The Sunday Times last week reported that Abdulmutallab had come onto MI5’s radar because of his “multiple communications” with extremists in the UK, including several radical figures at mosques.The report quotes one Whitehall official: “This was a young man who while he was in the UK was starting his journey and was exploring an interest in radical Islam. He was making contact and reaching out to people who were MI5’s targets of interest.”
Apparently UK’s MI5 concluded that Abdulmutallab did not pose a threat to national security.The report also says that British officials believe Abdulmutallab decided to become a suicide bomber only after leaving UCL last year and travelling to Yemen. They also think that up to a dozen young British Muslims are receiving terrorist training in that country.
The Associated Press reported yesterday that Rashad al-Alimi, Yemen’s deputy prime minister for defense and security has told reporters that Abdulmutallab was first recruited by Al-Qaida when he lived in London from 2005-2008: "During the period he was living in Britain, I believe he was recruited by radical groups in Britain."
What do we make of this?
If what the Yemini minister says is true, Abdulmutallab joins UK-born, Richard Reid, the shoe bomber who was also radicalized in London. Which makes one wonder -- how did MI5 miss these two and how many more young men starting their “journeys” have also been missed across the pond.
If what MI5 says is true, then we are faced with an equally disturbing truth – Al Qaeda could recruit, train and deploy a suicide bomber in 3-4 months.
Various documents on USA v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab including the 12/26/09 complaint and the 1/6/10 indictment have now been posted in cryptome.org.
… And the rationale for the all-source, multi-agency NCTC is all about intelligence sharing. But remember: the inputs are that the guy’s dad says he’s dangerous; he’s Nigerian; he might be in Yemen; and al-Qaeda in Yemen may be looking to use a Nigerian in a forthcoming attack. Is that really enough?
The answer to that question most certainly requires a policy decision, not an intelligence decision. The intelligence community is drinking from a fire hose of data, a lot of it much more specific than what was acquired on Abdulmutallab. If policymakers decide that these thin reeds will be the standard for stopping someone from entering the United States, then they need to change the process to enshrine that in the no-fly system. But it will make it much harder for people who aren’t threatening to enter, a move that will ripple out to effect diplomacy, security relationships (good luck entering the U.S. for a military-to-military contact program if, say, you’re a member of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, since you had contacts with known extremists), international business and trade, and so on. Are we prepared for that?
The four countries (Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria) designated as “state sponsors of terrorism” have a collective total population of 141 million people (2007 estimate | WolframAlpha). The ten “countries of interest” have a collective total population of 468.1 million people (2007 estimate | Wolfram Alpha).
The new directive mandates that “every individual flying into the U.S. from anywhere in the world traveling from or through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest will be required to go through enhanced screening.”
I do not know how many non-citizen travelers actually originate/transit/travel through these 14 countries en route to the United States. But I was curious at how many nationals from these countries could be impacted by the new directive. So I went digging for numbers.
Below is the grand total of nonimmigrant visa issuance and admission by nationality on the reported countries covered by the new TSA enhanced screening directive. The “ISSUED” data come from published statistics of the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the State Department, covering the period October 2007-September 2008. (See the FY2008 NIV Detail Table on nonimmigrant visa issuances by visa class and by nationality). Issued visas can be as short as 3 months with one entry or can have the maximum validity of 10 years with multiple entry. Which actually means, you can use it to travel to any US port of entry or border crossing and apply for temporary admission into the country while it is valid. The validity of the visa is not the length of authorized stay in the United States. Read more here.
The “ADMITTED” column below comes from the Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains the records of admittance to the United States of foreign visitors by citizenship, country of residence, gender, age, etc. Even with a visa, the authority to admit an alien into the US is still under DHS. The length of stay that immigration officers grant foreign visitors can vary, but the normal length of stay authorized as I understand it is usually six months. Check out its Yearbook of Immigration Statisticshere. You might also want to check out this April 2009 Annual Flow Report from DHS on admission. The DHS numbers below are extracted from Table 26(XLS, 54 KB Nonimmigrant Admissions (I-94 Only) by Region and Country of Citizenship: Fiscal Years 1999 to 2008).
It is important to note that the number of issuance and number of admission above have no real correlation because an applicant issued a visa in 2008 may have decided to travel/apply for admission at a port of entry in the United States in 2009. Or a visitor who applied for admission for entry in the United States in 2008 may have been issued a visa a year or two previously. To see the trends in the number of admission to the United States, check out DHS’s Table 26, an excel spreadsheet that details total admission by country from FY 2009 FY 1999 – FY 2008.
This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR
As is well known, a Nigerian national named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to destroy a passenger aircraft traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009. Metal detectors cannot pinpoint the chemical in the device he sought to detonate, PETN. The PETN was strapped to his groin. Since a detonator could have been detected, the attacker chose — or had chosen for him — a syringe filled with acid for use as an improvised alternative means to initiate the detonation. In the event, the device failed to detonate, but it did cause a fire in a highly sensitive area of the attacker’s body. An alert passenger put out the fire. The plane landed safely. It later emerged that the attacker’s father, a prominent banker in Nigeria, had gone to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria to warn embassy officials of his concerns that his son might be involved with jihadists.
The incident drove home a number of points. First, while al Qaeda prime — the organization that had planned and executed 9/11 — might be in shambles, other groups in other countries using the al Qaeda brand name and following al Qaeda prime’s ideology remain operational and capable of mounting attacks. Second, like other recent attacks, this attack was relatively feeble: It involved a single aircraft, and the explosive device was not well-conceived. Third, it remained and still remains possible for a terrorist to bring explosives on board an aircraft. Fourth, intelligence available in Nigeria, London and elsewhere had not moved through the system with sufficient speed to block the terrorist from boarding the flight.
An Enduring Threat
From this three things emerge. First, although the capabilities of jihadist terrorists have declined, their organizations remain functional, and there is no guarantee that these organizations won’t increase in sophistication and effectiveness. Second, the militants remain focused on the global air transport system. Third, the defensive mechanisms devised since 2001 remain ineffective to some degree.
The purpose of terrorism in its purest form is to create a sense of insecurity among a public. It succeeds when fear moves a system to the point where it can no longer function. This magnifies the strength of the terrorist by causing the public to see the failure of the system as the result of the power of the terrorist. Terror networks are necessarily sparse. The greater the number of persons involved, the more likely a security breach becomes. Thus, there are necessarily few people in a terror network. An ideal terror network is global, able to strike anywhere and in multiple places at once. The extent of the terror network is unknown, partly because of its security systems and partly because it is so sparse that finding a terrorist is like finding a needle in a haystack. It is the fact that the size and intentions of the terror network are unknown that generates the sense of terror and empowers the terrorist.
The global aspect is also important. That attacks can originate in many places and that attackers can belong to many ethnic groups increases the desired sense of insecurity. All Muslims are not members of al Qaeda, but all members of al Qaeda are Muslims, and any Muslim might be a member of al Qaeda. This logic is beneficial to radical Islamists, who want to increase the sense of confrontation between Islam and the rest of the world. This not only increases the sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the rest of the world, it also increases hostility toward Muslims, strengthening al Qaeda’s argument to Muslims that they are in an unavoidable state of war with the rest of the world. Equally important is the transmission of the idea that if al Qaeda is destroyed in one place, it will spring up elsewhere.
This terror attack made another point, intended or not. U.S. President Barack Obama recently decided to increase forces in Afghanistan. A large part of his reasoning was that Afghanistan was the origin of 9/11, and the Taliban hosted al Qaeda. Therefore, he reasoned the United States should focus its military operations in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, since that was the origin of al Qaeda. But the Christmas Day terror attempt originated in Yemen, a place where the United States has been fighting a covert war with limited military resources. It therefore raises the question of why Obama is focusing on Afghanistan when the threat from al Qaeda spinoffs can originate anywhere.
From the terrorist perspective, the Yemen attack was a low-cost, low-risk operation. If it succeeded in bringing down a U.S. airliner over Detroit, the psychological impact would be massive. If it failed to do so, it would certainly increase a sense of anxiety, cause the U.S. and other governments to institute new and expensive security measures, and potentially force the United States into expensive deployments of forces insufficient to dominate a given country but sufficient to generate an insurgency. If just some of these things happened, the attack would have been well worth the effort.
Today, the Transportation Security Administration issued new security directives to all United States and international air carriers with inbound flights to the U.S. effective January 4, 2010.
The new directive includes long-term, sustainable security measures developed in consultation with law enforcement officials and our domestic and international partners. Because effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders, and as a result of extraordinary cooperation from our global aviation partners, TSA is mandating that every individual flying into the U.S. from anywhere in the world traveling from or through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest will be required to go through enhanced screening. The directive also increases the use of enhanced screening technologies and mandates threat-based and random screening for passengers on U.S. bound international flights.
WaPo reports that TSA officials declined to name all the "countries of interest" on Sunday, but confirmed that the directive applies to the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The department's Web site lists Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. The report also says that “a senior administration official identified the following as terrorism-prone nations or countries of interest to U.S. intelligence agencies: Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen.”
The NYT on its coverage (U.S. Intensifies Air Screening for Fliers From 14 Nations) points out that these new changes will mean that “any citizen of Pakistan or Saudi Arabia will for the first time be patted down automatically before boarding any flight to the United States. Even if that person has lived in a country like Britain for decades, he now will be subject to these extra security checks.”
Nigeria has already criticized its inclusion under the new air passenger screening saying "It is unfair to discriminate against 150 million people because of the behaviour of one person."
2009 IG Inspection Says No Fly List Reduce Vulnerabilities, but Additional Vulnerabilities May Exist
The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security this past July released a redacted report on the Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation. The report includes background on the Secure Flight Program Implementation, Terrorist Screening Database, the No Fly and Selectee Lists and other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database. The OIG in its review writes that the No Fly and Selectee Lists reduce vulnerabilities to commercial aviation security, but that additional vulnerabilities may exist:
“The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the TSDB, the federal government’s consolidated watch list. The name inclusion criteria for these two lists are more narrowly focused and restrictive than the inclusion criteria for the entire TSDB. Specifically, the No Fly and Selectee lists focus on aviation security and concentrate on [REDACTED].
Although the No Fly and Selectee lists are largely successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, some individuals not included on the lists may also present threats to aviation security.”
Below is an excerpt from the report on the No Fly and Selectee Lists section:
No Fly and Selectee Lists
The No Fly and Selectee lists, two TSDB derivative watch lists, are unique among all watch lists derived from the TSDB. They are the only derivative watch lists that have their own minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements. These requirements are considerably more stringent than the TSDB’s known or reasonably suspected standard. Additionally, the No Fly and Selectee lists have the narrowest minimum biographic inclusion criteria of all TSDB watch lists.
Minimum Inclusion Criteria
The No Fly and Selectee inclusion criteria were initially established in October 2004 by the Homeland Security Council. This council is a cabinet-level body that coordinates homeland security–related activities and promotes effective homeland security policy development and implementation. The No Fly and Selectee Lists Implementation Guidance accompanying the inclusion criteria was released in January 2005. When establishing the initial criteria, responsibility for maintenance and export of the lists was transferred to the TSC. Prior to this time, TSA maintained the No Fly and Selectee lists. The lists were created in September 2001, before TSA was established, when the Federal Aviation Administration received 125 names from the FBI for inclusion on a No Fly list.
No Fly List Criteria
The TSC updated and supplemented the implementation guidance in July 2006. Recently, the Homeland Security Council [REDACTED] to allow for inclusion of more individuals on the No Fly list. The TSC’s Policy Board Working Group followed suit with new implementation guidance, all of which went into effect in June 2008. Appendix D provides more detail on the No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance (DS note: guidance extensively redacted).
Two paragraphs [REDACTED]
Selectee List Criteria
The derogatory information criteria for including an individual on the Selectee list require that an individual who is ineligible for inclusion on the No Fly list meet [REDACTED] the Selectee list criteria. Specifically, the Selectee list should include any person, regardless of citizenship, who is: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
In applying more narrow requirements than the TSDB’s minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements, the No Fly and Selectee lists are intended to prevent specific categories of terrorists from boarding commercial aircraft or subject these terrorists to secondary screening prior to boarding, and are not for use as law enforcement or intelligence-gathering tools. Past and present implementation guidance emphasizes that the criteria for the No Fly list require a [REDACTED] and that the Selectee list is not a default for those who do not qualify for inclusion on the No Fly list.
The current minimum biographic inclusion criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were not changed during the June 2008 policy revisions, require a [REDACTED] for a TSDB record to export to either list. [REDACTED] Given the restrictive derogatory and biographic criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists, these lists combined comprise the smallest exported subset of the TSDB. As of May 2008, the No Fly list contained approximately [REDACTED] records, and the Selectee list contained approximately [REDACTED] records, collectively comprising of the TSDB’s records. Additionally, the combined number of No Fly and Selectee records represents approximately [REDACTED] distinct identities, of which are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.
Process for Inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee Lists
Redundancies in the process through which individuals are added to the No Fly or Selectee list ensure that the proper individuals are watch-listed. For international terrorists, this process starts with a federal agency, usually a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, nominating an individual for inclusion in TIDE. The NCTC’s Terrorist Identities Group reviews nominations for the reliability of derogatory information and the sufficiency of biographic identifying information.
Nominating agencies can recommend an individual for inclusion on specific TSDB derivative watch lists, such as the No Fly and Selectee lists. Additionally, although the NCTC is not a nominator, its Terrorist Identities Group analysts, after reviewing all source intelligence information, may identify eligible individuals for watch-listing and contact the originator of the intelligence to request that the individual be nominated for inclusion in TIDE with specific watch list recommendations. Domestic terrorists are nominated to the TSDB via the FBI’s Terrorist Review and Examination Unit, by FBI case agents, and by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division; also, each of these can make specific watch list recommendations.
[REDACTED] the NCTC transmits to the TSC an export of additions and modifications of biographic and biometric identifiers from TIDE, resulting in additions, modifications, and deletions to the TSDB. These transmissions are collectively referred to as nominations. Analysts in the Nominations and Data Integrity Unit at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of each nomination for inclusion eligibility in the TSDB and for appropriateness of export to the various watch lists. As part of this review, TSC analysts review specific recommendations for initial No Fly or Selectee watch-listing, as well as follow-up recommendations for changes to an individual’s No Fly or Selectee status. This review ensures that recommendations are consistent with the biographic and derogatory inclusion criteria. Appendix E provides a graphic representation of the No Fly and Selectee list nomination process.
When TSC analysts recommend a change to an individual’s No Fly or Selectee status, the nomination is forwarded to TSA subject matter experts (SME), who are detailed to the TSC from TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). The SMEs review the previous analyst’s notes and all accessible derogatory information associated with the nomination. When SMEs determine that a change to the No Fly or Selectee status is warranted, TSA coordinates the change with the FBI’s Terrorist Review and Examination Unit and case agents for FBI investigative subjects, or with the NCTC for nominations from other federal agencies.
Domestic terrorism nominations go through a similar process. TSC domestic terrorism SMEs also review nominations for TSDB inclusion eligibility and for appropriateness to export to various watch lists, including the No Fly and Selectee lists. The SMEs coordinate with the Terrorist Review and Examination Unit to resolve any issues with a nomination or its watch-listing recommendation.
Other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database
In addition to the No Fly and Selectee lists, the TSDB exports daily to three other federal watch lists that are also used to conduct terrorism screening. Although none of these databases has its own minimum substantive derogatory criteria beyond the known or reasonably suspected standard, each has minimum biographic criteria requirements and some have additional restrictions.
The databases include: 1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s TECS Database,
2) Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System |The Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is a name-checking system used to screen visa applications for travel to the United States. A visa allows a foreign national to travel to a U.S. port of entry to request admittance into the country. Administered by the Visa Office within the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, CLASS is used by consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants against a number of government watch lists, including an exported subset of the TSDB. Once a CLASS name search identifies an individual, and that identity is verified, Department of State consular officers make a determination of visa eligibility according to federal law. 3) Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File and one other list: Additional Non-Federal Watch List Terrorist Screening Database Exports.
The OIG report provided one recommendation to TSA:
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration:
Recommendation #1: Determine whether it is appropriate to [REDACTED] to No Fly restrictions or additional screening prior to boarding an aircraft.
TSA Response: TSA concurred in part with this recommendation. In its response, TSA management said the nomination criteria for each list produced from the TSDB are developed and approved by a multiagency working group overseen by the Homeland Security Council. Each individual nominated to a terrorist watch list must independently meet the nomination criteria in order to be watch-listed. [REDACTED] would require an amendment to the nomination criteria.
[REDACTED] on the No Fly and Selectee lists, TSA said the only apparent and effective way to ensure that these individuals are restricted from boarding an aircraft or undergo additional screening would be to add them to the No Fly or Selectee list. TSA management said this would [REDACTED], and raises privacy and other concerns. [REDACTED] listed on the No Fly or Selectee list meet the criteria for nomination to either list, these individuals will be placed on the list.
TSA management responded further that it will need to explore this issue with other interested agencies to determine whether [REDACTED] on the No Fly and Selectee lists to these lists is a prudent step that would enhance security. However, given the privacy and rights issues involved in this recommendation, TSA management said that it is highly unlikely the lists would be [REDACTED] in this manner.
"The U.S. Government requires employees going to certain "high threat" areas to take a course that we affectionately call "Crash/Bang." So far this week has been the coolest week of my career. I got to "crash" cars, "bang" guns, drive an armored suburban, drive an up-armored hummer, see things blow up, skid cars around, and generally do all kinds of awesome stuff. I cannot believe I get paid to do this!"
By HollyCrash/BangfromFS Blog: Holly in the Foreign Service
Hannah Allam, a Cairo-based McClatchy Newspapers correspondent writes the blog, Middle East Diary.She visited Iraq last month and wrote about The New U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Makes you kind of wonder if the private security contractors' other shoe will drop here before too long:
Today, I arrived at the embassy with half an hour to spare before my appointment. I couldn't enter until my escort arrived, so I passed the time talking with a Peruvian guard -- in his broken English and what little Spanish I remembered from high school.
"Are you press?" he asked.
When I confirmed that I was a journalist, he lowered his voice and looked around to see if his American supervisor from Triple Canopy was watching the interaction.
"They no respect the contract, this company," he whispered. "The contract says we work one, two, three, four, five, six, seven days, and then we should have a day off. But I work 12 hours a day for 12 days and then one day off. They no respect the contract."
He went on to tell me about his 11-year-old daughter and how it breaks his heart to be so far away from her. Over the Internet, he said, she tells him to quit and come home, that the money isn't worth the job, which from his description sounded to me like a few short steps away from indentured servitude.
"My girl, she tell me, 'Come to Peru, come to Peru, why you work 12 hours a day for 12 days?'" he said. "I told her if I say something to the company, they say, OK, go back to Peru and they bring other guards."
Second person indicted for alleged kickback solicitation over USAID security contract
USAID/Afghanistan’s Infrastructure ProjectPhoto from USAID/LBG Massoud Hossaini
This is an excerpt from the USDOJ October 8 press release:
Ryan Scott McMonigle, 37, of Ponca City, Okla., was indicted today for his alleged role in a scheme to solicit kickbacks in connection with the award of a security services subcontract to protect U.S. government personnel and contractors in Afghanistan, announced Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division Christine A. Varney and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia Neil H. MacBride.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the principal federal U.S. agency that extends assistance to countries that are recovering from disaster, are trying to escape poverty and are engaging in democratic reforms. The agency works to support long-term and equitable economic growth and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In August 2006, USAID awarded a $1.4 billion contract known as the Afghanistan Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (the AIRP contract). The AIRP contract required the award of numerous subcontracts, including for the provision of security services to protect AIRP workers.
According to the indictment, McMonigle was employed from approximately February 2009 until May 2009 in Kabul, Afghanistan, by Civilian Police International, a Virginia-based company that provides law enforcement training internationally. The indictment alleges that McMonigle, Bryan Lee Burrows and others conspired to solicit kickbacks from security vendors in return for favorable treatment for those potential bidders in connection with the award of a subcontract to provide security services to protect USAID personnel and contractors in Afghanistan operating under the AIRP contract.
McMonigle is charged with one count of conspiracy to solicit a kickback and one count of aiding and abetting the solicitation of a kickback.
Burrows pleaded guilty on Sept. 2, 2009, to conspiring with others to solicit kickbacks from the security vendors in return for favorable treatment for those potential bidders in connection with the award of a security services subcontract.
If convicted, McMonigle faces up to 10 years in prison on the kickback solicitation charge and an additional five years in prison on the conspiracy charge, as well as a fine of $250,000 for each charge.
DOJ: Press Release | September 2009: Oklahoma Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Solicit Kickbacks in Connection with Government Contract in Afghanistan | Bryan Lee Burrows, 42, of Wagoner, Oklahoma | Read file
I imagine this could be one of longest seven weeks in a life of a diplomat subjected to a barrage of allegations both in the press and on the Internet.The story and video of the sex tape purported to be of a US diplomat assigned at the US Embassy in Moscow first surfaced in early August. Yesterday, the United States finally complained to Russia's Foreign Ministry over what it says is an effort to smear a diplomat with a fabricated sex tape.
From ABC News:
"Kyle Hatcher has done nothing wrong," said Ambassador Beyrle. "Clearly the video we saw was a montage of lot of different clips, some of them which are clearly fabricated," he told ABC News. "We had our security office back in Washington take a look at that and they are convinced Kyle has done nothing wrong. I have full confidence in him and he is going to continue his work here at the embassy."
The goal of the Russian government, Beyrle believes, is to "smear him in the eyes of his contacts."
ABC News also reports that according to a senior State Department official, the most disturbing element of the video may be the authentic elements that precede the fraudulent portion. According to this official, the tape begins with surveillance video of Hatcher walking Moscow streets some five years ago. "That portion of the tape is real," the official said. Hatcher, according to the official, traveled to Moscow as a tourist years before he worked for the U.S. government.
There have been lots of speculations online that this was the work of FSB, Russia's domestic and counter intelligence agency.In July FCO’s Deputy CG in Ekaterinburg was caught in a similar trap and subsequently resigned.
And here I thought our relationship with Moscow had been reset.
Come here to this gate!Mr. Putin, er sorry, Mr. Medvedev, close this gate! Make these rogues and honeytrappers go party elsewhere!
Read the whole thing here. News item also made it to the Department's daily press brief, read it here.
Read the previous coverage of this here.BTW, if you read Russian, check out Ambassador John Beyrle's blog here.
by T. Christian Miller, ProPublica and Aram Roston, Special to ProPublica - September 18, 2009 10:05 am EDT (Excerpts reprinted from ProPublica under Creative Commons License)
Last spring, the U.S. diplomatic mission in Iraq got a makeover,replacing the scandal-plagued Blackwater private security company with a firm named Triple Canopy.
The new $1 billion contract cemented Triple Canopy's status as the pre-eminent provider of private security services in Iraq, with its heavily armed employees appearing side by side with senior State Department diplomats.
But the company's rise to prominence followed a long, often chaotic route, marked by questionable weapons deals, government bungling and a criminal investigation that was ultimately closed without charges being filed, according to newly released investigative files.
Company employees told federal investigators that Triple Canopy swapped booze for weapons and supplies from the U.S. military. They said the company bought guns and other arms on the black market in Iraq. Some worried that the money was flowing into the hands of insurgents, records show.
The previously undisclosed documents and interviews with current and former Triple Canopy officials raise new questions about the U.S. government's ability to oversee private security contractors in a fluid and uncertain legal environment. And they give a glimpse into the messy business of creating a private army on the fly in the middle of a war zone.
That lawsuit against the company, filed in a Virginia circuit court by other former employees who sued Triple Canopy for wrongful termination, was settled this week, records show, but no terms were disclosed.
The criminal investigation began in 2007 after federal investigators received a tip that Triple Canopy was using stolen cars and captured Iraqi weapons [3] to boost profits to over 40 percent on some contracts. Andrew T. Baxter, the interim U.S. attorney for the Northern District of New York, declined to comment on why his office decided not to file charges. (His office handled the case because Triple Canopy’s invoices were paid out of a nearby federal contract processing center.)
Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, who oversaw the investigation, refused to talk about details. But he said the difficulty in building the case were indicative of the haphazard atmosphere in which billions of dollars of U.S. money was spent in Iraq without oversight.
"It's unclear if anything that Triple Canopy did was criminal, but it was symptomatic of the chaos that prevailed at the time," Bowen said. "It's another example of contracting gone wrong."{snip}A State Dept. official acknowledged that the department had been slow to respond to the need to arm the private companies it was hiring to carry guns. Until late 2004, the department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls blocked most requests for the export of automatic weapons to private firms — the result of a decades-old policy to cut down on international arms trafficking.
When private security companies began requesting weapons to fulfill U.S.-issued contracts, the department was caught off guard, the official said. It wasn't until November 2004 that the policy was changed to grant private security companies export licenses — more than a year and a half after the first such firms were hired in Iraq.
"This was something that the State Department hadn't considered as a possibility" until the requests for licenses started coming in, said the official, who spoke on background per department policy. "What they did was go through a relatively long discussion and decision process to figure out how to deal with the problem."
While the system for importing weapons has improved in Iraq, industry and State Department officials acknowledged that problems remain in Afghanistan.
Partly, this reflects the fact that more groups are at work there. Unlike Iraq, there is a substantial presence of nonprofits and international aid organizations in need of security. Companies buying weapons from local sources continue to run the risk of money flowing to insurgents, one official said.
Afghanistan is similar in one way, however. Just as in the early days in Iraq, there are comparatively few investigators on the ground to watch the billions of dollars now flowing into the country.
"It's an even worse Catch-22 over there," one industry official said.
US Embassy Kabul Guard Contract Takes Center Stage
The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) is an independent, bipartisan legislative commission established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Created in Section 841 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, this eight-member Commission is mandated by Congress to study federal agency contracting for the reconstruction, logistical support of coalition forces, and the performance of security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission may refer to the Attorney General any violation or potential violation of law identified by the Commission in carrying out its duties under this section.
Two of the eight commissioners have prior associations with the State Department: Clark Kent Ervin was a State Department Inspector General from 2001-2003 and Grant S. Green was Under Secretary of State for Management from 2001-2005. Had this story broke in 2005 or earlier, Mr. Green would be sitting in Pat Kennedy's chair facing the Commission's grilling. One of the co-chairs, Michael J. Thibault also had extensive experience with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and another member, Dov S. Zakheim was DOD’s Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer from 2001-2004. I imagine they'll be looking under a lot of rocks.
Shortly after the POGO story on the US Embassy Kabul security guards broke, the CWC announced its intent to hold public hearings about wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.On September 14 the Commission heard from witnesses representing the State Department and its security contractors. The hearings were split into three panels listed below.As of this writing, only videos of the hearings are available via c-span.org; the statements of witnesses and other committee documents have yet to be posted online here are now posted online here.Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq, Panel 1
Witnesses testified on the U.S. State Department’s selection, management, and oversight of security and other contractors.
Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq, Panel 2
Witnesses testified on the U.S. State Department’s selection, management, and oversight of security and other contractors.
Panel 2:
* Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the Project on Government Oversight (testimony)* Terry Pearson, former Operations Supervisor in Kabul, Afghanistan, for RA International.
Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq, Panel 3
Witnesses testified on the U.S. State Department’s selection, management, and oversight of security and other contractors.
Panel 3:
* Doug Brooks, President of the International Peace Operations Association.
* William Ballhaus, President and CEO of DynCorp International.
* Samuel Brinkley, Vice President, Homeland Security and International Security Services, Wackenhut Services, Inc. (parent company of ArmorGroup North America).
POGO Story Day 3The US Embassy Kabul released a brief statement on the POGO story yesterday. Today, it posted a longer statement (reprinted in full below):
September 3, 2009U.S. Embassy Statement on Local Guard ForceSince learning of the allegations by the Project on Government Oversight, the U.S. Embassy has taken a number of immediate steps to ensure our security is sound and that our Embassy community is well informed. The Ambassador and other senior Embassy officials held a Town Hall meeting today to discuss the current situation with American and Afghan staff.A full review of local guard force policies and procedures is underway and a full investigation is ongoing. Embassy officials continue to interview guard force personnel as a part of the investigation, to assess the need for possible suspensions and terminations. Alcohol is now prohibited at Camp Sullivan and Embassy Diplomatic Security staff have been assigned to the Camp on a full-time basis. An additional Diplomatic Security Officer has also been assigned to manage the local guard contract.We look forward to working closely with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as they carry out their investigation and will continue to take every possible step to ensure the safety and security of American Embassy personnel, while respecting the values of all Afghans, Americans and contract employees and visitors from other countries.
They did recognize the importance of a rapid response. And that's good. But Camp Sullivan will probably be a dry country for the foreseeable future .
