Dr. Shah, USAID and the Hanging “F”

President Obama officially announced his intent to nominate Rajiv Shah as USAID Administrator on November 10. At that time, I did wonder in this post about the “F” bureau. According to the State Department, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (“F”) is charged with directing the transformation of the U.S. Government approach to foreign assistance. The Director holds a rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary and serves concurrently as USAID Administrator, ensuring that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy objectives.

The last two USAID Administrators had served concurrently during their terms in office as Director of Foreign Assistance. Dr. Shah’s nomination, however, made no mention about the “F” bureau.

In Dr. Shah’s written answers (from The Cable) to the Questions for the Record Submitted for the Nomination of Rajiv Shah to be USAID Administrator, the first two pre-hearing questions from Senator Kerry’s asked precisely about the “F” bureau. Q&A reprinted in full below:

Question: Reporting Relationships

Please provide further information about the role, responsibilities and lines of authority to the position you have been nominated for. In particular, which official will you directly report to – the Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources? If confirmed, will you occupy the same position as Henrietta Fore – serving concurrently as the Administrator of USAID and the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, with the rank of Deputy Secretary of State? Will you retain operational control and authority over the State Department’s “F” bureau, also like those predecessors?

Answer:

Under current law, and consistent with conversations prior to my nomination, I will report to the Secretary of State. If confirmed, I am confident Secretary Clinton and I will have a strong and productive working relationship. I also welcome the opportunity to work closely with Deputy Secretary Lew, who has made clear his commitment to elevating development and working to rebuild capacity at USAID.

In terms of the “F Bureau,” as you know the Presidential Study Directive on Global Engagement (“PSD-7”) and joint State/USAID Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy (“QDDR”) are reviewing the question of the best way to organize State and USAID to execute policy effectively. The issue of resources and management is very much a part of these discussions, and I look forward to being an active participant in this conversation if confirmed as Administrator.

Question: Relationship to F

If you do not assume jurisdictional authority over the F Bureau, which official will continue to oversee it? Do you think USAID can effectively run a cohesive and coordinated development program without oversight of the F Bureau and without broader oversight over the budgetary and policy functions that guide its development programming?

Answer:

I believe USAID needs the capacity to plan budgetary requirements and monitor and evaluate performance to support the Secretary’s goals of formulating and executing programs that focus on sustainable outcomes and align with country-owned strategies. The specifics of resource management, budget and structure will be addressed through the QDDR process. I look forward to working with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary Lew to ensure that USAID has the resources it needs to become the world’s leading development agency.

The Kerry pre-hearing questions also inquired about a proposal reportedly circulating about the establishment of “a second “Deputy Chief of Mission,” reporting through the State Department, who would be responsible for all development activities in a given country.”

Have you heard about this proposal being floated about?The whole thing is worth reading although one comes away without the answer to the questions we really want answered. The only thing that seems sure from this and from the hearing is that we won’t really know how much change there will be for USAID until the roll out of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review next year.

In a related note, in case you missed it -- the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act cleared the SFRC on November 17. At that time, Senator Lugar also released a statement excerpted below:

Clearly, the State Department will have ideas about development assistance that will be expressed in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. This Committee will be eager to review the State Department’s ideas when they are ready. But Congress also should be offering proposals on how to improve development assistance. The bill we passed today should be seen as an essential input into this process. It is the product of well over a year of research and analysis by Senators and their staffs. It has attracted the support of most development groups, led by the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. It is co-sponsored by a bipartisan group of 19 Senators, twelve of whom are members of this Committee. This level of backing for a bill related to foreign assistance structure is extremely rare. It provides an opportunity to build something approaching a consensus on this issue.[…]Although the State Department declined to participate at our hearing on this bill last July, I am hopeful it will recognize that a bill co-sponsored by a majority of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should be given substantial weight in their review process. Congress will be making decisions about resources for development programs, and those decisions will be effected by our confidence in how funds are managed and coordinated.

I would underscore that our bill is a relatively modest proposal. There are more than a few members of Congress who would like to see USAID become an independent cabinet level agency.

A warning in soft gloves, but a warning nonetheless, hmmnn?

S. 1524: USAID Reform Bill Scheduled for Mark Up

The Kerry-Lugar foreign aid reform bill is scheduled for mark up today at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. John Rogin of The Cable has some background on this here. Rogin reports that the State Department leadership “has been asking Kerry to slow-walk the bill, not wanting the legislation to preempt State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).” But apparently, Senator Lugar wanted this to move along and "It's important for Kerry to maintain his arm-link with Lugar, so he pushed back." Rogin quotes one development expert close to the discussions.

S.1524 also known as the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009, amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to establish in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID):

(1) an Assistant Administrator for Policy and Strategic Planning to assist in matters related to policy planning, strategic planning, program design, research, evaluation, and budget allocation and management;(2) a Bureau for Policy and Strategic Planning whose primary duties shall include policy and long-term strategy development, evaluation of program effectiveness, and establishment of resource and workforce allocation criteria. Establishes:

• (1) in the Bureau for Policy and Strategic Planning an Office for Learning, Evaluation, and Analysis in Development;

• (2) the Council on Research and Evaluation of Foreign Assistance and the Council on Research and Evaluation of Foreign Assistance Advisory Board.

The bill directs the Administrator of USAID to: (1) develop a comprehensive workforce and human resources strategy and a related task force to support the objective of promoting development and reducing global poverty; and (2) establish career guidelines for Foreign Service officers and civil service officers that incorporate interagency, intergovernmental, or international organization rotational assignments.

It also directs the President to require all federal departments and agencies to make publicly available on their Web sites comprehensive and accessible information about U.S. foreign assistance on a program-by-program and country-by-country basis. Sets forth USAID program fund guidelines.

If you are currently with USAID, you might want to read Section 7 of this bill as it relates to workforce planning requirement for the agency. Section 8 covers rotations, promotions, including promotions into the senior ranks and external training and educational opportunities for USAID personnel.

