Snapshot: USTC/Blackwater/Xe in Afghanistan

2,730 missions | 0 casualties | 0 incidents with deadly force

This is the personal security contractor that everybody loves to hate. State’s Inspector General’s Office conducted a performance audit of the U.S. Training Center (a Xe company) contract in Afghanistan last year and had some good things to say:     

“In 2008, USTC conducted 2,730 personal protection missions in support of staff from the Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, USAID, and various Congressional delegations (see Table). In 2008, 257 (9.4 percent) of the missions were performed for USAID. During the entire time USTC has operated in Afghanistan, no one under USTC’s protection has been injured or killed, and there have been no incidents involving the use of deadly force. OIG observed personal protection missions and interviewed various representatives from the Department of State and USAID who regularly use USTC’s personal protective services. The representatives reported that USTC employees are professional, make them feel secure, and are respectful to both officials under chief of mission authority and their Afghan counterparts.”

Staff composition as of April 8, 2009

USTC staff consists of a project manager, personal security specialists, administrative and support employees, and interpreters, as well as local guards who are third-country nationals. As of April 2009, there was one project manager, 75 personal security specialists, 18 administrative and support personnel, 20 local guard force personnel, and five interpreters (94 Americans, 20 Columbians, and five Afghan interpreters).

On the need for a dedicated Contracting Officer’s Representative to Embassy Kabul to provide proper oversight of contractor activities, the OIG reports:

Despite its overall satisfactory contract management, DS could improve its performance in two areas, both of which have been mentioned in previous OIG reports. First, two Assistant Regional Security Officers at Embassy Kabul are currently acting as Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR). These officers’ many other duties may prevent them from providing adequate oversight of the USTC contract, particularly as personal protective service needs increase in Afghanistan. Second, the current acting CORs do not review or verify the personnel rosters (muster sheets) before they are sent to USTC and then DS in Washington, DC.

The OIG report concludes that “USTC personal protective services have been effective in ensuring the safety of chief of mission personnel in Afghanistan’s volatile security environment. Additionally, OIG found USTC has effective control over government-furnished equipment. Nevertheless, OIG has identified several areas in which contractor performance could be improved.”  The audit provides a 6-item recommendation. You can read it here.

Actually not just OIG.  Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, our former Ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007)  last December also had this to say at a congressional hearing:  "I would like to pay special tribute to the brave and hard working personnel, RSOs and ARSOs, who have protected me and my missions in dangerous times. I would also like to acknowledge my respect for the men of DynCorp and Blackwater who ran my personal protection details in Iraq and Afghanistan. They performed with courage, judgment and restraint and one lost his leg in the process. Whatever opprobrium now attaches to others I owe all those gallant men—State Department and contractor employees--my gratitude and I am glad to have a public forum in which to express it."

Related Item:

OIG Report No. MERO-A-09-08, Performance Audit of the USTC Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan - Aug. 2009 | PDF

GAO Report: Diplomatic Security Needs Strategic Review

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The Government Accountability Office had just released its report titled Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review (GAO-10-156 November 2009). It lists down Diplomatic Security’s policy and operational challenges.

First, according to Diplomatic Security officials, State is maintaining missions in countries where it would have previously evacuated personnel, which requires more resources and, therefore, makes it more difficult for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment.

Second, although Diplomatic Security has grown considerably in staff over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges further tax Diplomatic Security’s ability to implement all of its missions. Finally, State has expanded Diplomatic Security without the benefit of solid strategic planning; neither State’s departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security’s bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau’s resource needs or its management challenges.

The GAO report also gives an overview of the impact of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan on Diplomatic Security:

Staffing the Iraq mission: As previously discussed, staffing the large number of special agents at the Iraq embassy has drawn staff away from other missions and offices. Iraq is a critical threat post; therefore, Diplomatic Security fills it and other critical threat posts first. In 2008, 81 Diplomatic Security special agents—or 16 percent of Diplomatic Security staff—were posted to Iraq for 1-year tours. To fill this need, State officials reported that special agents frequently leave positions in other countries before completing the end of their tours to serve in Iraq. In 2008, we reported that, in order to provide enough Diplomatic Security special agents in Iraq, Diplomatic Security had to move agents from other programs, and those moves have affected the agency’s ability to perform other missions, including providing security for visiting dignitaries and visa, passport, and identity fraud investigations.

Afghanistan is currently Diplomatic Security’s second largest overseas post with a staff of 16 special agents in 2008, which increased to 22 special agents in 2009. As of April 2009, Diplomatic Security was responsible for the security of approximately 300 authorized U.S. civilian personnel, although Diplomatic Security expects that number to increase if State opens consular offices in the cities of Herat and Mazar-e-Sherif. While Diplomatic Security has not been placing a special agent in every contractor-led convoy, as in Iraq, Diplomatic Security plans to increase the use of Diplomatic Security staff for all convoys. To address these changes, Diplomatic Security plans to add an additional 25 special agents in 2010, effectively doubling the number of agents in Afghanistan.

Other operational challenges that impede the Diplomatic Security’s ability to fully implement its missions and activities were also indentified including two glaring ones on foreign language deficiencies and experience gaps. Excerpted from report:

Foreign language deficiencies: Earlier this year, GAO found that 53 percent of RSOs do not speak and read at the level required by their positions. According to officials in Diplomatic Security, language training for security officers is often cut short because many ambassadors are unwilling to leave security positions vacant. However, GAO concluded that these foreign language shortfalls could be negatively affecting several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including security operations. For example, an officer at a post of strategic interest said because she did not speak the language, she had transferred a sensitive telephone call from a local informant to a local employee, which could have compromised the informant’s identity.

Experience gaps: Thirty-four percent of Diplomatic Security’s positions (not including those in Baghdad) are filled with officers below the position’s grade. In a previous publication, GAO reported that experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness. In addition, Diplomatic Security officials stated that these gaps between the experience level required by the position and the experience level of the employee assigned can affect the quality of Diplomatic Security’s work. For example, several ARSOs with whom we met were in their first overseas positions and stated that they did not feel adequately prepared for their job, particularly their responsibility to manage large security contracts.

The GAO concludes that “Diplomatic Security faces human capital challenges, such as inexperienced staff and foreign language proficiency shortfalls. The implications of this growth—in conjunction with the potential for increased challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other hostile environments as well as the management challenges listed above— have not been strategically reviewed by the department. Nevertheless, State leadership acknowledges the importance of broad strategic planning, as evidenced by the Secretary’s new QDDR, which is intended to ensure people, programs, and resources serve the highest priorities at State.”

