1,000 personnel on the ground by early 2010 and some 20-30% additional staffing after that.  I’ve dug up an OIG report from last year that talks about staff expansion of protective service in Afghanistan.  If the OIG number actually means 14 FSOs to each of the new consulates in Mazar and Herat plus 67 protective service personnel in each location – that amounts to almost 5 security contract personnel for every direct hire employee.  And we’re not even talking yet about the additional protective service and life support requirements for the 1,000+ surge personnel.

The $400 million indicated below as resource requirement is probably nowhere closed to the actual amount when personal protective service and life support services are taken into account.  Since we unavoidably are going to “surge” the contractors into Afghanistan – shouldn't we have those numbers?  Just because we can’t see them, doesn’t mean we’re not paying for them. 

By the way, you must see this numbers from Sam Stein about how the Top Defense Contractors Spent $27 Million Lobbying At Time Of Afghan Surge Announcement. Ugh!

Excerpt from Af/Pak Stabilization Strategy: PDF | HTML

Hundreds of civilian experts have answered that call to service, and we are now in the midst of the most significant deployment of U.S. civilian expertise to a war zone in decades. The increase, coordinated by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, includes some of the top experts from 10 different U.S. government departments and agencies. Many have previous experience in Afghanistan or other conflict environments. U.S. civilian experts contribute to the mission in field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama will deploy. They partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of national and sub-national government institutions, and to help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors. When their tours are complete, permanent civilian experts are encouraged to continue service on Afghanistan or Pakistan, in Washington or abroad, as well as to help in training their successors. Our goal is to create a cadre of civilian expertise on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Enhanced Civilian Presence: The vast majority of civilian experts deploy to Afghanistan for a minimum of one year. Under the first phase of this uplift, the civilian footprint in Afghanistan will triple from roughly 300 personnel on the ground in January 2009 to nearly 1,000 on the ground by early 2010. We anticipate further increasing our civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30 percent, concentrating experts in the field and at key ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan people. Each U.S. civilian hires or works with an average of 10 Afghans and other implementing partner personnel. Additionally, civilians act as force multipliers for military personnel, helping build relationships with local community leaders and coordinate military civil affairs projects with civilian programs. Civilian personnel will remain deployed in significant numbers even after the security situation improves and our combat troops come home.

Expanded Presence in Ministries and Outside of Kabul: Responding to the Afghan government’s request for targeted technical assistance, we are placing more than 50 additional civilian advisors in core Afghan ministries. Outside of Kabul, we are deploying several hundred additional personnel to more than 50 locations. In addition to staffing PRTs, civilians are living and working alongside forward deployed military units in District Support Teams (DSTs). Civilians will also extend our permanent diplomatic presence outside of Kabul by staffing new consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, which will serve as assistance platforms for the North and West and also symbolize our long-term, increasingly normal relationship with Afghanistan.

Resource Requirements

Resources available to meet requirements from FY 2010 and prior year appropriations: approximately $400 million.           

* * *

A publicly released OIG audit of USTC/Blackwater/Xe’s performance in Afghanistan in 2009 includes this item:

"The Department has decided to open consulates in the north of Afghanistan at Mazar-e-Sharif and in the west at Herat. According to Department cable 027341 of March 29, 2009, 14 Foreign Service Officers will be deployed to these locations in 2009. USTC has submitted a proposal to add 67 personnel to each location. The RSO in Kabul has reported that the security threat in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat is considerably lower security than in Kabul."



This IG report was prepared last year; before rockets were fired on the new consulate site in western Afghanistan.  

Related Items:

-01/21/10 Af/Pak Regional Stabilization Strategy (January 2010) HTLM

-08/31/09   Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08) Aug 09

Why USAID, Combat Boots PD in Haiti, and the Hanging “F” Part II

Former USAID Administrator Explains Why USAID is the Right Lead in Haiti

J. Brian Atwood, currently dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, who was USAID Administrator during the Clinton Administration writes about Haiti's Tragedy and the Inevitable Controversy for the Huffington Post on January 20. Excerpt below:

[…] The relief challenge is extraordinary, requiring the removal of bodies, the treatment of the wounded, and the feeding and care of millions of people.

Complicating the effort is a chorus of critics who believe the response would be faster and more efficient under different leadership. They argue that the military or FEMA should be in the lead for the US Government rather than USAID. I have heard these appeals before when serving as the government's coordinator for relief efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti.

Our aid agency's Office of Disaster Assistance is statutorily authorized to respond to foreign disasters, both natural and man-made, and there is a logic to this. The office is staffed by professionals who understand the international community's relief organizations, the network of non-governmental groups that contribute so much to the effort, and the local culture. They are experienced in working in developing countries and understand the complexities of these environments. They also understand how to prepare the relief phase for the reconstruction and development phases down the road.

Other federal, state and local responder agencies including the US military, the Communicable Disease Center and major fire and rescue departments are seconded to OFDA. These organizations train together to handle foreign disasters. The OFDA operations center in the USAID building is as modern and efficient as any in Washington and in it you will see uniformed personnel sitting alongside USAID officers and representatives of other civilian agencies.

Our military units and FEMA do a great job in the context of their own primary missions, and they are occasionally brought into a very serious disaster to augment OFDA. When FEMA handles a disaster, it is operating in an American state that can bring resources and institutions into play. National Guard units and police forces are mobilized to help in the effort. Leaving the Katrina hurricane failure aside, FEMA at its best can cope with the disasters it faces in the United States. However, I would not want to see FEMA operating in a developing country. It would not have a clue what to expect.