SEC. 7. COMPREHENSIVE WORKFORCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

(a) Comprehensive Workforce and Human Resources Strategy for the United States Agency for International Development- The Administrator shall develop and implement a comprehensive workforce and human resources strategy for the Agency to support the objective of promoting development and reducing global poverty.

(b) Scope- The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be a strategy for modernizing the workforce of the United States Agency for International Development in support of foreign assistance and policy priorities, and shall--

• (1) determine long-term Agency personnel priorities, including priorities over 5- and 10-year time periods;

• (2) identify career professional development programs for all personnel, including training, language, and education, interagency and intergovernmental rotations, and assignment opportunities outside the United States Government;

• (3) include an assessment of future development and foreign policy priorities and the implications of such priorities for technical and policy expertise, including how to meet future unanticipated demands brought about by manmade and natural disasters;

• (4) include an overseas facilities and security assessment examining the implications of such facilities and security for personnel increases;

• (5) include the appropriateness of regional platforms to perform necessary Agency functions and to provide services to other donors and organizations;

• (6) consider structural reform options to professionalize the human resource capacity of the Agency, including options to outsource the entirety of the human resource capacity of the Agency; and

• (7) address the means to enable the Agency to access cutting-edge technical and managerial expertise.

(c) Factors To Consider- In developing the strategy required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall, among other things--

• (1) examine the objectives the Agency is mandated to fulfill, and assess whether its current workforce model effectively supports the goals of the Agency;

• (2) review the Agency’s workforce evolution and identify the additional program demands that have been placed on the workforce in the past 10 years;

• (3) examine different personnel and workforce management models from other United States Government agencies, international organizations, and the private sector and determine the comparative advantages the models might offer and whether they would allow the Agency to better structure its workforce to carry out its responsibilities and meet the challenges of a changing environment;

• (4) examine different bureaucratic and legislative constraints facing the Agency in implementing a comprehensive workforce planning and management system and how these constraints can be addressed, including--

• (A) which limitations, if any, currently exist that prevent the Agency from hiring the right people for the right positions in a timely manner, including mid-level hires and reentry of mid-level professionals into the Agency; and

• (B) how this compares with other organizations, such as the Department of State and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and how the Agency compares to the Department of State and the MCC in its ability to attract and retain high caliber professionals;

• (5) examine the advantages and disadvantages of the Agency’s use of contractors in the last 10 years to carry out its core mission and management responsibilities;

• (6) assess the scope and effectiveness of training, including the availability of language training, for Agency personnel, and the extent to which available trainings support carrying out Agency objectives; and

• (7) present a cost analysis for using a contracting model versus a direct hire model and determine the cost savings and consequences that could result from the elimination of institutional contractors and the hiring of the same professionals as personal services contractors.

SEC. 8. PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RESOURCES.

(a) Career Professional Development- Chapter 2 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2381 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 630 the following new section:

SEC. 630A. INTERAGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ROTATIONS.

(a) Rotations-

• (1) CAREER GUIDELINES- The Administrator shall establish career guidelines for Foreign Service officers and civil service officers that incorporate interagency, intergovernmental, or international organization rotational assignments. The guidelines established under this paragraph shall include--

• (A) selection;

• (B) professional education and training;

• (C) types of relevant interagency, intergovernmental, and international organization assignments; and

• (D) such other matters as the Administrator considers appropriate.

• (2) PROMOTIONS TO SENIOR RANKS- Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish additional guidelines that consider participation by relevant officers in at least 1 interagency, intergovernmental, or international organizational rotational assignment of at least 6 months as a factor for promotion into the ranks of the Senior Foreign Service or Senior Executive Service.

• (3) PROMOTION POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS-

• (A) QUALIFICATIONS- The Administrator shall ensure that promotion precepts and promotion panels do not penalize officers who have been assigned to interagency, intergovernmental or international organizations.

• (B) REPORT- The Administrator shall provide an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees that--

• (i) specifies the aggregate number of officers and the promotion rates of officers who are serving in, or have served in, interagency, intergovernmental, or international organization rotational assignments; and

• (ii) details efforts to meet the objectives described in paragraph (1).

(b) External Training and Educational Opportunities- It is the sense of Congress that--

• (1) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should augment and expand external training and educational opportunities for Foreign Service and civil service personnel and expand opportunities for work assignments to entities outside the United States Government;

• (2) a strong development agency should have a knowledgeable and capable workforce that is familiar with and has access to cutting edge development practices, methodologies, ideas, work experience, and programs; and

• (3) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should ensure that personnel of the Agency have opportunities during their careers to obtain a range of knowledge-building work experiences and advanced education and training in academic and other relevant institutions in the United States and abroad to increase the capacity of the Agency to fulfill its mission.’.

Read the whole text of the bill here.

In a related item -- Anne-Marie Slaughter, the State Department's Director of Policy Planning Staff and one of the leads in the QDDR process at State was over at the Center for American Progress yesterday as keynote speaker for its event on "Integrating the Instruments of National Power." She was quoted as saying that "the overall aim of the QDDR is to integrate and elevate development and diplomacy across the spectrum of the American foreign policy." [...]"You still need to integrate the power of development professionals, the ideas and the expertise, with the political clout and strategy and reach of diplomacy. That seems to me to be the perfect example of integrated power ... and that is what Secretary Clinton would like to see as one of her legacies." Rogin reports that she had the "whole development world scratching their heads."

Sorry, brain freeze here; I don't know how to translate what she said. I must point out that she was previously on the record with the "M" word as in -- "no merger," so I imagine integrate means incorporate, mix but ...

Quickie: On State/USAID - There Will Be No Merger

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Spencer Ackerman did a lengthy post last week on the Department’s QDDR process (see State Dept Project Signals Foreign Policy Shift | Washington Independent | October 22). The piece also delineates the composition of the five Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review working groups with senior officials from across both State and USAID.

Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of State for East Asia, and Karen Turner, director of USAID’s office of development partners, head the group responsible for “Building a Global Architecture of Cooperation.”

Maria Otero, the undersecretary of state for democracy and global affairs, and Gloria Steele, USAID’s global-health chief, work on whole-of-government solutions.

Johnnie Carson, State’s top African-affairs official, and George Laudato, USAID’s Mideast chief, handle “Investing in the Building Blocks of Stronger Societies.”

Conflict prevention and response is under Eric Schwartz, State’s assistant secretary for population, migration and refugees; Susan Reichle, USAID’s senior democracy and humanitarian assistance official.

Ruth Whiteside of State’s Foreign Service Institute and Jean Marie Smith, Jack Lew’s special assistant, are in charge of “Building Operational and Resource Platforms for Success.”

The piece includes something that would help our USAID folks let out a sigh of relief. It said that “only one policy option has been ruled out: dissolving USAID and moving development work to the State Department.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, the director of policy planning is quoted as saying, “There will be no merger. Secretary Clinton has made clear she wants a strong AID, a well-resourced AID, [and] wants diplomacy and development well-integrated.”

There she said "no" to the "M" word. Read the whole thing here.

QDDR: Transforming State/USAID for the 21st Century?

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Deputy Secretary Jacob J. Lew delivered his Remarks on the QDDR at an event hosted by the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition last week. His prepared statement has now been posted online here. You can also read the transcript of the panel discussion here (Panel participants: Jack Lew, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy and Planning, Department of State, Alonzo Fulgham, Acting USAID Administrator and moderator, Judy Woodruff). Quick excerpt below from D/S Lew:

[…] I am the first to acknowledge that resources are only a beginning. The world has changed, and we at the State Department and USAID have not done enough to change along with it. We use outdated tools and our organization was not designed to meet today’s challenges -- the rise of new powers and non-state actors, increasing interdependence, the dangers of transnational challenges and weak, impoverished states.[…]We have an excellent QDDR leadership team with veterans of State and USAID as well as the private sector and the nonprofit community.

Five working groups led by key stakeholders from State, USAID, and other relevant agencies will drive the details. They will work quickly and pragmatically to produce both analysis and solutions. There is a lot of fine work to draw on, which will make it easier to work quickly. The goal is full engagement of senior leadership informed by the people who can make bottom-up transformation a reality.

Here are the working groups' goals:

First, we are examining the kinds of capabilities needed to develop a new architecture of global cooperation.

Second, we are looking at how we can reform ourselves to both lead and support a whole-of-government approach to foreign policy.

Third, we are considering what capabilities we need to help contribute to the building blocks of strong societies.

Fourth, we are looking at ways to build a strong civilian capacity to respond to crisis and instability.

Finally, we are evaluating how the State Department and USAID should be organized to maintain core capabilities and execute them effectively.

I note that the fifth goal also says, “This group is considering how we recruit, train, and promote our own diplomats and development professionals, and how we can better equip them to meet these challenges. They are also reviewing how we manage our own resources, including how we work with outside partners.”

Read the whole thing here.

You might remember that “transformation” was a buzz word during a certain former Secretary’s tenure at the 7^th Floor. Transformational diplomacy shifted resources from one end of the world to another, there was whole lot of commotion and a lot of ink spent on it. It was transformation this, transformation that without new staffing or funding. It was done quickly and on the cheap with great results if you believe everything you read.

Transforming an old, traditional bureaucracy such as the State Department has never been easy. Just about every administration, Democratic or Republican have tried stretching that rubber band only to see it slap back into place. It is a journey littered with good intention but also with disappointments …

Organizational transformation starts with the people and its internal culture. A strong leader with a vision is necessary to drive change to fruition. The people who sit at the base of the pyramid must be willing to trust and follow that leader, even if the outcome is not totally clear.

Jack Lew is probably the one great hope at the moment to shepherd that State/USAID transformation into the 21^st century. Let’s wish him the best.

Related Posts:

• 2009: Putting the Diplomacy House in Order
• Global Repositioning Review – A Shocker!
• The People Factor and the C Street Bailout
• On Keeping Friends Close, and Enemies Closer
• Transformational Diplomacy: Headache in the Details
• The Challenge of Transforming Organizations

QDDR: Are You Putting Lipstick on a Very Old Pig?

First Public Dialogue on the State Department's QDDR

That’s a question thrown in during the first public dialogue on the State Department’s QDDR. Acting USAID Administrator Alonzo Fulgham disagreed with the premise that this is putting lipstick on a pig. He cited Jack Lew as an advocate for AID, and how this process is a way of breaking up the old model. In response to the same question, State Department Director of Policy and Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter said this one is “connected to the money;”that “we’re going to have results by January that will be used already for the 2012 budget guidance.” She also added that all working groups in the QDR are being run by undersecretaries/assistant secretaries … that this will be quadrennial… can’t put this in a shelf … and that this will be an ongoing process.

The first public dialogue on the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), "Putting Smart Power to Work," was hosted by the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition on October 14. The Deputy Secretary of State and QDDR Chair Jacob Lew, along with his co-chairs, State Department Director of Policy and Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter and Acting USAID Administrator Alonzo Fulgham, spoke at the event. Deputy Secretary Lew provided an overview of current U.S. development and diplomacy efforts. He took two questions during the panel discussion but had to leave early; the two other co-chairs continued the QDDR panel discussion with Judy Woodruff as moderator.

The most applauded question is probably the one about the appointment of a USAID administrator, and whether the QDDR is a process to elevate development in diplomacy or is it a process to have State more fully absorbed USAID …the way it had absorbed USIA. Anne-Marie Slaughter responded that "The vision that the secretary has coming out of the QDDR is of a much stronger, much better-resourced USAID ... it’s not about absorbing AID.”