According to the State Department’s response to this report, there is no current plan to conduct a strategic review of Diplomatic Security’s mission and capabilities under the QDDR, but it still mentioned the QDDR’s overall strategic focus on building operational and resource platforms for success” in its response. See State’s full response in Appendix X.

For the next several months, State can point to the QDDR as the possible response to the different challenges ranging from foreign assistance to human capital challenges and all that ails State. But the QDDR is not expected to be completed until summer or fall of 2010 (I hear that an interim report could be released early next year), half-way through this administration’s first term.

Let’s see what else DS, the American Academy of Diplomacy and AFSA might add to this report. The GAO as well as Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, A/Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, (Ret.) of the American Academy of Diplomacy and Susan R. Johnson of the American Foreign Service Association will be at the Senate tomorrow, December 9 for The Diplomat’s Shield: Diplomatic Security in Today’s World hearing (Dirksen Senate Office Building, room 342, 2:30 PM).

Related Item:GAO-10-156 State Department: Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review | November 2009 | PDF

Hard Skills Training Center at Old Smelting Plant Site?

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Our blog friend TSB over at The Skeptical Bureaucrat recently had an interesting post on the Contaminated Industrial Site Proposed for Diplomatic Security Training Center.

A local official was quoted saying "Given that Eastalco was there smelting aluminum and there was enough of a buffer," the 150-acre training center in the middle of a 2,000-acre site shouldn't be a problem.”

TSB’s translation: “By which he apparently meant that the training center's presence shouldn't bother local residents because the center will be right smack in the middle of the hazardous waste left behind by decades of aluminum smelting, and not close to them. Whether that should be a problem for the hundreds of DSS employees who would work and train at the center, Delegate Weldon didn't say.”

The site can be cleaned up for a mere cost of roughly $200 million -- “sufficiently to use it as a landfill.” Politicians are getting into the act, lobbying for the center to be built in their own backyards. Read TSB’s whole post here. Also read this on Eastalco’s plan on marketing the site for new uses.

The State Department is overseeing $600 million of investment for seven projects and a funds transfer to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The training center at issue here is the Hard Skills Training Center, one of its seven projects. The plan calls for its location within 150 miles of Washington, D.C., The Eastalco site is located about 45 miles from D.C.

Here is State Department’s summary for the training center:

Construct a training facility capable of supporting hard skills security-related training for the Department and the wider foreign affairs community. The existing security training infrastructure is not sufficient to meet current and projected training needs. Recovery Act funds along with regular Worldwide Security and Protection (WSP) appropriated funds will enable the Department to construct a hard skills training campus that meets the increased demand for security training and makes the delivery of security training more efficient than the current arrangement of 15 separate locations throughout the United States. Specifically, the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course, already mandated for federal employees assigned to only five specific posts, will be expanded to include all critical and high threat posts worldwide. This project will enable the Department to provide vital security training to law enforcement and security staff and all foreign affairs employees; especially those assigned to critical and high threat posts.

This hard skills training facility will use both ARRA stimulus funds and WSP funding. Currently, the Department has $105.5 million programmed to support this project ($70 M ARRA, $17.55M FY 2009 WSP, and another $18M in WSP) in FY2009. Subsequent phases of the project will be funded through WSP. The FY 2010 budget request seeks an additional $12.5M to bring annual WSP funding for this project to $30 million/year. As requested in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (Div. J, P.L. 110-161), the Department produced a report in May 2008 outlining the Department’s increased need for security training and provided the initial project concepts for a training facility as part of a consolidated security training complex. The report called for the development of a master plan starting with an Architectural & Engineering (A&E) study to help frame the project scope, cost and timelines. Those initial project studies will be completed with ARRA and WSP funds.

In addition, ARRA and FY 2009 WSP funds will be used to complete Phase 1 of the training facility. The consideration and funding of any possible future phases will be subject to annual funding availability and prioritization in the annual budget process. The project concept is to deliver functioning training facilities at the completion of each phase of the project and not have any partially completed training venues.

The State Department is also using ARRA funds for a Data Center – “The Data Center program ($120 million) will build an enterprise data center in the western United States and consolidate all domestic servers into four enterprise data centers.”

I wonder if anyone is interested in pitching for that...

Special Agent Fred Ketchem: DS Employee of the Year

Fred Ketchem Sr., Special Agent Fred Ketchem,U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,and Shareen Ketchem after the awards ceremony.U.S. Department of State Photo.

DS Special Agent Fred Ketchem was named the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security 2008 Employee of the Year.

At a November 5 ceremony at the Harry S Truman Building, Under Secretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns presented Ketchem with a certificate signed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. He also received a monetary award of $10,000.

The award was given to Ketchem for his superior achievements as senior deputy regional security officer during his tour of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

From March 2008 to January 2009, Ketchem helped manage all security programs and investigations on behalf of the U.S. Department of State in Baghdad — site of the largest U.S. Embassy in the world. Ketchem supervised a security staff of nearly 3,500 employees — including more than 80 Diplomatic Security Special Agents — and oversaw a budget of almost one billion dollars.

According to the State Department, Ketchem showed tremendous leadership and courage under fire in a war zone beset by more than 26,000 attacks during his tenure. In fact, soon after his arrival, the new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad experienced its most intense period of sustained rocket attacks to date.

Ketchem and members of the RSO Baghdad team also received the Department of State’s 2008 Award for Heroism for selfless actions under heavy fire.

Ketchem is currently the Special Agent in Charge of Secretary Clinton’s protective detail.

Read the whole thing here.

The Hunt for Madam le Consul

Foreign Service blog missing for 5 days now

Madam le Consul (aka: Cassandra Was Right) is a senior consular-coned US Foreign Service officer who has served in 23 countries and Washington. Since May 2009, she has been blogging in The Consuls’ Files, “bringing humanity, common sense, realism and humor to the work of the US consul.” And she did that and all in the short, short life of her blog.

This is going to scare the children ...I think late last Friday, the blog (and the blogger) simply disappeared into thin air. I thought it was a simple technical glitch. But by Monday, I know it wasn't. She is a regular blogger, Monday-Friday; she has last posted Friday morning. If you look it up now, Blogger would tell you that it cannot locate such a blog. Just like that, it went - puff! Of course, if you do a search for Madam le Consul, Google still spits out the cache files of the now missing blog.