Read the whole thing here.

Combat Boots Public Diplomacy in Haiti

Over at the U. S. Naval Institute (non-profit, professional military association of more than 50,000 members) Galrahn has blogged recently about how Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots.

Countries like France are exactly right to call US actions in Haiti as “occupation” even if it is not true, because in case you haven’t noticed, every US spokesman on TV and covered in press conferences involved in public diplomacy from the ground in Haiti wears combat boots.

[…]

There are serious coordination issues in Haiti, and it isn’t just the US with the UN or NGOs, because we would also not appear to be coordinating with other countries responding from sea, including NATO ships! The airport will not be able to meet the demand of inbound flights no matter how excellent a job the USAF 1st SOG does. Who is coordinating the effort at sea and in the port? How is it even possible that a Dutch naval ship is the first ship to unload materials in Port-au-Prince with all those US ships working on the port facilities, and at the exact same time the General is telling reporters something completely different? Did General Keen even know the Dutch ship was there when he was talking to reporters?

[..]

Everyone should understand why the DoD is being asked to carry the load in Haiti, but it is critical you also understand why USAID or the State Department should be in charge in Haiti even though you can’t name who the top US civilian leader is in Haiti right now. The DoD budget is going to be somewhere around $700 billion with supplemental budgets in FY2011, and that gets compared to a USAID budget of $4 billion and the State Department budget of about $65 billion. Obviously the catastrophe in Haiti is beyond the means of either USAID and State to handle the problem, but does that also mean neither agency can’t afford to have a leader inside Haiti to lead the US effort?

[…]

If the DoD is not the lead agency, and I do not under any circumstances believe they should be, why is the DoD being made the face of leadership in Haiti? Who and where is the Obama administration’s appointed representative? Rajiv Shah is in Washington DC, so who is running the show in Haiti? I do wonder if SOUTHCOM leaders are too buried in the internal politics of the UN and Haiti on the ground to support the relief efforts that involve the rest of the world, because General Keen seemed completely oblivious to what the Dutch were doing at the port – and activities at the port should be priority one.

When you don’t know the name of the top US civilian leader in the Haitian relief effort, there is a serious political leadership problem.

Read the whole thing here.

Rajiv Shah in DC and the Hanging “F”

Josh Rogin of The Cable writes Inside the Haiti response situation room yesterday which tells us a bit more about the USAID operation and what I’ve come to call “the hanging “F.”

"People have been working flat out 24/7. Some folks have been up until 5 a.m.," Susan Reichle, the USAID official who heads the coordination effort, told The Cable.

Reichle is not in charge of the entire relief effort -- her boss, USAID chief Rajiv Shah is -- but her shop is the clearinghouse through which the information is channeled up and down the chain within the U.S. government.

"It's a way for all that information at Port-au-Prince to come up to the interagency and a way for us to get messages back to Port-au-Prince from here," she said. "We deconflict issues and problems all day."

The interagency team is led by USAID's Office for Disaster Assistance, but has representation from an alphabet soup of government entities, including DHS, FEMA, the Coast Guard, DOD, the Joints Chiefs, OSD, OCHA, HHS, the State Department, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.

Shah isn't in the room. He's busy interfacing with top officials and lawmakers. Shah met with national security advisor Jim Jones yesterday, speaks with people like State Department counselor Cheryl Mills and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen regularly, and went to Capitol Hill today to brief House appropriators.

But Shah "is the decision maker," Reichle emphasized.

In the long term, it's not clear that USAID will remain in charge. Although President Obama announced an initial $100 million for Haiti relief, a long-term budget is being put together at State's Bureau of Foreign Assistance, the "F" Bureau, led by Rob Goldberg.  In the past, USAID administrators have supervised the F Bureau, but under the current arrangement its money (as well as USAID's) is controlled by Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew, rather than Shah.

Read the whole thing here. 

Uh-oh! I have a funny feeling about all this.

Secretary Clinton on Internet Freedom

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gives a speech on Internet freedom at the Newseum in Washington, DC. | Jan, 21, 2009. | Duration: 59:44



"Our foreign policy is premised on the idea that no country more than America stands to benefit when there is cooperation among peoples and states. And no country shoulders a heavier burden when conflict and misunderstanding drive nations apart. So we are well placed to seize the opportunities that come with interconnectivity. And as the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good. To do that, we need to develop our capacity for what we call, at the State Department, 21^st century statecraft.

Realigning our policies and our priorities will not be easy. But adjusting to new technology rarely is. When the telegraph was introduced, it was a source of great anxiety for many in the diplomatic community, where the prospect of receiving daily instructions from capitals was not entirely welcome. But just as our diplomats eventually mastered the telegraph, they are doing the same to harness the potential of these new tools as well."

Read Full Text

Quickie: State Department Arm Wrestling with the Pentagon

And the winner is ….

Josh Rogin of The Cable has this piece yesterday: Pentagon wins turf war with State over military aid. Quick excerpt: 

One big chunk of funding at issue is in foreign security assistance, known as the "1206" account, which could total about $500 million next year. This is money used to do things like military training and joint operations with countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Indonesia and Somalia.

Since the military doesn't have the lead in those countries, the funding should flow through State, right? Well, not in 2011. The president's budget will keep those funds in the Pentagon's purse in its Feb. 1 budget release, following a pitched internal battle in which the State Department eventually conceded.

"That literally is the result of vigorous arm wrestling within the administration," one source familiar with the discussions said. The battle had been waged primarily between the shops of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro, but finally Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew got involved.

[…]

Overall, State is expected to receive a hefty increase in its top-line budget request for fiscal 2011, but much of that money will be for Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing little growth in the rest of the State-USAID accounts.

The slow pace of rebalancing national security spending and the lack of a comprehensive strategy for guiding that process is the subject of a new book by former OMB national security funding chief Gordon Adams, entitled Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home.

"The tool kit is out of whack," Adams told The Cable. "There's been a major move over the last 10 years to expand the Defense Department's agenda, which has been creeping into the foreign-policy agenda in new and expensive ways."

Read the whole thing here.

Christmas Day Attack: Senate Judiciary Hearing

“Securing America's Safety: Improving the Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Tools and Inter-Agency Communication”

We almost missed this one.  The Senate Judiciary Committee held a full committee hearing yesterday related to the Christmas Day attack (January 20, 2010 | 10:00 AM | ROOM: Dirksen-226).  View Webcast

The Honorable Patrick Leahy



The Honorable Russ Feingold

Witness Testimony:

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III | PDF

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Washington, DC

The Honorable David F. Heyman | PDF

Assistant Secretary for Policy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

The Honorable Patrick Kennedy | PDF

Under Secretary for Management

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC

Excerpt from U/S Patrick Kennedy testimony:

In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his father’s November 19 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the Washington intelligence and law enforcement community through proper channels (the Visas Viper system) that “Information at post suggests [that Farouk] may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.” At the same time, the Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab into the Consular Lookout and Support System database known as CLASS. In sending the Visas Viper cable and checking State Department records to determine whether Abdulmutallab had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his name, but entered it correctly into CLASS. As a result of the misspelling in the cable, information about previous visas issued to him and the fact that he currently held a valid U.S. visa was not included in the cable. At the same time the CLASS entry resulted in a lookout using the correct spelling that was shared automatically with the primary lookout system used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accessible to other agencies.

[…]

The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, we have revoked 51,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 1,700 for suspected links to terrorism.

[..]

In addition to revocation efforts, consular officers refused 1,885,017 visas in FY2009. We now are renewing guidance to our officers on their discretionary authority to refuse visas under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act with specific reference to cases that raise security concerns. No visa is issued without it being run through security checks against our partners’ data. And we screen applicants’ fingerprints against U.S. databases as well.

[..]

DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, containing 136 million records related to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and covering visa actions of the last 13 years. Special extracts of data are supplied to elements within DHS, including the Visa Security Units of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

[…]

We give other agencies immediate access to over 13 years of visa data, and they use this access extensively. In November 2009, more than 16,000 employees of DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the FBI and Commerce made 920,000 queries on visa records.

[…]

In 2009 we expanded use of facial recognition from a selected segment of visa applications to all visa applications. We now are expanding our use of this technology beyond visa records. We are testing use of iris recognition technology in visa screening, making use of both identity and derogatory information collected by DOD. These efforts require intense ongoing cooperation from other agencies.

[…]

In addition, we have 145 officers and 540 locally employed staff devoted specifically to fraud prevention and document security, including fraud prevention officers at overseas posts.

[…]

We fully recognize that we were not perfect in our reporting in connection with the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253. We are working and will continue to work not only to address that mistake but to continually enhance our border security screening capabilities and the contributions we make to the interagency effort.

Patrick F. Kennedy, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Under Secretary of State for Management on November 6, 2007. As Under Secretary for Management he is responsible for the people, resources, facilities, technology, consular affairs, and security of the Department of State and is the Secretary’s principal advisor on management issues. He also provides regular direction to the Bureau of Resource Management, and the Chief Financial Officer serves as a core member of the Under Secretary’s senior management team. The Bureau of Consular Affairs reports to him, and he reports to the Deputy Secretary Jack Lew.

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• Security Lapses Are Being Addressed, Officials Tell Panel (nytimes.com)


• Intel chief concedes errors in Christmas bomb case (sfgate.com)

Snapshot: USTC/Blackwater/Xe in Afghanistan

2,730 missions | 0 casualties | 0 incidents with deadly force

This is the personal security contractor that everybody loves to hate. State’s Inspector General’s Office conducted a performance audit of the U.S. Training Center (a Xe company) contract in Afghanistan last year and had some good things to say:     

“In 2008, USTC conducted 2,730 personal protection missions in support of staff from the Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, USAID, and various Congressional delegations (see Table). In 2008, 257 (9.4 percent) of the missions were performed for USAID. During the entire time USTC has operated in Afghanistan, no one under USTC’s protection has been injured or killed, and there have been no incidents involving the use of deadly force. OIG observed personal protection missions and interviewed various representatives from the Department of State and USAID who regularly use USTC’s personal protective services. The representatives reported that USTC employees are professional, make them feel secure, and are respectful to both officials under chief of mission authority and their Afghan counterparts.”

Staff composition as of April 8, 2009

USTC staff consists of a project manager, personal security specialists, administrative and support employees, and interpreters, as well as local guards who are third-country nationals. As of April 2009, there was one project manager, 75 personal security specialists, 18 administrative and support personnel, 20 local guard force personnel, and five interpreters (94 Americans, 20 Columbians, and five Afghan interpreters).

On the need for a dedicated Contracting Officer’s Representative to Embassy Kabul to provide proper oversight of contractor activities, the OIG reports:

Despite its overall satisfactory contract management, DS could improve its performance in two areas, both of which have been mentioned in previous OIG reports. First, two Assistant Regional Security Officers at Embassy Kabul are currently acting as Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR). These officers’ many other duties may prevent them from providing adequate oversight of the USTC contract, particularly as personal protective service needs increase in Afghanistan. Second, the current acting CORs do not review or verify the personnel rosters (muster sheets) before they are sent to USTC and then DS in Washington, DC.

The OIG report concludes that “USTC personal protective services have been effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in Afghanistan’s volatile security environment. Additionally, OIG found USTC has effective control over government-furnished equipment. Nevertheless, OIG has identified several areas in which contractor performance could be improved.”  The audit provides a 6-item recommendation. You can read it here.

Actually not just OIG.  Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, our former Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007)  last December also had this to say at a congressional hearing:  "I would like to pay special tribute to the brave and hard working personnel, RSOs and ARSOs, who have protected me and my missions in dangerous times. I would also like to acknowledge my respect for the men of DynCorp and Blackwater who ran my personal protection details in Iraq and Afghanistan. They performed with courage, judgment and restraint and one lost his leg in the process. Whatever opprobrium now attaches to others I owe all those gallant men—State Department and contractor employees--my gratitude and I am glad to have a public forum in which to express it."

Related Item:

OIG Report No. MERO-A-09-08, Performance Audit of the USTC Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan - Aug. 2009 | PDF

People Finder Tools to Help Locate Relatives Missing in Haiti

State Department’s ‘Person Finder’

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced on Friday the launch of a new tool, the “Person Finder,” to allow people to find and share information on missing loved ones in Haiti. This tool and other relief information can also be found at http://www.state.gov/haitiquake.

Here is part of the statement on the release of State’s Person Finder:  People around the world are turning to the Internet to search for information on friends and family in Haiti: however, accurate information is fragmented and difficult to locate. The State Department convened a call with NGOs and the tech community to brainstorm how to innovatively utilize technology in the ongoing search and rescue efforts. As a result of the call, a group of engineers from the private, public, and NGO sectors come together to build the “Person Finder.” It is a simple tool that allows people to locate and contribute information on people in Haiti. This tool is available in French and English, and can be embedded on any website.                

In addition to helping people find their loved ones, this tool will make the data accessible to other governments and private organizations in an easily manageable and accessible format.

International Committee of the Red Cross:  Locate Relatives through Family Links

The International Committee of the Red Cross has opened an online page called FamilyLinks.icrc.org which aims to accelerate the process of restoring contact between separated family members.  You can check The List to see if your relative's name is on the list, Register yourself if you want to inform your relative of your whereabouts, Register your relative if the relative you’re looking for is not on the list.

The ICRC cautions that it has no means of verifying the information sent through this open network. “The information given on this website is not confidential and can be consulted by everyone. It is the responsibility of the persons publishing information on this website to ensure that no harm can result from this publication. The ICRC cannot be held responsible for any possible negative consequence that might arise from the publication in this website.”

Ushahidi Haiti | http://haiti.ushahidi.com/

Ushahidi Haiti says that its crisis map represents the most comprehensive and up-to-date crisis map available to the humanitarian community. The information in the site is mapped in near real time and gathered from reports coming from inside Haiti via: SMS, web, email, radio, phone, Twitter, Facebook, television, list-serves, live streams and situation reports. It has 449 reports as of this writing.

How to Report

1. By sending a message to 447624802524


2. By sending an email to haiti@ushahidi.com


3. By sending a tweet with the hashtag/s #haiti or #haitiquake


4. Filling this form

Volunteers at the Fletcher School's Situation Room are mapping about 50% of the reports 24 hours a day. The other 50% of reports come from the Ushahidi team and volunteers around the world. Each report is first read at least once by Situation Room before being published on the map. This Ushahidi deployment represents a joint initiative with members of the International Network of Crisis Mappers (CM*Net).

Don’t Forget the FSN Emergency Relief Fund

The Foreign Service National (FSN) Emergency Relief Fund enables the Department of State to respond to crises affecting locally employed staff overseas, such as the recent earthquake in Haiti. To donate to the fund, send a check to the Department’s Gift Fund Coordinator, Donna Bordley, RM/CFO, Rm. 7427, 2201 C Street NW, Washington DC 20520. Make checks payable to the U.S. Department of State, designation for the “FSN Emergency Relief Fund.” (h/t to AAFSW). State and USAID employees may also check their intranet for guidance on donation by cash or credit cards.   

 

The Fund dates from April 1983 when FSN employees at the U.S. Embassy in Santiago collected funds to support the families of colleagues killed or injured in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut—and by DACOR’s unsolicited donation to the U.S. Ambassador in Lebanon to aid bomb victims.

Besides Beirut, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the fund has assisted FSNs in Tegucigalpa, Dhaka, Santo Domingo, Niamey, Athens, Karachi, Algiers, San Salvador, Freetown, Maputo, Ndjamena, Caracas, Bamako, Islamabad and São Paulo. FSN employees in earthquake-wracked Algeria and war-torn Liberia have received assistance from the fund, along with local employees in Jamaica, Grenada, the Bahamas and Haiti— countries ravaged by  hurricanes in 2007. 

Ronda Harvey, a program analyst for the Gift Fund and K Fund wrote about the FSN Relief Fund: in the June 2009 issue of State Magazine (excerpt below): 

Unlike other appropriated activities, the relief fund is based completely on donations from the foreign affairs family. The fund has no administrative costs, so 100 percent of every donation is disbursed to LE Staff at U.S. posts around the world.

                                            

The fund receives requests to provide financial support to employees who have been devastated by natural disasters, political unrest and serious injuries or death occurring in the line of duty. The aftermath of a catastrophe can be especially devastating for LE Staff, once they realize the enormity of the disaster. In the past 26 years, approximately $651,000 has been disbursed among the regional bureaus.

[..]

Since the 1983 Beirut embassy bombing, the fund has assisted many families of employees at posts attacked by terrorists. Jennifer McIntyre, a supervisory post management officer in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, said the fund means a great deal to her colleagues.

“The bureau’s most compelling need this year was a payment to the family of a local guard force member who was killed while defending the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a against terrorists,” she said. “We cannot overemphasize our appreciation for the employees and private donors who contribute to this important fund.”

Requests for disaster assistance from the fund are most common. In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis destroyed the homes and property of 281 LE Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon.  The government of Burma provided no public assistance, and most of the affected individuals had to buy imported high-cost building materials to rebuild. After reviewing each case, the fund disbursed $34,400 for property claims.

[…]

In recent years, support for the fund has come from Foreign Service officers who named it as a beneficiary in their wills or from requests that donations be made to the fund in lieu of gifts at weddings or flowers at funerals.

[…]

Donations also come from LE Staff themselves. “It is particularly gratifying to see how previous recipients return the favor and donate their own scarce funds to assist others in need,” Bordley said. “When the 1998 Nairobi embassy bombing victims needed assistance, our office received crumpled money that had been dug up from the backyards of the LE Staff of the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia—examples of the helping hands that are also on the fund’s logo.”

Foreign Service Nationals  (also known as “LES”) provide unique services in support of foreign policy at nearly 265 posts worldwide. LE Staff are an integral part of every US mission overseas, providing continuity, the institutional knowledge and professional contacts that are so important to the embassy. US government agencies under Chief of Mission authority depend on their continuity staff, frequently delegating to them various supervisory roles and program functions. For those not in the know, local staff  are also compensated based upon prevailing practice in-country and are usually paid in host country currency. 



The situation in Haiti -- with such a large scale devastation of structures will probably be comparable to Cyclone Nargis in Burma where 281 LE staff of US Embassy Rangoon lost their homes. Please think about the embassy's local staff in Haiti when you're considering a donation. 

Update 1/17/2010:  The word we're hearing is not good. Also via NDS: "The FSN Emergency Relief Fund needs money. And lots of it. Many of our FSNs are unaccounted for. I spoke to one of my colleagues in Haiti and not one of her FSNs (out of seven) has called in. In another section, only two out of ten FSNs have called in. It's really bad."

Related Items: 

•  OIG Report No. ISP-I-09-44, Review of Locally Employed Staff Compensation Issues, April 2009 | PDF


• 2 FAM 962.1-10 Gifts to FSN Emergency Relief Fund
  
  

State Dept Reports Death of FSO in Haiti Earthquake

Victoria DeLong: Cultural Affairs Officer

At the Daily Press Brief yesterday:

[W]e are saddened to report that Ms. Victoria DeLong, a cultural affairs officer at the U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince, died in the collapse of her home following the earthquake in Haiti. Her next of kin have been notified. Ms. DeLong served in Haiti since February 2009 and at the State Department since November 1983. It’s a tragedy for the State Department and for our family in the public diplomacy and public affairs world. Some of you who are old-timers here – she was previously – did serve in our Bureau of Public Affairs during her career.

NDS of Calling a Spade a Spade posted about this in The Foreign Service Loses One of Its Own in Haiti

Digger of Life After Jerusalem also has this Sad News for the Foreign Service

No word yet on casualties among the embassy's local employees.



Updated: Secretary Clinton has released a statement on the passing of Victoria DeLong.  Read it here.



Updated | 1/16/2010:

• Arturo Valenzuela (State/WHA): In Memory of Victoria DeLong (comments/memories accepted)


• Laua Rozen | Politico: State reports death of U.S. Embassy official
  
  


• WaPo: Victoria DeLong was only known U.S. diplomat to die in quake

 

  

Related articles by Zemanta

• Diplomat identified as 1st American quake victim (seattletimes.nwsource.com)

State Dept Sets Up Email Inquiry Address for Haiti Crisis

For people trying to contact U.S. citizen friends and relatives in Haiti 

The US Embassy in Haitihas updated its contact information for inquiries on welfare and whereabouts of American citizens in Haiti. Reprinted in full below: 

During the Crisis in Haiti, calls regarding the welfare of U.S. citizens can be made to the Embassy’s Consular Task Force in Port-au-Prince at 509-2229-8942, 509-2229-8089, 509-2229-8322 or 509-2229-8672. (Prior announcement also urged Americans to contact the Embassy via email at ACSPaP@state.gov to request assistance).

 

The Department of State has received a high volume of calls concerning the welfare of U.S. citizens in Haiti.   To handle these requests most efficiently, the Department has established an e-mail address for people who are trying to contact their U.S. citizen friends and relatives in Haiti. 

Please send your inquiries to:  Haiti-Earthquake@State.Gov and include the following information:

• The full name, date of birth and passport information (if known) of the persons in Haiti you are trying to contact.


• Their contact information in Haiti;  telephone numbers, email address, hotel name or address (if known)


• Your name and contact information, and your relationship to the person in Haiti (parent, spouse, friend etc.)


• Any special or emergency circumstances.

Our task force will work with our Embassy staff in Haiti to locate and, if needed, provide assistance.  We will respond to each message as soon as possible.  If you hear from the person you are concerned about, please be sure to send us an email providing the new information about their location or condition. 

Below is the contact info for the Ops Center from a prior announcement:

The State Department Operations Center has set up the following number for Americans seeking information about family members in Haiti: 1-888-407-4747 (due to heavy volume, some callers may receive a recording). Outside of the U.S. and Canada, call 202-501-4444. 

 

New Embassy Compound Contractors Wanted

The Department’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is requesting submissions to pre-qualify firms for Design-Build (D/B) services for the design and construction of a Standard Embassy Design (SED) New Embassy Compound (NEC) in Laos, Norway, Dominican Republic and Papua New Guinea.

SAQMMA-10-R0100:  Vientiane, Laos: (Backup):

Approximate Site 30,000 square meters.

New Embassy Complex buildings area: 10,669 square meters;

Estimated design-build cost: $110 to $145 million.

Read more here

SAQMMA-10-R0098: NEC Oslo, Norway NEC: (Backup):

Approximate Site 33,589 square meters.

New Embassy Complex buildings area: 10,669 square meters;

Estimated design-build cost: $145 to $185 million.

SAQMMA-10-R0099: NEC Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic NEC: (Backup): Approximate Site 40,000 square meters

New Embassy Complex buildings area 41,458 square meters

Estimated design-build cost: $165 to $210 million.

Read more here.

SAQMMA-10-R0086: Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea NEC

Approximate Site 25,000 square meters

NEC total building area 2,768 square meters

Estimated construction cost: $24 – $38 million

Read more here.

US Embassaurus Baghdad Plans to Go Double Whopper

Image by avlxyz via Flickr

No End in Sight for the Iraq Tax ...

The Cable’s Josh Rogin had an exclusive interview with Robert S. Ford, the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Baghdad. Ambassador Ford (former ambassador to Algeria) on supersizing the embassy, quote: "If Congress gives us the money we are asking for, this embassy is going to be twice the size it is now. It's not going down, it's getting bigger.”  

Rogin writes that the Obama administration has prepared a budget request for a program that would vastly increase the number of people working on police training when the military draws down. That request, if granted, could increase the overall U.S. diplomatic presence in Baghdad from around 1,400 to more than 3,000 total personnel, including contractors.

"My biggest problem here is figuring out where are these people going to live, how are we going to get the security for them, how are we going to get food for them, and how are we going to get their mail delivered," he said.

Rogin points out that our Baghdad embassy is already the largest in the world and “bursting at the seams with people and equipment.”

The report also says that the new police training will focus more on "middle management," to include human resources, operational planning, and building institutional capacity, "rather than showing a new recruit how to wear a uniform and how to shoot a gun."

Read the whole thing here.

Funding for US Embassy Iraq

Extracted from OIG/MERO August 2009 Report

An August 2009 report from the OIG’s MERO Office on Embassy Baghdad’s transition planning for reduced US military in Iraq says  that the embassy’s mission strategic plan indicates a gradual reduction in PRTs from 16 teams in August 2010 to six teams by December 2011.  Wow! But there is also this:

Department budget officials are identifying costs associated with the U.S. military drawdown as requirements are identified, and they believe sufficient funds have been budgeted through FY 2011 to meet projected embassy operational requirements as currently defined. However, OIG has identified several areas in which the military drawdown may result in additional costs. These areas include requirements for: (1) enhanced security around the new embassy compound; (2) convoy security for fuel, food, and other supplies; (3) commercial air travel as an alternative to military transport; and (4) private sector design, contract preparation, and contract oversight to replace U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ support services.

[...] 

Embassy Baghdad stated that there are two program areas that will greatly impact the embassy platform in 2011 and beyond: (1) a Department program to take over training Iraqi police from the U.S. military, and (2) the possible stand-up of an Office of Military Cooperation under chief of mission authority to assume some of the support and assistance now provided by U.S. military units. Embassy Baghdad noted that neither of these two programs has yet been defined in terms of scope, numbers of personnel and their deployment to different Iraqi sites, or the duration of their missions or support needs.

How could budget officials say in mid-2009 that sufficient funds have been budgeted through FY 2011 when the embassy did not yet know at that time how many additional personnel were needed for the police program?

Since Ambassador Ford is now talking about a staffing increase from “around 1,400 to more than 3,000 total personnel,” I’m presuming they have now identified personnel requirements for the Iraqi Police training program that the Department will take over from DOD. 

 

Ah yes, no good deed will go unpunished.  And just when I started to believe that the new hiring authority will begin to close the staffing gaps especially at the mid-levels – sigh!

The largest bump in recent years that the Foreign Service got in terms of staffing happened during Secretary Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI). That bump was quickly swallowed by a dinosaur with an almost bottomless appetite.  The State Department had recently received authority to hire 724 new officers. But with the surge in Afghanistan and a still hungry embassaurus in Baghdad, can you really expect a break in staffing gaps in diplomatic missions not located in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan?  What -- or Yemen?.

You may need to start bringing your own pencil to work, before long. The estimated funding for US Embassy Baghdad in FY2010 was $1.865B.  If its request for over 1600 additional personnel is approved, the estimated funding of $1.875B for FY2011 will most certainly skyrocket.   

With these kind of numbers, would talk on directed  assignments be too far behind?.    

Related Item: 

-08/25/09   Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad's Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence in Iraq (MERO-A-09-10) Aug 09

Insider Quote: the most individualistic staff in town

"Another challenge one has as secretary is that I think it's the best staff in town, but it's also the most individualistic staff …in town. With so many constituencies, to get them to work toward a coherent goal is a huge assignment for the secretary."

Henry Kissinger

Former Secretary of State

Newsweek: Hillary Clinton, Kissinger on Sec. of State Job

US Embassy Jakarta Issues Warden Message on Bali Warning

Image by FriskoDude via Flickr

On December 31, 2009,
the US Embassy in Jakarta issued the following Warden Message on Bali. Reprinted
in part below:

The Bali Tourism Board widely distributed this message: “The
Governor of Bali Mr. Mangku Pastika wishes to share a message with all of us:
‘There is an indication of an attack to Bali tonight,’ but please don’t panic,
but put your security system to full alert.”  This message is shared
verbatim for your information. The safety and security recommendations in our
Consular Information Sheet, quoted below, remain valid.

“Indonesian police and security forces take active measures
against both ongoing threats posed by terrorist cells, including Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization that
carried out several bombings at various times from 2002 to 2009 and outbreaks
of violence elsewhere.  While Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts have
been ongoing and partly successful, violent elements have demonstrated a
willingness and ability to carry out deadly attacks with little or no warning. 
Most recently, in November 2009, unknown assailants shot at foreigners in Banda
Aceh, North Sumatra, an area that was devastated by the 2004 tsunami and the
scene of a long-running separatist conflict that ended in 2005.  The
gunfire wounded a European development worker.  A house occupied by U.S.
citizen teachers was targeted and hit by gunfire, but there were no U.S.
citizen casualties.  In July 2009, attacks by armed assailants in Papua
resulted in several deaths, including security personnel and one Australian
national.  Also in July, suspected JI elements bombed two Western hotels
in Jakarta, killing nine Indonesians and foreigners and injuring over 50,
including six U.S. citizens.  U.S. citizens in Indonesia must be
physically and mentally prepared to cope with future attacks even as they go
about their normal daily routines.

Extremists may target both official and private interests,
including hotels, clubs and shopping centers.  While it may be difficult
to modify one’s behavior to counter risks in a country where places in which
U.S. citizens and other Westerners must congregate to live and work are well
known and few in number, it is also extremely necessary.  In their work
and daily living activities, and while traveling, U.S. citizens should be vigilant
and prudent at all times.  We urge U.S. citizens to monitor local news
reports, vary their routes and times, and maintain a low profile.  U.S.
citizens must consider the security and safety preparedness of hotels,
residences, restaurants, and entertainment or recreation venues that they
frequent.”

Americans living and traveling in Indonesia are urged to register and update
their contact information with the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, U.S. Consulate
General in Surabaya, U.S. Consulate Medan or U.S. Consular Agency in
Bali.  Registration facilitates the U.S. Mission’s contact with Americans
in emergency situations, and may be done on line and in advance of
travel.  Information on registering can be found at the U.S. Department of
State’s Consular Affairs website at http://travelregistration.state.gov
and at the Embassy’s website at http://jakarta.usembassy.gov.  All Travel Warnings,
Travel Alerts, Worldwide Cautions, and recent warden messages are posted on the
Embassy website.

Read the whole thing here.

Note that Warden
Messages are not easily visible on the main page of the US Embassy’s website.  When checking for updates, click on American Citizen Services,
and select Notices
to Americans. 

Let the Finger-Pointing, Circular Firing Squad Begin …

That’s Just What Al-Qaeda is Counting On ...

The off with her head calls came barely 24 hours after the attempted bombing of the Detroit flight. DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano’s head, that is. 

What a great idea! Fire the head of homeland security, and wait for the nomination and vetting process to start from scratch with a new candidate.  Which, of course, can’t be done in days, or weeks, but months because you know – the candidate has to be scrupulously scrutinized to ensure there are no skeletons in his/her closets or no unpaid jaywalking tickets. Oh, and god forbid, a nanny problem!



And when all that is done, the new nominee, unless deminted in Congress like the TSA nominee must transition into his/her new role as top honcho of homeland security, and provide leadership to 225,000 employees in 7 sub-agencies, and 11 other components, plus tackle its $52 billion budget. 

I don’t care if that candidate is a genius. The fact is, transitioning into that leadership role won’t happen overnight as we might like to think. And while he/she is transitioning, Al Qaeda is rolling in their caves, laughing at how quickly we pick up their bait and diversion.  They will send their agents of chaos on to our commercial airlines (we’re not even talking about the land borders yet!) and expect these knee jerk emotional reactions from us. Why else would they claim ownership over Mr. Underpant’s failed attack? To sow fear and terror, and more fear and terror; and to watch us, most especially our politicians as they tear each other down -- until we get so foul and twisted in our fears, we won’t know our heads from our tails.

NO MORE!

The politicians who are using this incident as rocket boosters for their own ambitions should be lined up on the steps of the Capitol; and we should call on their mothers to publicly scold them for such shameful behavior.                       

In a related note, Thomas Lipscomb, a Senior Fellow at the Annenberg Center for the Digital Future also pens,  The Trouser Bomber Effect: Watching Government Cure Incompetence with Idiocy for Huffington Post: “Incompetent State Department consular officials and poor enforcement of visa procedures that have been in place long before the personal computer, the Xerox machine or even the jet airliner are the problem here.”

Ugh!

I supposed that is the easiest trick in the book -- to scream “incompetence” when something like this happens.  But it shows a deep misunderstanding of the consular trade.  There are over 1500 consular officers in the Foreign Service. They are some of the hardest working folks I know. Most work more than 8 hours or weekends and are on call 24/7 with no additional compensation.  Perhaps, more than anyone else in a US mission, consular officers are dictated by manuals, guidelines, SOPs, and regulations. They are not freelancers, and the work that they do have almost zero optional parts. 