The USGLC website says it will continue to gather input in the coming months for the State Department’s QDDR staff, and if you have questions or comments, please send them to my2cents@usglc.org.

The U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC) describes itself as "a broad-based influential network of 400 businesses and NGOs; national security and foreign policy experts; and business, faith-based, academic and community leaders in all 50 states who support a smart power approach of elevating diplomacy and development alongside defense in order to build a better, safer world." Coalition members include some top government contractors like Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Raytheon, Chemonics International, Inc., companies like Caterpillar, Microsoft, Motorola, Procter & Gamble, NGO’s like CARE, Save the Children, Mercy Corps and many more. See the full list of coalition members here.

Video of the event is posted below. Starts slow and not the best image/sound quality from where I am but you may get better quality with better internet connection. I’m looking for the transcript of the Lew speech and of the panel discussion but none seem to be available at the moment. I'll add the links here when they become available online. Click here for the previous briefing on the QDDR at the State Department back in July 2009.

Insider Quote: There are no bad missions, just bad ambassadors

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Every previous reorganization of the Foreign Service and the State Department has involved at least some such straitjacketing of operations in the field. The hope this time, one which I fully share, is that we can achieve major improvements without suffering much of this kind of damage, because this reorganization is being done from within, by the professionals themselves. Even professionals, however, can mesmerize themselves with their own generalizations, particularly if they have been steeped for a while in the hothouse atmosphere of Washington; so even the present effort requires constant attention from its leaders to keep it honest and pragmatic rather than theological. In the final analysis, there are no bad missions, just bad ambassadors. No set of rules is a substitute for executive talent.

Letter From the Ambassador to Nepal (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume IICarol Laise served as Ambassador to Nepal from 1966 to 1973

Quickie: Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom

"The State Department suffers from low morale, bottlenecks, and bureaucratic ineptitude. Do we need to kill it to save it?" That’s the question asked by Matt Armstrong in Foreign Policy. Armstrong is a principal with Armstrong Strategic Insights Group and a member of the Public Diplomacy Council. He publishes the public diplomacy and strategic communications blog www.MountainRunner.us. Not a pretty read but needs a good reading. Excerpts below:

Years of neglect and marginalization, as well as a dearth of long-term vision and strategic planning, have left the 19th-century institution hamstrung with fiefdoms and bureaucratic bottlenecks. The Pentagon now funds and controls a wide range of foreign-policy and diplomatic priorities -- from development to public diplomacy and beyond. The world has changed, with everyone from politicians to talking heads to terrorists directly influencing global audiences. The most pressing issues are stateless: pandemics, recession, terrorism, poverty, proliferation, and conflict. But as report after report, investigation after investigation, has highlighted, the State Department is broken and paralyzed, unable to respond to the new 21st-century paradigm.[…]Some commentators have even wondered aloud whether the best way to fix the State Department might be to destroy it. Foggy Bottom could retain a small core staff for its embassies and ambassadors. All other functions -- such as public diplomacy, countering misinformation and propaganda, and development, including provincial reconstruction staffing -- could migrate to the Pentagon or become wholly independent agencies.

But atomizing the State Department would ultimately prove dangerous and further the militarization of foreign policy. The Pentagon needs a counterbalance, a vertically integrated State Department that the president, Congress, and the U.S. public can count on. Change, rather than creative destruction, is what Foggy Bottom needs.

Read the whole thing here.

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• Hitting Bottom at Foggy Bottom at ForeignPolicy.com (mountainrunner.us)
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FECA Death Gratuity Goes Up to 100K

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The Interim final rule and request for comments on the Death Gratuity Under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) has been posted in the Federal Register.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, was enacted on January 28, 2008. Section 1105 of Public Law 110-181 amended the FECA, creating a new section 8102a. The section establishes a new FECA benefit for eligible survivors of Federal employees and NAFI (non-appropriated fund instrumentality employees) who die of injuries incurred in connection with service with an Armed Force in a contingency operation.

“Section 8102a was effective upon enactment of Public Law 110-181, on January 28, 2008. It states that the United States will pay the death gratuity of up to $100,000 to the eligible survivors ``immediately upon receiving official notification'' of an employee's death. The section also contains a retroactive payment provision, stating that the death gratuity will be paid for employees of certain agencies who died on or after October 7, 2001, due to injuries incurred in connection with service with an Armed Force in the theater of operations of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both the immediate payment provision and the retroactive payment provision strongly suggest that the Department act as quickly as possible to implement section 8102a.” (links added)

Read the whole thing here.

Comments are solicited.

Applicability date: This interim final rule applies to all claims filed on or after August 18, 2009. This rule also applies to any claims that are pending before OWCP on August 18, 2009.

Comments: The Department invites comments on the interim final rule from interested parties. Comments on the interim final rule must be postmarked by October 19, 2009. Written comments on the new information collection requirements in this rule must be postmarked by October 19, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the interim final rule, identified by Regulatory Information Number (RIN) 1215-AB66, by any ONE of the following methods:

Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: The Internet address to submit comments on the rule is http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site instructions for submitting comments. Or you can go directly to the page for sending comments to this specific rule here. The full text of the interim rule is here.

Mail: Submit written comments to Shelby Hallmark, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3524, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210. Because of security measures, mail directed to Washington, DC is sometimes delayed. We will only consider comments postmarked by the U.S. Postal Service or other delivery service on or before the deadline for comments.

Instructions: All comments must include the RIN 1215-AB66 for this rulemaking. Receipt of any comments, whether by mail or Internet, will not be acknowledged. Because DOL continues to experience delays in receiving postal mail in the Washington, DC area, commenters are encouraged to submit any comments by mail early.

Examples provided with the interim final rule.