The question is where is Madam le Consul? And what happened to The Consuls’ Files? Like any amateur detective, you have to start with a list. So below is Diplopundit’s list in what we hope will turn out to be a massive blog hunt with the help of some friends.

#1. Did Madam le Consul pull down her own blog?

This is always a possibility. The Hegemonist has been gone since June and I am doubtful if he will return. But -- MLC is a consular officer with a lot of experience and a lot to say. I know that she has become a popular read very quickly. Why would she pull down her blog? Besides she’s big on doing the right thing, she would not close shop without a proper goodbye. No, she did not do this on her own.

#2. Was Madam le Consul (and her blog) abducted by Martians?

Okay, we’ve considered this. But -- MLC is a consular officer; given her experience, she’d be negotiating her release by now. I cannot imagine that she’d be scared silly or easily, not even by aliens from space. If she does not show up by the end of the week, we know that the somebodies got her. And they’re not from outer space.#3. Is Madam le Consul in an undisclosed location?

MLC could be writing a book that will bring more humanity, common sense, realism and humor to the work of the US consul. We've thought about that but we know she’s not in Tora-Bora. Again, if she has decided on her own to disappear for a while, she would have left a note. She’s a diplomat; she knows it’s impolite to leave without a word.#4. Did Diplomatic Security catch up with Madam le Consul?

And told her to zip it? There is always that possibility. But see, DS is busy with all sorts of things right now; from security contracts, contractor investigations, staffing issues, returning fugitives, security investigations, etc. etc. Can you imagine DS spending its limited resources hunting down a blog and shutting it down? I can’t. Besides, the blog Dead Men Working, whose bloggers very closely follow Diplomatic Security has been around a while and when I last checked, Steve is still on. Unless there’s a witness, I don’t think the culprit is DS. Diplopundit's friends are not so sure.

#5. Did the Consular Affairs Bureau shut down Madam le Consul?

Did the good folks at CA issue a cease-and-desist order to gag her? MLC is a senior consular-coned US Foreign Service officer who has served in 23 countries and Washington. How many officers would fit that description like a glove? And which office would be able to dig up and match that description quickly? MLC has also been blogging about consular issues and her posts have been excerpted in Liam Schwartz’s Consular Corner, which is read by consular officers, and by folks in the CA Bureau (motive and opportunity?). Makes us wonder if "controversial" blogs have now become line items in the agenda of executive meetings at Foggy Bottom. Is the Consular Affairs Bureau (under M) responsible for the disappearance of Madam le Consul and her blog? If it is, who gave the order and why? How many manhours were used to track her down? Has she been thrown into a visa dungeon with no internet connection?

The hunt for Madam le Consul in on. Anonymous tips are solicited here.

FSO Group Seeks Changes in DSS Practices

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The September 21 issue of the Federal Employees News Digest (FEND) contains an interview with Michael Metelits who recently became spokesperson of the Concerned Foreign Service Officers (CSFO). Read the interview here (pdf).

FEND says that CSFO represents hundreds of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) who are pressing for changes in what the group views as intrusive and arbitrary practices of the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security (DS) unit, as well as improvements to other problems in background check and internal security procedures. Co-founded by Daniel Hirsch (currently AFSA's State VP) and William Savich, CSFO was created in July 2005 to "investigate, document and expose apparent misuse of the security clearance process to circumvent federal labor laws and established personnel practices."Check out the group’s website here. Their “What to Expect” page is actually quite shocking.

US Embassy Kabul: OIG Report from 2006 Shows Up

You know things are moving fast when even a 4-year old OIG report on US Embassy Kabul is found and posted 2-4 days after the POGO story. I don’t know if this was a result of a FOIA request or if State’s OIG office simply anticipated interest on this prior report.

The OIG inspection took place in Washington, D.C., between September 6 and September 30, 2005, and in Kabul, Afghanistan, between October 6 and October 30, 2005.

In its report dated January 2006, the OIG says in part:

Embassy Kabul is staffed by energetic, capable employees who work tirelessly to accomplish their work. All assigned Americans are volunteers, a factor that enhances esprit de corps.

Afghanistan presents a dangerous and stressful operating environment. Stringent security requirements constrain work schedules, consume large amounts of human and other resources, restrict mobility, and directly affect post morale. The conduct of the embassy’s protective detail projects an overly aggressive image that has the potential to generate negative opinions of the United States.

As far as I know, the US Embassy Kabul continues to be staff by State Department and other agency employees who volunteer for one-year assignments in Afghanistan. Afghanistan also continues to present a dangerous and stressful operating environment. If you look at the coalition military casualties by month, you will see the casualties in an upward trajectory since 2005 but with the highest level in August 2009. But that IG statement on the security details appears prescient given what happened in Baghdad with Blackwater/Xe, doesn't it?

OIG Saw the Future on Staffing Numbers

The exact number of employees under chief of mission authority in Afghanistan varies widely from month to month, and even from day to day. At the time of the inspection, best estimates were 180 direct-hire Americans and 343 FSNs. FY 2005 funding for the mission was approximately $62.75 million. One embassy officer compared the process of ascertaining staff numbers to “trying to catch flies with chopsticks.” These totals do not include positions in the pipeline for approval, the ever-fluctuating pool of long-term and short-term TDY employees at the mission, or the growing number of personal services contractors. The only certainty is that the numbers are increasing and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Fast-forward to 2009 and the civilian surge .... people in the pipeline ... the IG saw the staffing up of US Mission Afghanistan four years before it happened. I imagine that putting down the staffing numbers at post would still be similar to "trying to catch flies with chopsticks."

In any case, whoever requested this file was presumably interested in looking at the local guard issue at the US Embassy, the cause of so many news feed in the last 72 hours. I should note that Armor Group, North America did not get the guard contract until March 2007. Previous to that, the contract was held by a company called MVM terminated for “failure to meet contract requirements” according to State’s Logistics Management DAS, William H. Moser. Below is what the OIG report says about the local guard contract four years ago.

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DS did not submit requirements for local guard services to the Office of Acquisitions with sufficient lead-time to allow full and open competition. As a result, the local guard contract was awarded on an urgent and noncompetitive basis. DS officials say that requirements were submitted late because they received late notification from Defense of its plans to withdraw its combat Marine Task Force from Kabul. However, OIG learned that Defense gave official notification to the Department six months before deployment and gave earlier verbal notification of its plans on several occasions. This lack of advance planning by DS and lack of coordination among government agencies led to higher local guard contract cost. This noncompetitively awarded contract has been costing DS approximately $6 million per month since the departure of the combat Marines on March 31, 2005. A new local guard contract, awarded on a competitive basis on July 7, 2005, to become effective on December 1, 2005, will cost the U.S. government less than $2 million per month - a significant reduction.

There are legitimate reasons for issuing contracts on an urgent basis and also for contractual delays, but OIG found no evidence in the contract files that suggests DS conducted advance acquisition planning within time frames suggested in the Federal Acquisition Regulations. FAR 7.104 states that acquisition planning should begin as soon as an agency identifies a need, preferably well in advance of the fiscal year in which contract award or order placement is necessary. In August 2004, OIG made a recommendation to correct similar acquisition planning issues in its inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Directorate of Infrastructure.

So that's that until more reports are dug up. This is going to be a loooong September. May seem particularly long for DS. The Middle East Regional Office (MERO) of the DOS OIG is also currently reviewing the Diplomatic Security’s management of WPPS in Afghanistan. The review which started in March 2009 is looking at what studies and needs assessments were conducted by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to determine PPS requirements in Afghanistan and what mechanisms are in place to ensure personal protective services assets are utilized in an efficient and effective manner. This report is bound to show up in the next couple of months.

Related Item:

OIG Report No. ISP-I-06-13A, Inspection of Embassy Kabul, AfghanistanJanuary 2006 | PDF

US Embassy Kabul: POGO Story Day 2

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The State Department Spokesman addressed the POGO letter on September 2 during the DPB; a day after the news broke and went all over the known universe. I realized that timing on what’s available to be dispensed to the public is not always within Ian Kelly’s control but I just wished he had this yesterday. It would have shown that DOS was on top of this even before the POGO story broke. Now, everything done appears nothing more than a patellar reflex to show that somebody was not sleeping at the wheel. Below is the Department's official statement on allegations raised by the Project on Government Oversight:

Let me start off with talking a little bit about the allegations that were raised by the Project on Government Oversight. As I said before, we take these allegations extremely seriously. In fact, we’ve documented a number of management concerns through our ongoing oversight of this particular contract. There are a number of investigations that are underway, both here and out in Kabul. And we expect to see prompt and effective action taken, as a result of these investigations, and we expect that there will be some changes.

A senior team from Diplomatic Security and our Bureau of Management, some contracting officials, will be going to Kabul in the coming days to investigate. This team will work very closely with the Office of Inspector General, who, as you know, is also investigating this. In addition, Ambassador Eikenberry has instructed his senior staff to examine the allegations and report back to him. He’s also having a town hall tomorrow with staff at Embassy Kabul to discuss this situation and the allegations, and expressed his determination to correct management deficiencies.

To be clear, there were some things going on in Kabul which we were not aware of, but frankly, we should have been aware of. I’d like to stress, though, that all along, any problems that we did discover throughout this contract, we did promptly raise with the contractor, and they were immediately addressed. And you saw some of these deficiencies, of course, in the report of the – of POGO regarding some of the communications we’ve had with the contractor.

By the way, let me just say that – just remind everybody, not that you need reminding, but Afghanistan is a very dangerous place. But it is also important that we believe that the Embassy in Kabul has been well protected. We believe Americans, host nationals, and others working at Embassy Kabul have had the security that they need. As I said before, we have a number of investigations going on, and we’ll keep you abreast of the – of developments as we can.

The subject took most of the DPB yesterday. A summary of the topics covered is below. Read the full text here.

ARMOR GROUP

• Documents were shared with Senator McCaskill and Senator Collins
• State Department has a number of investigations going on
• Armor Group contract value is $189 million for one year with four one-year option periods
• State Department does not believe that security has been compromised
• Ambassador Eikenberry is having a town hall meeting tomorrow
• Eight deficiency letters sent to Armor Group and it has been determined that they have addressed these concerns
• The only way to justify renewing the contract is to address deficiencies
• Letters Started in June 2007 and continued through April 30, 2008
• Ninth letter was a show cause notice
• The show cause notice was the first step towards considering termination of the contract
• State Departments has real concerns with this group in Kabul
• Concerns include conduct issues, management of leadership, and Morale and harassment
• Staffing shortages were manned from within the Embassy by supervisory personnel and RSO's
• The decision to renew the contract was based on the information on hand and State was satisfied that the contractor was providing adequate security for the Embassy.
• State Department has eight guard service contracts with ArmorGroup - Kabul, Manama, Bahrain, Quito, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda

BLACKWATER

• State Department has temporarily arranged for an extension of the U.S. Training Center contract
• The contract only applies to aviation services
• State Department is disappointed that a transition to a new contractor cannot be made
• Logicistical issues with Dyncorp

Ultimately, "M" (Management) and Diplomatic Security are the ones on the line here. One oversees administration including contracts and the other has oversight on the ground through the Regional Security Office. Of course, on the ground RSOs report directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission or the Deputy Ambassador, who then reports directly to the US Ambassador. So this thing is going to ricochet through multiple offices and cubicles before this is over. Expect a speedy investigation from OIG, followed by a very public release of the report. And I would not be surprised if they would bring out before long U/S Patrick Kennedy and whoever is the top honcho at DS these days to give an on the record briefing on this. This is such a public meltdown that I doubt if time-outs would work here. (See Dead Men Working's post on heads rolling for this; graphic photos posted).Now, I'll have to see if Ambassador Eikenberry's town hall in Kabul would make it out of the embassy walls.

Related Item:

Senator McCaskill’s letter to U/S Patrick Kennedy | September 1, 2009 SubCommitee on Contracting Oversight

"Operation Coffee Country" Nets Three for Smuggling and Visa Fraud

Quimbaya, Quindío, Colombia
Photo by Shaun McRae
From Wikimedia under cca 2.5 license

From DOJ press release dated June 2: Three Colombian Nationals Arrested, Charged in Alien Smuggling and Visa Fraud Scheme: Three Colombian nationals have been arrested in Colombia on charges of conspiracy to commit alien smuggling for profit, alien smuggling for profit, and conspiracy to commit visa fraud in connection with their alleged roles in an extensive and sophisticated visa fraud scheme against the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia.

Heliber Toro Mejia, 50, Humberto Toro Mejia, 58, and Luz Elena Acuna Rios, 51, all of Bogotá, are charged in a three-count indictment returned by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia on Feb. 4, 2009, and unsealed today. All three defendants were arrested on June 2, 2009, by Colombian authorities in Bogotá on provisional arrest warrants in response to a U.S. government request for their arrest.