I wonder what he meant by “poor enforcement of visa procedures?”  That the suspect was issued a visa two years before his Detroit attack? That State did not know the Brits did not renew the suspect’s visa? US visa sections in over 200 embassies and consulate refuse visa applications every single work day, and as far as I know, we don’t tell the Brits about them. Why should they tell us about their refusals or nonrenewals? Now, it would have been much simpler if the father’s report was transmitted with an automatic “arrest” or "kill" button, right? But we still live by the rule of law.  

As one the U.S. intelligence official puts it to Spencer Ackerman -- “Realistically, a lot of guys call every day and say their relative or former friend is dangerous,” the official explained. To use that level of information to revoke someone’s visa or stop someone from flying would be “unmanageable. We’d probably shut down air traffic.”

I don’t think folks really have an idea how much poison pen letters visa sections overseas get. If you take every single poison pen letter from jealous neighbors, ex-spouses, cranky relatives, broken families, old lovers, ditched boyfriends, mistresses, third wives, business competitors, etc, etc. as “word from god”  commercial travel as we know it would stop. Really.  No more Disneyland trips, no more shopping in New York, no more students for American universities and colleges, etc. etc. And congressional constituencies, even those still unable to vote would run to "their" representatives to complain, and senators and congressmen would send out congressional inquiries to embassies and consulates as to why so and so was refused a visa.

Finally, one more former Bushie has called for the visa function to be removed from the State Department to DHS saying that: “Granting visas is a function that most people at State relegate to the margins of their activities. State’s mandarins — foreign service officers or “FSOs” — look down at the consular officials who handle visas. This is considered a third-rate assignment, something young FSOs have to suffer through for a few years at the very start of their careers.”

He added that “Moving visa functions to DHS is no panacea, obviously, but the case of the would-be airline bomber Abdul Mutallab is perhaps suggestive. His multiple-entry visa to the U.S. was not cancelled by State, not even after his own father alerted U.S. Embassy officials in Nigeria of the danger he might present. His visa to enter the United Kingdom was cancelled, however, months ago.”

Of course, DHS is responsible for American’s homeland security and border control. Maybe DHS wants the visa adjudication function, maybe not.  No offense to our friends at DHS but I understand that there are 12 million illegal aliens in the United States that we have not caught or deported yet.  DHS has records of aliens entering the United States but there’s no one out there who actually knows when or if these aliens depart because DHS has no tracking system for them. Further, according to the Center for Immigration Studies, USCIS, one of DHS’s sub-agencies that deal with immigration is “actually still deep in the weeds and unable to keep up with the existing workload”. CIS reports that as of the end of June 2009, the agency had a backlog of nearly 2.7 million applications and petitions that were pending review, above and beyond the 1.8 million that had been completed that quarter. 

So yes -- instead of figuring out what went wrong this time, so it won’t happen again next time -- let’s just forgettaboutallthat and shuffle the decks, move this function from here to there. It's all rather very simple, isn't it?  We would, of course, all sleep like babies at night knowing that the same agency that could not get a handle on 12 million illegal aliens within our borders would now be tasked with issuing visas to all foreigners coming into the United States. You would find that exceptionally comforting, yes?      

Let’s pretend for a moment that the visa function was with DHS this past year. That when the suspect’s father went to the US Embassy to report his concern about his son, he talked to a DHS officer. As I understand it under current regulations, the DHS officer would have brought this to the attention to the Visas Viper Committee normally chaired by the Deputy Ambassador. A Visas Viper cable would be transmitted to the US as it happened in this case. The information would go to NTC, and an interagency committee decides to put the suspects name in the half-a million name database.  Would it have made a difference in the airport screening of this case? Given the same information, provided by DHS this time, instead of State, would they have decided to revoke the suspect’s visa?  If the information was not significant enough to put subject in the more restrictive “No-Fly” list, would it have been significant enough for visa revocation? 

Let’s presume that the revocation occurred. It is not as simple as stamping the visa “revoked” or “cancelled.” A report has to be made out, a "lookout" created and submitted, actual revocation documents drafted and approved by a responsible official, the subject of revocation had to be notified and asked to present his visa at the embassy for physical cancellation, the information had to be sent by DHS to other agencies including its child agency, CBP to warn them of possible entry, and its other child agency, ICE to locate, apprehend and remove subject if he was inside the United States. 

In an alternate universe this might work, in a real world, I doubt it. 

We need to find out what happened in this case without the hysteria or the urge to convene the circular firing squad. We need everyone’s help to get to the bottom of this, without the constant fear that their jobs are on the line -- whether in the airports, the airlines, or any of our relevant agencies, including the CIA and other intel agencies. We must refuse to let mob mentality drive this issue, let our people do their work and hope that they are now, learning more quickly to connect the dots before another incident happens. What we don't want to happen is for officials to lower the threshold for inclusion as CYA, and in so doing presents our analysts with more haystack than they can manage.       

As Peter Feaver  writes in FP, Off with her head? I'd rather know what's on Napolitano's mind first: “It may well be that there were lapses of judgment and oversight that rise to firing offenses. But let's investigate the alleged crime before we execute the sentence.”

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• 
  
  
  State Department, for All Practical Purposes, Couldn't Have Revoked Abdulmutallab's Visa | (Spencer Ackerman)