(1) Example One. An employee's survivors are entitled to the Foreign Service Act death gratuity; the employee's spouse received payment in the amount of $80,000 under that Act. A death gratuity is also payable under FECA; the amount of the FECA death gratuity that is payable is a total of $20,000. That employee, using Form CA-40 had designated 50% of the death gratuity under this subpart to be paid to his neighbor John Smith who is still living. So, 50% of the death gratuity will be paid to his spouse and the remaining 50% of the death gratuity paid under this subpart would be paid to John Smith. This means the surviving spouse will receive $10,000 and John Smith will receive $10,000.

(2) Example Two. Employee dies in circumstances that would qualify her for payment of the gratuity under this subpart; her agency has paid the $10,000 death gratuity pursuant to Public Law 104-208. The employee had not completed any designation form. The FECA death gratuity is reduced by the $10,000 death gratuity and employee's spouse receives $90,000.

(3) Example Three. An employee of the Foreign Service whose annual salary is $75,000 dies in circumstances that would qualify for payment of both the Foreign Service Act death gratuity and the death gratuity under this subpart. Before his death, the employee designated that 40% of the death gratuity under this subpart be paid to his cousin Jane Smith, pursuant to the alternate beneficiary designation provision at section 10.908 and that 10% be paid to his uncle John Doe who has since died. At the time of his death, the employee had no surviving spouse, children, parents, or siblings. Therefore, the Foreign Service Act death gratuity will not be paid, because no eligible survivors according to the Foreign Service Act provision exist. The death gratuity under this subpart would equal $100,000, because no other death gratuity has been paid, and Jane would receive $40,000 according to the employee's designation. As John Doe is deceased, no death gratuity may be paid pursuant to the designation of a share of the death gratuity to him.

Data on Injuries and Death since 2004 in Iraq:

The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) has been tracking federal civilian injuries and deaths resulting from incidents or exposures arising in Iraq since March 2004. Through the end of FY 2008, there have been 220 claims accepted for injuries or exposures sustained in Iraq. Of those 220 accepted claims, 14 have been claims arising from the death of the Federal civilian employee.

Data on Injuries and Death since 2007 in Afghanistan:

OWCP also has been tracking Federal civilian injuries and deaths resulting from incidents or exposures arising in Afghanistan, but only since October, 2007. Through the end of FY 2008, there have been 25 claims accepted for injuries or exposures sustained in Afghanistan and only 1 of those claims was for the death of the employee.

OWCP Projects Expenditures:

Based upon these data, OWCP projects about 10 death claims per year as an upper limit estimate. Assuming each claim is paid at the maximum allowable rate, this would result in expenditures of $1 million or less annually. It is important to note, however, that the projection is based on a very limited amount of data and that a single significant event could result in substantially higher than projected expenditures.

Some Questions:

#1. The rule says that “DOL has determined for equitable reasons that every death gratuity will be paid in the amount of $100,000. (The $100,000 gratuity is offset by other death gratuities that have been paid for the same death.)” But how did Labor come up with that figure is what I’d like to know. What went into that calculation?

#2. This rule specifically addresses the death gratuity for Federal employees who “die of injuries incurred in connection with service with an Armed Force in a contingency operation.” Elsewhere, it talks about “injuries incurred in connection with service with an Armed Force in the theater of operations of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

Okay so -- A) What happens to FS employees who die in terrorist attacks outside the theater of operation? Those that are located in places not considered “service with an Armed Force in a contingency operation?” Wouldn’t this result in a two-system gratuity?

B) Operation Enduring Freedom includes operations in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia), Trans-Sahara and Kyrgyzstan. USAID officer, John Granville was in Sudan when he was assassinated in 2008; Sudan falling under OEF, his NOK could potentially received retroactive benefit under this new rule. But where does this leave the family of Laurence M. Foley, the US diplomat who was assassinated in Jordan in 2002? Or David Foy who was killed in Pakistan in 2006?

The full text of the interim rule is here. You can also send comments to this rule no later than October 19, 2009; see the comments page here.

* * *

For State, the death benefits for death in the performance of duty under 3 FAM 3650 derives its authority from the following:

(1) Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8101-8152; 20 C.F.R. Parts 1, 10 and 25;(2) Title VI, Section 651 of Public Law 104-208 (The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996), effective September 30, 1996; and(3) Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, codified in 5 U.S.C. 5570; Executive Order 12598; 22 C.F.R. Part 192.

State’s Bureau of Human Resources explained this below:

Section 413 of the Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3973 The Secretary of State, the Director of AID and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce may provide for payment of a death gratuity in an amount equal to one year's salary of the employee at the time of death to the surviving dependents of any Foreign Service employee who dies as a result of injuries sustained in the performance of duty abroad.

3 FAM 3653.1 on Eligibility: A death gratuity may be payable under section 413 of the Foreign Service Act when any member of the Foreign Service or a U.S. representative to an international organization or commission dies as a result of injuries sustained in the performance of duty abroad (outside the United States) provided that a survivor is entitled to elect monthly compensation benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA).

According to 3 FAM 3653 Death Gratuity Under Section 413 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

The survivor is eligible for one year's salary of the employee at the time of death. For purposes of the death gratuity under Section 413 of the Foreign Service Act, one year’s salary includes the employee’s full annual salary (rate of basic pay) or full cash wage, locality pay, and law enforcement availability pay that the employee was receiving at the time of death.

Title VI, Section 651 of Public Law 104-208 Under Title VI, Section 651 of P.L. 104-208 (the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996), the head of an agency may pay a death gratuity of up to $10,000 to the personal representative of the deceased employee. The legislative history for this provision indicates that the amount is intended to supplement costs for funeral expenses. This payment may not exceed $10,000 inclusive of the amounts identified in paragraphs (2) and (3) under FECA benefits above. Because $ 1,000 for funeral and administrative payments typically is made under FECA, the amount of this death gratuity payment usually is $9,000. Death benefits under this authority are considered taxable income.

Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §5570 and 22 CFR 192

This authority provides for the payment of compensation to eligible dependents or parents by Federal agencies where U.S. Government civilian employees or family members of such employees are killed, if the President determines that the death was caused by hostile action and was the result of the individual’s relationship with the Government. Payment authorized under this authority must be reduced by any other amount payable by the U.S. Government in connection with the death or disability (emphasis added).

[NOTE: Because of the other payments authorized above, including FECA and section 413 of the Foreign Service Act authorizing one year’s salary, this benefit rarely is paid because of the offset provision in the law.]

The President’s authority under the Act was delegated to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor. The Department’s regulations at 22 CFR Part 192 implementing 5 U.S.C. §5570 provide that the death benefit payment for either an employee or a family member of an employee is equal to one year’s salary of the principal at the time of death.

* * *

That’s how FSO Howard Kavaler and his two daughters received $65,000 as death gratuity for his wife, Prabhi, a Foreign Service officer who perished in Kenya during the East Africa embassy bombings. Jeff Stein pointed out in this article that “the families of the 1,995 men and women killed in the Sept. 11 attacks were awarded checks averaging nearly $1.5 million each.” 12 Americans were killed in Nairobi. I am jaded; the families of 12 are not enough to move Congress.

H.R. 2410 which passed the House last June did contain a provision (Section 313) that the death gratuity be ‘‘at level II of the Executive Schedule.” As of 2009, that amount is at $177,000.00. H.R. 2410 was referred to Senate committee on June 22, 2009. Current bill status: “Received in the Senate, read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.” We’ll keep our eyes on it. But it’s time to write to your representatives in Congress.

Related Items:

• 3 FAM 3653 Death Gratuity Under Section 413 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980
• State Department: Death and Disability Benefits – Iraq and Afghanistan (undated)http://www.rnet.state.gov/forms/Death_Disability_Benefits__Iraq__Afghanistan.pdf

Quickie: Downsizing US Embassy Baghdad; Yes, Please!

On July 22, Warren P. Strobel of McClatchy Newspapers reports on “Big cuts needed at huge Baghdad embassy built by Bush.”

The U.S. Embassy in Iraq, the government's largest overseas diplomatic mission, is significantly overstaffed and needs to be downsized to reflect the reduced American role in the country, according to a new State Department report.

"There is a clear consensus from the top to the bottom of the embassy: The time has come for a significant rightsizing," says the report Wednesday by the department's inspector general.

In addition to downsizing the embassy, the report recommends ending the Provincial Reconstruction Teams by 2011, which have been the prime U.S. tool for rebuilding civilian life in Iraq's provinces.

"For some, it (the downsizing) is much overdue, as they believe the 'civilian surge' went too far," the report says. "For others, it is a necessary result of the now-changed circumstances in Iraq and in our bilateral relationship."

Good lordy, it’s about time! I’m still hunting down the OIG report on this. Will post as soon as it’s available online. In the meantime, read the full Strobel report here.

Update: Link to OIG report added @ 11:57pm

Embassy Baghdad, Iraq
OIG Report Number ISP-I-09-30A, July 2009
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/126600.pdf

State’s “T” Bureau: Where Restructuring Was “Easy” as Pie...

And Condi’s transformational diplomacy went kaplunk

Well, I guess the marching order was to “restructure” so they did. Nobody said it had to be coherent or needed an end state. “Just do it!” Like the ad campaign says. 400 employees were reportedly impacted – but heck -- you don’t have to agree with it, just move wherever they want you to move your desk, right? There were complaints that staff decisions were politically motivated – aw -- I mean, really!

Here is the 2005 on-the-record briefing on the Reorganization of the Bureaus to Better Address the Threat From Weapons and Mass Destruction and to Promote Democracy: “It had to be done right because it is absolutely essential, as part of what the Secretary calls transformational diplomacy, that we readjust the structure of the State Department bureaus in order to be able to best contribute to the national security agenda that has been set by the President.”

Sigh ;> A funny thing happened on the inkway to the history books.  The GAO
just came out with  its assessment of the restructuring of the Nonproliferation,
Arms Control, and Verification and Compliance bureaus in 2005.  Below is a
summary of its finding:

State cannot demonstrate that the 2005-2006 restructuring of its Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Verification and Compliance bureaus achieved all of its objectives because it did not clearly define the objectives and lacked metrics to assess them. State’s objectives were to enable it to better focus on post -September 11 challenges; reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and top-heavy management; and eliminate overlap. State sought to achieve its first objective by creating new offices and roles to address terrorism and counterproliferation issues.

To meet its second objective, State merged three bureaus having 30 offices and functions into two bureaus having 26 offices and functions and freed up staff slots for these new roles, but problems with workload mismatches persisted after the reorganization as State employees noted it left some offices overworked and some offices underworked. State cannot demonstrate that it met its third objective, reducing top-heavy management, as its goals were undefined. Although it reduced the number of senior executives from 27 to 20 and reduced office directorships, the overall number of higher-ranking employees increased from 91 to 100 and executive office staff increased from 44 to 50.

Moreover, concerns about mission overlap persist, in part because bureau roles remain undefined in the FAM. State’s reorganization addressed few of the key practices for organizational mergers and transformations that GAO developed in 2002. These practices are found to be at the center of successful mergers and transformations. As illustrated below, State generally addressed one key practice, partially addressed two, and did not address the remaining five. For example, State did not address establishing coherent mission and strategic goals because it did not define an end state with measurable goals, nor did it devise a means to gauge progress toward such goals or assess the results of actions taken. As a result, State lacks reasonable assurance that the reorganization achieved its objectives or that it can identify any lessons learned.