According to the indictment, the defendants were the leaders of an extensive and sophisticated visa fraud ring that profited by assisting otherwise inadmissible Colombian nationals in fraudulently procuring U.S. visas from the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá. To support the visa applications of alien applicants, the defendants and other conspirators allegedly created fictitious backgrounds for the aliens and created fraudulent supporting documentation, including paperwork that appeared to be official Colombian government-issued documents such as tax filings and birth and marriage certificates. The indictment alleges that the conspirators coached the aliens on how to pass the U.S. visa interview at the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá by answering questions untruthfully. During the course of this conspiracy, which according to the indictment lasted between July 15, 2005, and March 20, 2007, more than 100 aliens are alleged to have fraudulently obtained or attempted to fraudulently obtain a U.S. visa. According to the indictment, many of those aliens who did obtain a fraudulently-procured visa used that visa to enter the United States.

If convicted, each defendant faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for conspiracy to commit alien smuggling for profit, 10 years in prison for alien smuggling for profit, and five years in prison for conspiracy to commit visa fraud. Each defendant is also subject to a maximum fine of $250,000 for each charge.

The arrests and charges are the result of "Operation Coffee Country," a coordinated international investigation by the Diplomatic Security Service - Regional Security Office in Bogotá and the ICE Attaché’s Office in Bogotá. The Diplomatic Security Service - Criminal Investigations Division and the ICE Special Agent in Charge, Washington, D.C. provided substantial assistance. The Colombian Department of Administrative Security (DAS) and Colombian prosecutors also provided substantial support.

An indictment is merely a formal accusation. It is not proof of guilt, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Love as "Unindicted Co-conspirator”

US Embassy Beijing contractor gets jail time ...

In January this year, a civilian contractor who performed work on the United States Embassy in Beijing, China, pleaded guilty to conspiring to make false statements about and concealing his frequent and lengthy contact with a female Chinese national.

Gregory W. Blackard, 37, of Houston, was arraigned on charges alleged in a superseding indictment returned Wednesday, Jan. 14, 2009, and thereafter entered a plea of guilty to the first count of that indictment before United States District Judge David Hittner. Count One of the superseding indictment accused Blackard of conspiring with a female Chinese national to make false statements to federal agents about his frequent contacts with her over the course of a two-year period and taking steps to prevent discovery of the personal relationship while he was employed as a senior manager of a contractor performing work on the United States Embassy in Beijing. Blackard had obtained the high level security clearance needed to work on the embassy construction and received extensive training and materials on Standards of Conduct (fraternization policy) and counterintelligence programs.

At the hearing, Blackard admitted he had a two-year relationship with a female Chinese national which began in February 2005 and continued through June 2007 and knowingly failed to disclose his frequent and intimate contact with her as required on frequently requested and submitted questionnaires, contact reports and travel reports. He further acknowledged he and the Chinese national, an unindicted co-conspirator, used various methods to prevent the discovery of their relationship including the use of different entrances to his apartment, different meeting places, non-use of cellular telephones or text messaging (because they create a record), avoiding places where westerners might congregate, and constantly were on the lookout for evidence the Department of State Personnel Security Services could possibly use against them. During the two-year period, Blackard received more than $200,000 in salary.

On May 29th, Mary Flood of the Houston Chronicle reports on Blackard’s sentencing before U.S. District Judge Gray Miller. The court papers call Blackard's love an "unindicted coconspirator." His lawyer also asked the court for leniency because Blackard had never been in trouble before, was a good worker, a good father and a good son.

Judge Miller sentenced Blackard to the six months in prison and refused the lawyer’s request that it be served in a community facility. The sentence includes three years of post-prison supervision and 180 hours of community service. Blackard will reportedly remain free on bond but must report to prison when told to do so by the Bureau of Prisons.


I think he got lucky; it could have been worse. According to DOJ, conspiracy conviction carries a penalty of not more than five years imprisonment, a fine of not more than $250,000 and a supervised release term of not less than three years.

Who can resist stories like this? Perhaps it is the human interest here or maybe it's just that I've never heard of "love" called an unindicted co-conspirator before. It just seems so ... so stupid to imagine that you won't get caught. At the same time, it also seems understandable that somebody who is aware of the consequences would still go to great lengths to do this. He should have known better... right. But who can explain the crazy things people do when they are in love? Can you? As Patsy sings it, "worry, why do I let myself worry..." I guess that's why there's the regs, so one knows understand what's at stake and not let oneself worry ...

Related Items:

• AFSA Reminder: Rules for Reporting Foreign Contacts and Intent to Marry or Cohabit with Foreign Nationals (May 11, 2009)



• 12 FAM 270: Security Reporting Requirements



• 12 FAM 262: Security Awareness and Contact Reporting

Diplomatic Security’s Gregory Starr Heads to the UN

On May 6^th, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of Gregory B. Starr of the United States as chief of United Nations security, replacing David Veness, who resigned last year in the wake of the 2007 terrorist attack against UN facilities in Algiers.

Mr. Starr is currently the State Department’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Diplomatic Security Service Director. As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, he is the number two officer in charge of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), the security and law enforcement arm of the State Department.

According to his State bio, Mr. Starr concurrently serves as Director of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). In this position, Mr. Starr manages the day-to-day operations of some 32,000 Special Agents, Diplomatic Couriers, Security Engineering Officers, Security Technical Specialists, and other professionals who make up DS’s global security and law enforcement force.

Mr. Starr’s new title is Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security. The UN announcement is here. His State Department official bio is here. No word on who will succeed him as numero dos over at DS.

Tomas Perez: Diplomatic Courier Honored for Heroism

Foreign Affairs Day seems like an appropriate day to remember not just retirees who are back at the State Department for the annual homecoming event, but also current employees who have done more than what is asked of them. One of them is Tomas “Andy” Perez, a diplomatic courier who was honored this past February with the State Department’s Award for Heroism.

As a Diplomatic Courier, Perez routinely accompanies classified diplomatic pouches in support of the U.S. Department of State’s mission, ensuring that equipment and materials arrive securely at diplomatic posts. However, on May 25, 2008, the job was anything but routine.

That morning Perez was strapped into the jump seat of a Kalitta 747-200 cargo aircraft, traveling with a four-member crew from Brussels. As the aircraft began takeoff, Perez and the crew heard a loud noise. The pilot aborted liftoff and tried to stop the aircraft, but, as the landing gear failed, the airplane skipped the runway and plunged into a field. The crash caused the fuselage to break apart. The aircraft’s nose section, which included the cockpit holding Perez and the four crew members, broke off from the rest of the plane and dropped to the ground, stopping just 26 feet from high power lines and railroad tracks.

Despite sustaining injuries, Perez jumped into action to help the others on board. In the chaos, the air filling with the smell of jet fuel, and two of the escape hatches damaged by the crash and rendered unusable, Perez was able to locate a working hatch, open it, and lead the crew to safety. However, the group then faced a steep, dangerous descent, and the crew was understandably hesitant to jump from the plane. Perez again led the way, demonstrating how to use the escape slide to slow their steep descent and land safely.

Once the crew was safely on the ground, Perez attended to the injured and quickly alerted authorities at the Department about the accident and his need for support. Never forgetting his duty as a Diplomatic Courier, Perez refused to leave the site for medical treatment so that he could maintain surveillance of the diplomatic pouches—enough material to fill an 18-wheeler truck. Crews from U.S. Embassies around the world flew in to take shifts guarding the cargo continuously for eight days while HAZMAT personnel cleared the leaking jet fuel and investigators combed the crash site.

For his valor under life-threatening conditions, Perez was presented with the Department of State’s Award for Heroism. In a ceremony on February 17, 2009 at the U.S. Department of State’s Annex in Rosslyn, Virginia, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Eric J. Boswell presented Perez with a medal set and a certificate signed by the Secretary.

Perez became a Diplomatic Courier in 2005 and worked in the Washington, D.C. office. He began working in the Frankfurt Regional Diplomatic Courier Division in September 2008. The presentation of the Award for Heroism is not the first time the U.S. Department of State has honored Perez. In 2007, he received the Meritorious Honor Award for outstanding efforts in office modernization and dedication to the mission of the U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service. Prior to coming to State, Perez served in the United States Army for eight years; he was a Russian linguist, and he received two Army Achievement medals.

Quickie: A Severely Stretched Service

State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security not only handles security for embassies and other civilian outposts around the globe but also protects foreign officials visiting the United States. With only 1,600 highly trained special agents in the bureau, the Iraq mandate has severely stretched the service. "You'd need the entire [Diplomatic Security] workforce just to do Iraq," a senior State Department official said, "leaving nothing for Afghanistan, nothing for anywhere else in the world."

U.S. Moves to Replace Contractors in Iraq
Blackwater Losing Security Role; Other Jobs Being Converted to Public Sector
Karen DeYoung │Washington Post
Tuesday, March 17, 2009; Page A07

What's State Doing with Question 21?

“Question 21” on Standard Form 86, is the item in the government security-clearance form that specifically asks applicants or employees renewing their clearance whether they have ever received treatment for mental-health issues. Here is DOD on Security Clearance Question 21. What is the State Department doing with Q21?

Walter Reed Strives to Remove
Stigma from Mental Health Care

Military Works to Eliminate Perceived Mental Health Treatment Stigma

Leaders Should Step Up, Receive Mental Health Care if Needed

DoD Changes Question to
Encourage Troops to Ask for Help

Gates Announces Change to
Security Clearance Question 21

Related Posts:

• Join the Petition: Revise Q21 for the Foreign Service
• PTSD on the Cheap?
• On the Infamous Q21, PTSD and the Wholeness of People in the Foreign Service

Would Blackwater Be Beta Dog Now?

Iraq to Deny New License To Blackwater Security Firm, WaPo reports (January 29, 2009; A12). The Iraqi government has informed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that it will not issue a new operating license to Blackwater Worldwide, the embassy's primary security company, which has come under scrutiny for allegedly using excessive force while protecting American diplomats, Iraqi and U.S. officials said Wednesday.

I don’t think this is a totally unexpected development. I think folks have been waiting for this shoe to drop for a while now.

Quick review of the protective services contracts:

March 2000
– Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS-I) Contract
(former Yugoslavia)
DynCorp International

July 2002
– WPPS-I (expanded) Palestinian Territories
DynCorp International

November 2002
– WPPS-I (expanded) Afghanistan
DynCorp International

2005
– WPPS-II Contract Iraq
Blackwater USA (Baghdad and Hillah)
DynCorp (Erbil and Kirkuk)
Triple Canopy (Tallil and Basra)

2009
– WPPS-III (contract to be awarded early 2009?)

The OIG reports that “there have been no assessments or analysis to determine the personal protective service requirements in Iraq, including how many security personnel to employ, where they should be deployed, or the level and manner of protection given the threat in particular locations. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) noted several instances that raised concerns over the efficient deployment of contractor security assets.”

The concerns it cited over efficient deployment are as follows:

• In Tallil in 2007, there were no security protection movements for more than six consecutive months despite having between 30 to 53 security specialists stationed there.
  
  
• At the Basra Regional Embassy Office, chief of mission personnel had engaged in five security movements since January 2008 off the Air Base, and as of late-September 2008, approximately 113 security specialists, support staff, and guard force personnel were assigned there.
  
  
• In August 2008, at the mostly vacated Kirkuk Regional Embassy Office, the OIG team observed that 14 private security specialists and guard force personnel were assigned to protect one Foreign Service administrative officer.

That infamous shooting at Nisur Square involved 19 private security specialists, in four heavily armed trucks transporting a USAID protectee. I'm not begrudging the protection afforded COM personnel in Iraq but how effectively can they really do their jobs if they are delivered and extracted by troops of armed guards to/from their every meeting point? And considering that we have people who want us dead there, aren't the other parties in these meetings put at risk simply by meeting US officials? No answers, just questions ...

According to the OIG, Department security officials have also stated there were no plans to conduct an overall assessment of the security requirements in Iraq before the solicitation and awarding of WPPS III contract. Why not? I'm scratching my head here, why not?

Wouldn’t it make sense to find out how many you need before you contract out those services? While at it, perhaps the new administration can put rightsizing the embassy in Baghdad in somebody’s top must-do list, too (please not HR)? With transparency in the air, it's about time we see some sunlight on the logic of the staffing pattern there.

In any case, Blackwater is the largest provider of private security specialists, administrative and support staff, and guard force for the State Department, so this development has the potential to significantly impact what State can do in Iraq. Unless, Blackwater buys a stake either/both in DynCorp or Triple Canopy, and be the beta dog or the two other companies hire the former BW guards.


Or there is this …

U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor said during the indictment of the Blackwater guards on December 8:

As set forth in the indictment, the five defendants were all employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States. Specifically, the defendants worked as independent contractors and employees of Blackwater Worldwide, a company contracted by the Department of State to provide personal security services related to supporting the Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq, within the meaning of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, or MEJA.

This indictment represents the first prosecution under MEJA to be filed against non-Defense Department private contractors, which was not possible prior to 2004 amendments that specifically expanded the reach of MEJA to non-Defense Department contractors who provide services, quote, “in support of the mission of the Department of Defense overseas” end quote.

So apparently -- these guards were contracted by the State Department “to provide personal security services related to supporting the Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq.” If that is the case, if State is supporting DOD in Iraq, then perhaps the time has come for Hill and Bob to have that MOU for DOD to provide security protection for our embassy personnel?


BTW, am I the only one confused by that attorney's convoluted reasoning about why these guys are covered by the MEJA? On December 12, the Congressional Research Service writes that "As the term is defined in the agreement, “U.S. contractors and their employees” only applies to contractors that are operating under a contract/subcontract with or for the United States Forces. Therefore, U.S. contractors operating in Iraq under contract to other U.S. departments/agencies are not subject to the terms of the SOFA and are, arguably, immune from Iraqi civil and criminal jurisdiction as long as CPA Order 17 remains in effect."


Since CPA Order 17 have not been rescinded when the SOFA was signed, doesn't it stand within reason that it was in effect prior to the signing of the SOFA, and thus still covered the now indicted guards? I don't know if these guards are guilty or not, I don't know them from Adam, never met any of them -- but I have some Vulcan blood; I like logic served cold.

Related Items:

OIG: Review of Diplomatic Security’s Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq
(January 2009)

CRS: U.S. – Iraq Withdrawal: Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight
December 12, 2008

OIG: Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations
(December 2008)

Bad News Round-up

Tell me there will be some good news tomorrow ...


On January 27: Fox News reports that "U.S. Consulate Mistakenly Sells Secret Files in Jerusalem"

Three years ago, in December 2005, a woman reportedly purchased a file cabinet from the American Consulate in Jerusalem during its regular furniture auction. Fox News reports last Tuesday (January 27, 2009) that “hundreds of files — with social security numbers, bank account numbers and other sensitive U.S. government information — were found in a filing cabinet.”

"We thought of calling the American consulate right away, and then we thought, you know they'll just hide it and say, 'Oh, we made a mistake.” The buyer, a woman named Paula was quoted as saying.

According to the report, Paula decided to come forward with the file after hearing about a Sept. 22, 2008 incident in which a Palestinian teenager crashed a BMW into a group of Israeli soldiers (her son’s unit); and she was angered when she heard that the car was purchased from an auction held by the consulate. The report includes a statement about U.S. officials denying any connection to the car. Fox News investigation also found there was no connection. “Paula, an Israeli who also holds U.S. citizenship, says she wanted to expose the incident because her loyalty is to the state of Israel.”

I just want to point out that a U.S. Consulate is normally a much smaller presence than an embassy. Whereas an embassy would have a senior General Services Officer (GSO) who may directly supervises auctions like this (reporting to a Management Officer), in smaller posts, auctions and other management and administrative duties become collateral duties for Consular, Political, or Econ/Pol Officers. So one becomes post management officer or post security officer in addition to one’s primary gig. But in this case, it looks like Jerusalem has its own Management Officer, GSO and its own Regional Security Officer.

Read more about this here.

The Department’s Acting Spokesman, Robert Wood confirmed to the press yesterday that there is an investigation underway and that “the file – the components of the file cabinets have been returned,” but could not say when.

TSB at the Skeptical Bureaucrat has written about this here.

On January 28: Third State Department worker pleads guilty to passport snooping

A third former employee of the U.S. Department of State has pleaded guilty to illegally accessing the electronic passport application files of Barack Obama and dozens of other politicians and celebrities in a snooping case that came to light last March.

Gerald Lueders, 65, of Woodbridge, Va., entered the guilty plea yesterday in U.S. District Court in Washington, admitting to a single count of unauthorized computer access, the U.S. Department of Justice announced.

In his guilty plea, Lueders acknowledged that between July 2005 and last February, he logged into the State Department's Passport Information Electronic Records System (PIERS) and viewed the passport applications of more than 50 politicians, actors, musicians, athletes, members of the media and other people.

Since all the three incidents appear to be all out of idle curiosity, makes one wonder why they had time to be idle in the first place. Once I worked with somebody who often pretends she was doing work while reading magazines as the rest of the office scrambles to attend to customers. Nobody ever said anything about it. Until a new supervisor arrived. The supervisor, a lovely, grouchy old lady marched up to this woman's desk and simply growled, "Doris (not a real name) what are you doing?" I loved that lady! And that was the end of "Doris's" hobby work during office hours.

Read the whole thing here.

One January 28: An ABC News Exclusive: CIA Station Chief in Algeria Accused of Rapes

The CIA's station chief at its sensitive post in Algeria is under investigation by the U.S. Justice Department for allegedly raping at least two Muslim women who claim he laced their drinks with a knock-out drug, U.S. law enforcement sources tell ABC News.

The suspect in the case is identified as ***** in an affidavit for a search warrant filed in federal court in Washington, D.C. by Scott Banker, Special Agent with the United States Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). The allegations against the suspect were for committing aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(b)(2) and 2242. Officials say the 41-year old *****, a convert to Islam, was ordered home by the U.S. Ambassador, David Pearce, in October after the women came forward with their rape allegations in September.

Greg Miller reporting for the LA Times quotes an unnamed government official speaking of the suspect: "He is exactly the guy we need out in the field," said a senior U.S. government official who had met with the accused officer in Algiers last summer before the scandal emerged. "He's African American. He's Muslim. He speaks the language. He seemed well put together, sharp and experienced."

More on this here, here and here. And one more from CQ. I'm sure there'll be a lot more coverage on this as the story develops. However this turns out, his cover is blown now.

Click here to read the affidavit (graphic details).

Excuse me, I need to go to the vomitorium now.

Insider Quote: The truth is you do less with less

Do you feel that the U.S. State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) should continue to use Private Security Contractors (i.e. Blackwater, Dyncorps, Triple Canopy) to fulfill its protection responsibilities in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan?