The GAO’s damning assessment of the reorganization process includes the following on State’s unsystematic approach and its contribution to staff and employee group concerns:

Instead of using the above [GAO identified] practices to plan, implement, and assess the results of the restructuring, State reorganized the bureaus unsystematically, contributing to staff and employee group criticisms of the process and suspicions that some staff decisions had been politically motivated. State officials told us that they spent most of their time in the months before September 2005 developing the organizational structure for the new bureau and little time planning to implement the reorganization. In the wake of the reorganization, some ISN staff stated they perceived morale within their bureau to be lower. According to State data, attrition rates rose to levels higher than the average for State’s civil service as a whole.

To implement the reorganization, the T human resource office furnished an informal implementation guide to the SMP at the panel’s request. This paper envisioned a reorganization directed by the Bureau of Human Resources and the T bureaus’ human resource office, while the SMP would serve as an advisory body that would recommend specific actions, such as decisions on acting directors, staffing levels, and other details for the new ISN offices. Instead, according to a senior T official, the SMP made its own implementing decisions and reduced HR’s and the T bureaus’ human resource office’s roles to ensuring that State followed all applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

State officials and employees expressed concerns about the SMP’s direction and conduct of the reorganization even before the panel made its first public announcement about the reorganization on September 28, 2005. While the Office of the Legal Advisor and HR stated that the SMP could direct the reorganization, some officials in HR and the T bureaus’ human resource office disagreed with this decision.38 According to T bureau officials, they were concerned that the panel’s members were not sufficiently knowledgeable about change and personnel management principles. On September 29, 2005—the day after the SMP sent out its summary of the reorganization procedures—a senior T bureaus’ official with human resource responsibilities sent an e-mail to the SMP stating that it was not following sound personnel management principles.39 The email also stated that the SMP had ignored or misinterpreted her office’s recommendations, advice, and suggestions to the extent that the office had been unable to contribute meaningfully to the reorganization process.

Some ISN employees and AFSA officials also criticized the SMP’s decisions after it publicly announced its reorganization procedures and named acting office directors in September 2005. Eleven ISN employees wrote a memorandum to the Undersecretary for Management and the Director General of the Foreign Service in October 2005, stating that morale was poor within the new ISN bureau. ⁴⁰ Moreover, these employees stated that the SMP’s selections for acting office directors (which resulted in passing over several experienced officials for these positions) reinforced their doubts about the impartiality of the process, as did the lack of career officials or representatives from the T bureaus’ human resource office, HR, and the Office of the Legal Advisor. They also expressed concern about other aspects of the process, such as the requirement to express workforce preferences without first having concrete position and office mission descriptions, position grades, or the names of permanent office directors or deputies. The employees asked the Undersecretary for Management and the Director General of the Foreign Service to suspend the reorganization until a comprehensive staffing plan had been developed and add career civil service or FSOs and HR staff to the SMP, among other actions. AFSA expressed similar concerns in a November 2005 letter to the Secretary of State and noted that the reorganization could result in the potential downgrade or elimination of Foreign Service-designated positions. It also requested, among other things, that State form an independent panel to review all proposed reorganization decisions related to Equal Employment Opportunity concerns and allegations of prohibited personnel practices. In response to these concerns, State named a career official to the SMP, and included representatives of the HR bureau and the Office of the Legal Advisor in the SMP’s discussions, and agreed to have HR review the position descriptions of the acting office directors and prepare new position descriptions where necessary.

The lack of confidence in the reorganization may have adversely affected staff morale and may have contributed to increased ISN civil service attrition rates that immediately followed the reorganization, according to current and former State officials and documents. Twelve percent of ISN’s full-time civil service employees retired or otherwise left the bureau in fiscal 2006, the highest level for the bureau and its predecessors from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008. In contrast, State’s overall civil service attrition rate during the same period averaged about 8 percent.

Wouldn’t you want to know who former Secretary of State Rice appointed to that Senior Management Panel (SMP) tasked with restructuring these bureaus? I think the GAO should start naming names; it is, after all, an agency tasked with providing accountability reports.

Back in 2006, Dean Rust, a 35-year veteran of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and State (who was acting deputy director of the office that dealt with nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency matters) did write about this one in Reorganization Run Amok, a must read if you want an excellent background on this restructuring effort.

My jaded brain assumes that exceptionally talented individuals must now be sharing their restructuring and reorganization talents from some corner offices earning VPs or directorship salaries. Fabulous, really! And no consequences for the mess left behind.

Still, considering that Gonzo did manage to find a job after leaving a higgledy-piggledy DOJ, I am convinced now more than ever that if there is ever a place where second chances can be a lucrative gig (and it might as well be in the bill of rights) -- that is the United States of America. [According to Texas Tech Provost Bob Smith, Gonzales' $100,000 paycheck is on-par with the amount paid to other university employees who are high performers with significant experience or expertise. Someone with a national presence and a long list of accomplishments would be hired at the full professor level," Smith said.]

This is when I get fire ants in my pants -- because really -- where else but in the USA can radioactive blokes “re-invent” themselves time after time, counting on the public’s short memory and apathy, and rise again to wreck havoc once every few years -- all in the name of serving the public like you and me? PS: No offense to the real public servants who gets restructured and realigned and reinvented and rightsized under whatever ice cream flavor is hot.

Related Items:

• GAO-09-738: STATE DEPARTMENT Key Transformation Practices Could Have Helped in Restructuring Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus | July 2009 | PDF
  
  
  
  


• On-the-Record Briefing: Reorganization of the Bureaus to Better Address the Threat from Weapons and Mass Destruction and to Promote Democracy | 2005 | PDF

What’s going to happen to USAID? Jack Lew.

At the July 13 town hall meeting at USAID, Secretary Clinton was asked about the next USAID Administrator reporting to Jack Lew, the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources. Below is Secretary Clinton’s response:

The administrator of AID will certainly have a direct line to me, but on budget issues and coordination that will enable us to maximize our impact, I will expect the administrator to work with Deputy Secretary Lew. We believe that it will enhance the results that AID will see in terms of budget support.