“YES in the near term; The current state of DS, in my opinion, necessitates the use of contractors in this area. We currently do not have sufficient personnel to effectively carry out the mission. Political issues preclude our senior management from openly and honestly disclosing the true extent of our need for resources required to fulfill our mandate abroad. For years, DS has done "more with less" but the truth is you do less with less. Until there is a consensus within the branches of government that our mission must be more appropriately funded, we will have to employ private security firms to augment our personnel in critical threat locations. Even in the unlikely event that we are authorized to recruit, hire and train enough Agents to deal with our expanding duties, they will not be mission ready in the short term.”

Diplomatic Security Agent #5
―p.97

Should the U.S. Department of State Continue to Use Private Security Contractors to Protect U.S. Diplomats?
June 2008 │140 pages PDF
By Special Agent Derek Dela-Cruz
(Master of Military Art and Science, Fort Leavenworth, KS)

Join the Petition: Revised Q21 for the Foreign Service

I don't know what it is like to have post-traumatic syndrome disorder or PTSD; the closest I've been was what I'd call "moving blues" which lasted for about six months. It was dark and depressing but nothing like what Kristin Loken, a Foreign Service officer with USAID had experienced. In the January 2008 issue of the Foreign Service Journal, she writes:

"Strong emotions would come and go without any relevance to what was happening around me. I had regular nightmares about running away from uniformed men with guns trying to kill me. Sometimes I would also have what I called “daymares.” I would encounter a person at work in a meeting and see them suddenly fall victim to some horrible trauma — a car wreck, a shooting, a bomb explosion. These daymares struck quickly, then disappeared, leaving me sitting in a meeting not knowing what I had missed. As I tried to regain normal functioning, I noticed that my mouth wouldn’t work right; I couldn’t talk properly and could hardly communicate with people around me.

There was a great deal going on inside my head, but it had no relevance to what was going on in the world around me. I could answer a direct question in a few words, but then could not say anything more for long periods of time. I didn’t feel sad; I didn’t feel happy. Often I didn’t seem to feel anything at all."

It seems like every week, I get somebody online with the search phrase "PTSD and security clearance concerns." It's been months since the Secretary of Defense has successfully advocated the revision of Question 21 of the SF-86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions for DOD and I have not heard a single thing out of State. With a few remaining days left in office, I doubt if this is going to get any attention from the current occupant of the 7th Floor.


I also find it troubling that none of the webpages of Mental Health Services, Bureau of Diplomatic Security or "M" carry any information nor guidance on mental health consultations/treatment and its relevance to the employee's medical and security clearance. Please don't tell me they are on the intranet. Family members and partners do not have ready access to that thing.


In any case, I figure that with an incoming Secretary of State, this would be a good time to initiate a petition. I have considered the pros and cons of an online petition and have reservations not just with publicly posting names of petitioners, but also whether the intended recipients ever actually read online petitions. Thus, this one is going to be an old fashion, paper and snail mail petition.


Below is the text of the petition urging the revision of Question 21 of SF-86 for the Foreign Service. You can download the petition in Word file here or PDF file here. Please sign it, collect five other names/signatures from your immediate colleagues and mail it off to the Mother ship. I also urge you to pass on this petition to family members and friends of the Foreign Service for additional support.


The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is scheduled to examine the nomination of Hillary R. Clinton to be Secretary of State on Tuesday (January 13, (9:30 am, SH-216). On January 15, the SFRC will have a business meeting to consider HRC's nomination. With a simple majority needed for confirmation, I expect that she will be confirmed very shortly after the new president takes office. I would therefore suggest that petition letters be mailed off between now and February 20, 2009 to help ensure that the letters will be at her office when she assumes her duties.

~ ~ ~

Date

The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520

PETITION: Revised Q21 for the Foreign Service

We, the undersigned call on the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton upon assumption into office, to reaffirm that the Department of State strongly endorses the practice of seeking professional help to address all health- related concerns whether mental or physical; to also reaffirm that the Department of State considers it a mark of strength and maturity to seek appropriate health care whenever required; and to make clear that seeking professional care for mental health issues in and itself is not a reason to revoke or deny an individual’s security clearance. This is important in the Foreign Service, whose members are exposed to traumatic events with psychological impact not only in conflict zones but also in diplomatic hardship assignments worldwide.

Nearly 60% of our Foreign Service personnel are at posts considered by the U.S.Government as "hardship" due to difficult living conditions (for example, violent crime, harsh climate, social isolation, unhealthy air, and/or terrorist threats). Of those hardship posts, half are rated at or above the 15-percent differential level which constitutes great hardship, and where family members are unable to accompany such assignments.

In April 2008, the Secretary of Defense has successfully advocated the revision of Question 21 of the SF-86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions, which asks about mental health treatment. The revised question excludes counseling related to marital, family or grief issues, unless related to violence by the applicant/employee. It also rules out counseling for adjustments from service in a military combat environment. The OSD guidance also points out that failure to seek care increases the likelihood that psychological distress could escalate to a more serious mental condition, which could preclude an individual from performing sensitive duties.

Your immediate predecessor has not released a similar affirmation to encourage the treatment of PTSD and other related mental health issues. The Concerned Foreign Service Officers has noted “the continued revocations of security clearances based on mental health treatment - a practice that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security routinely perpetuates even after DOD and OPM have agreed not to count certain types of treatment, e.g. for PTSD, against the employee.”

The organization of the 21^st century will be judged by the wholeness of its people. The first step to getting us there is to help ensure that Foreign Service officers, specialists, and family members and partners obtain the help they need without fear that such consultation/treatment jeopardizes their security clearance and employment.

Sincerely,
Employees, Family Members/Partners and Friends of the U.S.Foreign Service

Your name/signature:

Collect five more names/signatures

Name/signature 1:

Name/signature 2:

Name/signature 3:

Name/signature 4:

Name/signature 5:

References:

Office of the Secretary of Defense - Revised Q21
http://www.army.mil/docs/OSD_Guidance_on_Revised_Q21.pdf

Concerned Foreign Service Officers Warning On Mental Health Treatment
http://www.emaxhealth.com/7/11720.html

Foreign Service Journal January 2008: Focus on PTSD and the Foreign Service
http://www.afsa.org/fsj/2008.cfm

Executive Order 10450
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10450.html

Executive Order 12968
http://www.opm.gov/extra/investigate/eo12968.asp

~ ~ ~

Download:
Petition in Word (if you want to insert your own story)
Petition in PDF

Sorry I don't have a mail budget so the stamp is on you :-). Please mail signed petition to:

Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520


Many thanks for your help!