And I take very seriously what you say about the changing winds of politics in Washington, which is why we’re trying to establish institutional structures like the QDDR so that it stands on its own, it provides a pathway for USAID no matter who is in charge in the White House or the State Department, and why we also want to build up USAID again and not see what’s been happening, which is a transfer of expertise and experience outside the agency, which we think has undermined the strength and the authoritative position of USAID within our own government as well as outside it.

So we’re trying to take steps that we believe will actually strengthen AID’s position no matter who’s in charge. But I would just end by saying you know when a new president is elected, policies change. So we’ve got to try to strengthen AID to withstand what might be a political atmosphere that was not as positive about development, and I think the steps we’re taking will enable us to do that.

Hillary Clinton
June 13, 2009 Town Hall at USAID

Secretary Clinton's Town Hall on QDDR

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hosted a State Department town hall meeting on July 10 to discuss a new initiative to review the U.S. strategic approach to diplomacy and development. Washington, DC. [54 min].

She talks about the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Transcript of the town hall meeting is here. The QDDR is actually part of H.R.2410 (see below) so this is a headstart. If that bill becomes law, the QDDR would be institutionalized in the State Department. Full text is here.

SEC. 302. QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT (QRDD).

(a) Development of National Strategy on Diplomacy and Development-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than December 1, 2010, the President shall develop and transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a national strategy on United States diplomacy and development. The strategy shall include the following:

(A) An identification of key objectives and missions for United States foreign policy and foreign assistance policies and programs, including a clear statement on United States objectives for development assistance.

(B) A description of the roles of civilian agencies and mechanisms for implementing such strategy, including interagency coordination.

(C) The requirements for overseas infrastructure necessary to carry out such strategy.

(D) Plans to adapt such agencies and mechanisms to changing circumstances and the role of international institutions in such strategy.

(E) Budget requirements to carry out such strategy.

(F) Other elements of United States foreign policy and foreign assistance policies and programs with a view toward determining and expressing the strategy of the United States and establishing a diplomacy and development program for the next 10 years.

(2) RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY- The strategy described in paragraph (1) shall be consistent with any National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) that has been issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) Review Required-

(1) IN GENERAL- Beginning in 2013, the President shall every 4 years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a ‘Quadrennial Review of Diplomacy and Development’) of the national strategy for United States diplomacy and development described in subsection (a).

(2) KEY ELEMENTS OF REVIEW- The review described in paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A review of all elements of the strategy described in subsection (a), consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) that has been issued after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) A review of the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments and agencies in carrying out the strategy described in subsection (a) and the mechanisms for cooperation between such departments and agencies, including the coordination of such departments and agencies and the relationship between the principal offices of such departments and agencies and offices defining sufficient capacity, resources, overseas infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of United States diplomacy and development of the United States that would be required to have a high level of confidence that the United States can successfully execute the full range of missions called for in such strategy.

(C) Identifying the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in the strategy described in subsection (a) at a high level of success and any additional resources required to achieve such a level of success.

(D) Making recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

(3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION-

(A) IN GENERAL- Each Quadrennial Review of Diplomacy and Development shall take into account the views of the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Trade Representative, and the head of any other relevant agency.

(B) DELEGATION- If the President delegates the requirements of this section, the head of the Federal department or agency to whom such delegation is made shall consult with each official specified in subparagraph (A).

(c) Consultation With Outside Stakeholders- In developing the strategy required under subsection (a) and conducting the review required under subsection (b), the President shall consult with private businesses, non-governmental organizations involved in diplomacy and development, and experts at academic institutions or institutions involved in the study of foreign policy or development matters.

(d) QRDD and Congressional Committees-

(1) CONSULTATION- In developing the strategy required under subsection (a) and conducting the review required under subsection (b), the President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

(2) REPORT- The President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on each Quadrennial Review of Diplomacy and Development. The report shall be submitted in the year following the year in which such a Quadrennial Review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code. The report shall include the following:

(A) The results of such a Quadrennial Review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national strategy for United States foreign policy and foreign assistance policies and programs, the roles and responsibilities of and strategic guidance for civilian agencies and mechanisms in implementing such strategy, the requirements for overseas infrastructure necessary to carry out such strategy, plans to adapt such agencies and mechanisms to changing circumstances, and the role of international institutions in such strategy.

(B) The assumed or defined objectives and missions that inform the national strategy for United States foreign policy and foreign assistance policies and programs.

(C) The threats to the assumed or defined objectives and missions of the United States that were examined for the purposes of such a Quadrennial Review.

(D) The assumptions used in such a Quadrennial Review, including assumptions relating to--

(i) the capacity of United States diplomatic and development personnel to respond to such threats;

(ii) the cooperation and capacity of allies, other friendly countries, and international institutions in addressing such threats;

(iii) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and

(iv) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies that arise in the diplomatic and development context.

(E) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components available to civilian agencies, including capabilities and resources necessary to assure that such reserve components can capably discharge such roles and missions.

(F) The extent to which diplomatic and development personnel need to be shifted to different regions to carry out the national strategy under subsection (a).

(G) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.

(e) Independent Panel Assessment-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 6 months before the date on which the report on a Quadrennial Review of Diplomacy and Development is to be transmitted under subsection (d), the President shall establish a panel to conduct an assessment of such a Quadrennial Review.

(2) REPORT ON ASSESSMENT- Not later than 3 months after the date on which the report on such a Quadrennial Review is transmitted under subsection (d), the panel established under paragraph (1) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of such a Quadrennial Review, including an assessment of the recommendations of such a Quadrennial Review, the stated and implied assumptions incorporated in such a Quadrennial Review, and the vulnerabilities of the strategy underlying such a Quadrennial Review.

(f) Exclusion- Any provision in this section relating to budgets or budget plans shall not be construed to require any information on any program that is funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense).

Related Items:

07/10/2009 - The Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

07/10/2009 - Briefing on Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(with Jack Lew and Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter)