The ‘Palmer Effect’ on the US Foreign Service

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FSO Alison Palmer once worked as social secretary to a US ambassador’s wife 

Cape Cod Times has an article on Alison Palmer’s battle against the U.S. State Department which began in the 1970s when she couldn’t land Foreign Service officer jobs because of her gender (Wellfleet resident's lawsuit broke ground for women | January 11, 2010). Excerpt below:

In 1976, when she was in her mid-40s, Alison Palmer brought a class-action discrimination suit against the U.S. Department of State because she was tired of being passed over for jobs as a Foreign Service officer.

Palmer is now 78. Last month, more than 20 years after winning her case, Palmer decided with her attorneys to agree to terminate the lawsuit, said one of Palmer's attorneys, Elisabeth Lyons, who was practicing with a Washington, D.C., firm at the time. On Dec. 18, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, upon an agreement by the parties, dismissed what has come to be known as "the Palmer Case."

The parties agreed to dismiss the class action because the State Department had finally demonstrated compliance with court orders, made reparations to affected women and modified hiring and personnel systems.

[…]

She was hired as a Foreign Service officer in 1959 and specialized in African affairs. She served in what was then the Congo in central Africa and then-British Guiana on South America's northern coast. The State Department then paid for her to attend Boston University for a master's degree in African studies, which she completed in 1970.

But after the federal government had invested in her future, and despite her graduate degree, Palmer was turned down for two assignments in Africa after ambassadors wrote that they didn't want her because she was a woman. A third ambassador in Ethiopia also said he didn't want her because she was female. She ended up as a social secretary to his wife.

[…]

In 1975, 9 percent of Foreign Service officers were women, according to Leader. As of 2007, it was 37 percent, according to the State Department.

"Why not 51 percent, the same as the general population?" Palmer said.

Read the whole thing here.

According to this, a Court Order dated January 19, 1989, found that the Department of State (“State”) had discriminated against women in the administration of a written examination that applicants for positions in the Foreign Service were obliged to take. As part of the relief awarded, it enjoined State from administering any written examination that had an adverse impact upon women.

In 2002, plaintiffs and State entered into a Consent Decree. Pursuant to the decree, the court certified as a class all female applicants who took, but did not pass, the 1991, 1992, 1993, or 1994 Foreign Service Written Examinations. The decree also permitted 390 members of the plaintiff class to participate in the Oral Assessment phase of the Foreign Service application process. These women, referred to as the invitees, had the highest non-passing scores on the 1991-1994 examinations.



I could not  find the 1989 or the 2002 court documents, but have included links to some of the Palmer case documents available online below.

Related Items:

Palmer Case Documents:

Mar 24, 1987 DC

Alison Palmer, et al., Appellants v. George P. Shultz, As Secretary of State.marguerite Cooper, et al., Appellants v. George P. Shultz, As Secretary of State

May 11, 1990 DC

Alison Palmer, et al., Appellants, v. James A. Baker, Iii, Secretary of State of the United Statesof America, Department of State, Appellee.marguerite Cooper King, et al., Appellants, v. James A. Baker, Iii, Secretary of State of the United Statesof America, Department of State, Appellee

May 11, 1990 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

http://openjurist.org/905/f2d/1544

Palmer v. Rice

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?1976cv1439-649

Palmer Documents

http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~sch00841

Quote: The Neglected Art of Diplomacy

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"An generation of American leaders has been brought up with a kind of Manicheanism: to some, bombs are the necessary catalysts to negotiation; to others, bombs are just evil. To only just a few traditionalists, it seems, dropping bombs represents a diplomatic failure, however necessary it may be as a last resort.

Such reductionism in foreign policy thinking is compounded by the periodic rivalries between the State and Defense Departments (and the White House), and the widespread but bizarre perception that negotiations (and “diplomacy” itself) are the weapons of the weak. Obama has rightly ridiculed the perception. But he will need to show some results for his critique to take hold. He won’t get those results if his diplomacy continues to be as tentative and under-managed as it has been to date."

Kenneth Weisbrode History News Network: The Neglected Art of DiplomacyDecember 7, 2009

Mr. Weisbrode is the author of The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats who Forged America's Vital Alliance with Europe (Da Capo, Nov. 2009)

Book description (from Borders): Historian Kenneth Weisbrode reveals for the first time, warts and all the insider's story of such well-known figures as Dean Acheson, W. Averell Harriman, and Henry Kissinger. It is the story of how and why the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs (EUR)the "mother bureau" as it was called, the nerve center of the Atlanticists rose to become the U.S. government's preeminent foreign policy office.

Remember When: Policy on Wives of Foreign Service Employees

Washington, January 22, 1972, 9:05 a.m.

The following is U.S. Government policy regarding wives of Foreign Service employees. This policy applies as well to male spouses and other dependents of Foreign Service employees. Copies of this instruction should be made available to all employees and their dependents. Ambassadors and Principal officers are asked to insure that this policy is observed and that all concerned understand the voluntary character of wives' participation on which it rests:

1. The wife of a Foreign Service employee who has accompanied her husband to a foreign post is a private individual; she is not a Government employee. The Foreign Service, therefore, has no right to levy any duties upon her. It can only require that she comport herself in a manner which will not reflect discredit on the United States.

2. Foreign Service Officers have broadly defined representational responsibilities overseas. These are an integral part of their job, and they are expected to lead generally active social lives. An officer is not relieved of such responsibilities if his wife chooses not to assist him in carrying them out. However, the U.S. Government has no right to insist that a wife assume representational burdens. Each wife must decide the extent to which she wants to participate as a partner in this aspect of her husband's job. She is free to follow her own interests (subject only to the laws and regulations of the host country and the U.S. Government).

3. Many wives may want to engage abroad, as they do at home, in charitable activities. In doing so they not only help others less fortunate than themselves, but often contribute favorably to the image of the U.S. abroad. However, a wife's participation in charitable activities must be truly voluntary. Which particular charity, if any, and the extent of her involvement is a decision for the wife alone to make.

This applies also to wives' participation in activities such as binational organizations, clubs and “in-house” social gatherings which are often worthwhile, contribute to morale and the effective functioning of the post, and thus benefit the Foreign Service. Many wives enjoy these activities, provided they are not viewed as requirements. Some do not and are not required to engage in them.

4. Although membership in a diplomatic community and the requirements of protocol inevitably involve considerations of rank and precedence in dealing with people outside the post, this does not grant to any wife authority over, or responsibility for, the wives of other employees. The American tradition of neighborliness, personal courtesy and mutual concern is the appropriate way to be helpful and friendly without assuming a superior-subordinate relationship.

5. Mention of wives' participation or lack thereof in the types of activities discussed in this instruction may not be made in performance evaluation reports, Inspectors' efficiency reports, or training evaluations. Every rating and reviewing officer has the responsibility of insuring that employees' ratings are not affected by such considerations. However, should violations of this policy occur, remedial action will be taken.6. The Department, USIA, and AID are instituting careful review of their regulations and guidelines to insure that they conform with these principles. Posts are instructed to review their own programs and guidelines to insure conformity with this instruction. These Agencies are confident that this policy statement will receive the support and cooperation of all concerned. If violations do occur, every effort should be made to resolve them at post. However, if after such an effort is made, they cannot be resolved in the field, they should be brought to the attention of the Director General for the Department of State, Office of Personnel and Manpower for AID, and the Assistant Director for Personnel and Training for USIA. Complaints of abuse will be handled on a confidential basis.

Related Items:

• Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel, Department of State (Thomas) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Macomber | October 20, 1971
• Secretary Roger’s Airgram | From the DoS to All Posts | Policy on Wives of Foreign Service Employees | January 22, 1972

Quote: Married to the Service in the 50’s

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‘For the male officer, marriage presents no Service problem. Convention allows that his wife need have no profession of her own. Moreover, she probably should have none, seeing that in the higher grades of the Service she will have an important social role which is likely to keep her fully employed. Indeed, it is very nearly true that she can properly have none; since, quite apart from the question of social demands on her time, there are extremely few professions the following of which would not conflict in some degree with the interests of the Service.’

Sir William StrangThe Foreign Office, 1954 from Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, 1782-1999

Peter Galbraith in the News Again

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Peter Galbraith was thrown under the bus over the Afghan election in late September. Last week, Nate Jones over at the Unredacted Blog of the National Security Archive blogged about their “hot doc,” released by the Department of State to Archive analyst William Ferroggiaro on 22 June 2004; it features Galbraith who was then US Ambassador to Croatia.

"This 1994 State Department cable, penned by then US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, described as “MUST READ” by its cover letter, was disseminated to White House personnel. Galbraith reported that the criteria for genocide, as defined by the Geneva Convention, were being met in the three-party war raging in the former Yugoslavia." Click here on how to decipher a State Department cable.

On November 11, NYT published U.S. Adviser to Kurds Stands to Reap Oil Profits:

Peter W. Galbraith, an influential former American ambassador, is a powerful voice on Iraq who helped shape the views of policy makers like Joseph R. Biden Jr. and John Kerry. In the summer of 2005, he was also an adviser to the Kurdish regional government as Iraq wrote its Constitution — tough and sensitive talks not least because of issues like how Iraq would divide its vast oil wealth.Now Mr. Galbraith, 58, son of the renowned economist John Kenneth Galbraith, stands to earn perhaps a hundred million or more dollars as a result of his closeness to the Kurds, his relations with a Norwegian oil company and constitutional provisions he helped the Kurds extract.

The Editors of NYT are none too happy about this. On November 12, it also published an Editors’ Note:

Like other writers for the Op-Ed page, Mr. Galbraith signed a contract that obligated him to disclose his financial interests in the subjects of his articles. Had editors been aware of Mr. Galbraith's financial stake, the Op-Ed page would have insisted on disclosure or not published his articles.

• As Iraqis Celebrate, the Kurds Hesitate(February 1, 2005)
• Our Corner of Iraq(July 25, 2006)
• Make Walls, Not War(October 23, 2007)
• Questions for the Next Vice President(October 2, 2008)

Last night, Galbraith spoke openly about the issue at an appearance at the Centre Congregational Church in Brattleboro, Vermont. The Brattleboro Reformer reported that Galbraith spoke to a large crowd regarding the recent elections and future American involvement in Afghanistan, where he served as the deputy special representative to the United Nations. The conversation reportedly shifted quickly to the new reports of his business interests in Kurdistan. Excerpts below:

Defending his business decisions, Galbraith said "I actually find the article quite, well, it is full of innuendo. If you read the facts [with the implications and innuendo], I find [it] offensive."[…]In August 2005, Galbraith said he was asked by the Kurds to advise them on a permanent constitution, even after they were aware of his business interests with foreign oil companies. With the Kurdish political leaders controlling their own oil industry, it provides them an economic base for the people, a goal Galbraith said he always supported."I gave them advice and the end result that they achieved was identical to what was already proposed in February 2004," he said. "Now, it’s true that people in Baghdad may disagree with that, people in Washington may disagree with that, but there’s no conflict there. The advice I was giving and the economic interest were exactly, exactly congruent."If you talk to a majority of the Kurdish people, they say the oil under their feet is a curse because it has given former Iraqi leaders the financial means to kill them, said Galbraith. By having their own natural resources, the Kurds have a vehicle to defend themselves against future attacks, he added."I make no apologies for my role here ... at that time, I was a private citizen. Private citizens engage in business, that’s what I did."

Read the whole thing here.

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Quote: Diplomats, Not Meant to Sell Widgets

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I don’t think that diplomats are meant to sell widgets - that isn’t their function - or to know about the intricate details of how widgets are made and what they measure. What diplomats are meant to do is generally create, promote, foster the environment in which British exports are likely to be successfully achieved and specifically to press, pursue, and promote individual contracts when these are at stake. A lot of diplomacy is not about that; it’s about representing Britain in a much wider sense, a lot of which incidentally is extremely dull. It is about protecting British citizens. It’s about, in poor countries, promoting development assistance. I don’t myself think that businessmen are likely to find it a very comfortable environment in which to operate.

Sir David Gore-BoothFormer British Ambassador to India from the British Diplomatic Oral History Project | 1999David Alwyn Gore-Booth, diplomat and banker (1943- 2004)

The Diplomatic Wives: Tribute and Thanks

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In their swearing in, you see the spouses holding the book; when they retire and if they get lucky, the spouses may get a special mention at the ceremony. It does not seem to matter whether it’s the Foreign Service or the FCO. Most days, the spouse is just a spouse, doing all things unofficially, that is.

In 1971, when the Foreign Service issued a directive saying that "participation by a Foreign Service wife in the work of a post is a voluntary act of a private person, not a legal obligation which can be imposed by any Foreign Service official or his wife,” it also said: “We believe it would be a serious loss if the feelings of common effort and cooperation of our Foreign Service personnel and their wives were somehow lost.”

‘Frankly, if a wife chooses to be involved in the embassy work, it’s an unpaid benefit for us.’ That’s from the FCO spokesman in 1986. They were no longer obligated to do anything for the mission, but that did not mean the end of such things. The British Ambassadors in their valedictories recognized that when they pay tribute to their wives (with names never mentioned) even as one puts it, an “empty gesture through it is.”

Sir David Gore-Booth, the British Ambassador to India (Valedictory Despatch: Delhi, 1999) writes:

"So how does the “blustering buffoon” of Francis Wheen’s imagination sign off for the last time? Not without thanking my wives: the first for giving up under the strain after only a few years; the second for making the last 21 years a joy above and below deck. And scores of colleagues, whether UK based or locally engaged, who have helped keep this particular show on the road. I have hugely enjoyed a career that has always been colorful and times controversial. But now it is time to go home."

Sir Michael Weir, the British Ambassador to Egypt (Valedictory Despatch: Cairo, 1985) writes:

"I must end with the customary tribute to spouse and Service, empty gesture through it is to include a sentence or two of compliments in a dispatch which will be read mainly by colleagues. In my case, I have two wives to thank both of whom have been a great support but the first of whom decided that diplomatic life was crippling to the spirit. The second had joined the Service before we met, and has no excuse. I am therefore not taking my leave the same way as other valedictorians, and look forward to several further years service below stairs while my wife pursues her career."

Then there’s Lord Moran who was High Commissioner to Canada (1981-1984) (Valedictory Despatch: Lord Moran, Ottowa, 1984):

"I pay tribute, as I have done in some of my speeches, to the incalculable contribution made to our efforts by a good many of our wives, unpaid but often making all the difference between success and failure. And in this, my last dispatch, I should like to say thank you to my own wife. For thirty five years, at home and in eight countries overseas, we have done everything together. Mine has been an easier job than hers. But her contribution has been enormous. Doing it all together has made it fun. Indeed to have done it without her would have been inconceivable."

And that's that. The Foreign Service, of course, does not have the tradition of the valedictories. Occasionally, you hear the tribute to the wife in the public sphere like this one below from Craig Stapleton, former US Ambassador to France and the Czech Republic. His wife, Dorothy Walker Stapleton, is a first cousin of George H.W. Bush.

"Having served for seven years in a U.S. Embassy, I must say it would be impossible for an Ambassador to fill all the demands of the job, including managing and running the residence staff and events without a wife. Nancy Brinker, an Ambassador to Hungary, often told Debbie and me, "I need a wife." Luckily, Debbie was a willing partner, who made the visit of all who came warm and special. The spouse of an Ambassador has no direct staff, is unpaid, yet the success of the Mission in improving the relations between our respective countries falls equally on the couple."

Quote: Cocktail parties are death …

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“One of the great failures of the Diplomatic Service has been its inability to cast off its images as bowler hated, pin-striped and chinless with a fondness for champagne. It does not help when Ministers earn themselves a cheap thrill by colluding with the notion that the FCO is elitist and fuddy duddy. Or that Eton is a dirty word. A Foreign Office career is one of the best levelers – upwards or down – that has been devised. It is also testing. Bubbly is far from the mind when burning confidential documents on the roof of the Embassy in Baghdad, battening down the hatches against stone throwing mobs outside the High Commission in Lusaka or the Embassy in Tripoli, grinding out text at all-night sessions in Brussels or New York, paying incognito visits to Syria or doing bumps and jumps in an RAF Tornado over Kuwait. Indeed cocktail parties are death as I am sure 99 perfect of DS colleagues would agree. Whoever it was who suggested an international treaty banning National Day receptions should be canonized.”

Sir David Gore-BoothBritish Ambassador to Indiafrom the Valedictory Despatch: Sir David Gore Booth, Delhi, 1999British Diplomatic Oral History Project | 1999David Alwyn Gore-Booth, diplomat and banker (1943- 2004)

From Valedictory Despatches to Twitter?

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The Ambassadors’ Parting Shots

Today on BBC Radio 4 Matthew Parris kickoffs a 5-episode program on the passing of the valedictory despatch. That’s the traditional final telegram home in which British ambassadors could “let their hair down and settle a few scores.” That is, they could say whatever they wished in their final telegram home. The series features declassified Foreign Office files alongside interviews with the diplomats who wrote them. These files were released to the BBC under the Freedom of Information Act. Click here to hear the episodes. Click here to hear a clip now (additional excerpts read by actors).

The BBC also interviewed our blog friend, three times British Ambassador Charles Crawford, who left the FCO in 2007. Ambassador C gave it a thumbs up: “The BBC series is well researched and should be well worth a listen if you are interested in the way diplomacy has evolved, both for better and worse, in recent decades.” He further writes that the valedictories were canned when he was in Warsaw, and that he sent two from there: “-- one on the philosophical aspects of the end of communism in Europe (extracts from which readers in a world scoop here have seen: The Final Submission); -- one describing my Lifetime Career Oscar Achievement Awards, a self-indulgent but droll list of the best and worst moments of 28 years' service." Read Charles’ post here.

You can read below some of the valedictory despatches (pdfs) included in the series.

• Dame Glynne Evans, Lisbon, 2004
• Sir David Gore Booth, Delhi, 1999
• Sir Robin Renwick, Washington, 1995
• Sir Michael Weir, Cairo, 1985
• Lord Moran, Ottowa, 1984
• Ralph Selby, Oslo, 1975
• Sir John Russell, Rio de Janeiro, 1969
• Roger Pinsent, Managua, 1967
• Sir Anthony Rumbold, Bangkok, 1967

Andrew Bryson , the producer of the BBC show writes that “this centuries-old tradition survived in the Foreign Office through countless changes of government, upheaval and wars - before coming to an abrupt end under Labour in 2006. Perhaps the remarkable thing was that it lasted so long.”

He reports that the final straw was a 2006 valedictory from Sir Ivor Roberts, then the outgoing British ambassador to Italy. “It was fitting that his parting shot, the last of the genre, should also be a classic. He told of a Foreign Office under siege by management consultants, efficiency drives and Wall Street business-speak mumbo-jumbo:”

"Can it be that in wading through the plethora of business plans, capability reviews, skills audits, zero-based reviews and other excrescences of the management age, we have indeed forgotten what diplomacy is all about?" - Sir Ivor Roberts, Rome, 2006

Apparently, hours after this telegram was sent, ambassadors then received word from Whitehall that the practice was to be discontinued.

The report says there was concern for the “growing tendency of these valedictories to leak.” That or could it be that they no longer write them “mainly because no-one is interested to read anything longer than a text message?” Or perhaps a tweet at 140 characters?

So instead of texting “most difcult assgmt, glad wl soon b out of here” you can actually say “sucks to all this; time to go home and start a garden while wifey starts her own career.” Or “Nine countries, six continents, three wives later – thank you it has been a great ride.” Man, you can start a whole new lit genre writing valedictories in Twitter. Except that Whitehall would cringe at that and Foggy Bottom has not done these type of dispatches; and well, it also doesn't tweet goodbyes.

Of course, if they come around to it, and your valedictory is longer than 140 characters, you can fix that with Twitzer – a Firefox extension for Twitter that will short tweets that seem to cross the 140 limit. Once installed, the extension will fetch all the Twitzered text from shortText.com and update the Twitter site itself.

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Insider Quote: And Thou Shall be Cautious

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"I have seen men's careers set back and, in fact, busted because they held the right views at the wrong time, or for accurately reporting facts which were not popular at the time."

W. Averell Harriman from Essay: The State of the Department of StateFriday, Oct. 15, 1965 | Time.com

Quickie: Where Caution is King

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Thus Rusk is a cautious man, and caution is king throughout the State Department. Rusk did not create the condition, he has merely compounded it. John Foster Dulles was a notable exception to the rule that a Secretary of State does not "make" foreign policy; with President Eisenhower's approval, Dulles often acted out of his own mind and experience, and woe to the State Department underling who went against him. What Dulles personalized, Rusk has institutionalized; and the most common complaint within and without the State Department is that there is little room for the original thinker, the daring or dissenting mind.

from Essay: The State of the Department of StateFriday, Oct. 15, 1965 | Time.com

A Lesson in "Good News” Reporting

Seated during the Clark Air Force Base turnover ceremonies arefrom left to right, Foreign Minister of the Philippines, Carlos P. Romulo;US Ambassador Richard W. Murphy;Philippine President and Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos;and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones.DOD Photo: 3/14/1979

Nicholas Kralev reported recently on U.S. embassies discouraging or suppressing negative reports to Washington about U.S. allies. Some 37 years ago this month, a dictatorship was born in a distant country. Would “bad news” reporting have made a difference in this case? Who knows? But from the records published in the FRUS series, one gets a sense that our reporting officials did not get this one right. Was it a simple matter of faulty analysis and interpretation? Or was it because there was a prevailing notion subscribed to by the mission that precluded a better reading of the situation on the ground? Not that it matters anymore. Most of the principal players in this game, except Imelda are dead. But given our country's involvement in Central Asia, an area populated by tyrants and dictators, the Philippines provide a lesson in history.

Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos served as President of the Philippines from 1965-1986. He declared martial law on September 21, 1972, and by virtue of a presidential proclamation curtailed press freedom and other civil liberties, closed down Congress and media establishments, and ordered the arrest of opposition leaders and militant activists, including some of his staunchest critics like Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

In February 25, 1986 during the People Power Revolution, Ferdinand Marcos fled the country after 20 years of rule; Corazon Aquino became the first Filipino woman president. By 1991 when the Philippine Senate formally rejected the military base pact with the US, the bases became the most visible symbols not only of colonial legacy but also of America's long-term support of a dictator and a kleptocrat.

Read the excerpts below, all taken from the FRUS series unless otherwise noted:

Excerpt from a Memorandum of Conversation with President Nixon, Henry A. Byroade, American Ambassador to the Philippines and John H. Holdridge discussing developments in the PhilippinesWashington, January 15, 1971

Ambassador Byroade then declared that he had a very sensitive matter to lay before the President at Marcos' request. At the end of his predeparture conversation with Marcos, Marcos had warned him that he might find it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and establish martial law in the city of Manila—unprecedented steps which had not been taken by any Philippine President since the late 40's during the hukbalahap movement. What Marcos wanted to know was: in the event that he found it necessary to declare martial law in Manila, would the United States back him up, or would it work against him? Ambassador Byroade noted that he had promised Marcos he would bring back the President's personal reply.

The President declared that we would “absolutely” back Marcos up, and “to the hilt” so long as what he was doing was to preserve the system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty. The President indicated that he had telephoned Trudeau of Canada to express this same position. We would not support anyone who was trying to set himself up as a military dictator, but we would do everything we could to back a man who was trying to make the system work and to preserve order.

Excerpt from an Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State | Discussion with Filipino Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., LP Secretary General)Manila, August 20, 1971

Aquino said that Marcos was becoming more and more of a dictator and was gaining control of the government and the country in line with his alleged intentions of continuing to stay in power beyond the end of his second term in 1973. Thus Marcos' present actions and future ambitions, Aquino argued, were creating a revolutionary situation for the Philippines. While Aquino said he could not predict with precision when a revolution would occur, he said that one of the key factors that any revolutionary must consider and which at present was unclear was the position the United States would take in a revolutionary situation in the Philippines.

Comment: Senator Aquino can be prone to exaggeration, and his remarks on the possibility of revolution and the role that he might play as one of its leaders seemed quite farfetched. Aquino, who is a longtime and prominent critic of Marcos, has no political ideology beyond his own personal ambitions. In this respect, his discussion of revolution can be interpreted as meaning that, if the Philippine political system has been changed to the extent that his political clique cannot alternate in power with the Marcoses by democratic means, then it will become necessary to resort to violent revolution as the means of gaining power. Although Aquino is believed to maintain regular contact with the Huks and the NPA, the jump from being a potential Liberal Party candidate for the 1973 Presidential election to leading a revolution in the hills may be a bit too much for the “boy wonder of Tarlac” to make.

Excerpt from a Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State | Ambassador reporting about meeting with President Marcos and wife, ImeldaManila, September 3, 1971, 0937Z

4. Later on as I was sitting down with the President, Imelda asked to see him before his talk with me. When I later joined the President in his private library, he said that I had left the First Lady quite agitated and worried, with her worry centering on my remarks in the quotes above. Marcos said I must know that he had not suspended the writ solely on the Plaza Miranda incident, as he had stated publicly, that this was only the last straw. He said he was determined, during the period of the suspension of the writ, to break the back of Communist-led insurgency in the Philippines, even though this might take some time. He assured me that he would not misuse the suspension for political purposes, or against personal enemies. Interestingly, he said that it would not be difficult to have the constitutional convention extend his tenure of office, but that he was not going to do that. He said he would retire in 1973 unless at the time the country seemed in such a condition that he could not conscientiously leave the office of the President.

Excerpt from a Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State | Ambassador reporting about meeting with MarcosManila, September 21, 1972, 1011Z.

8. I reminded him again that it was terribly important that he understands that it was only I, a friend, talking to him personally and privately. In that context, I said I wanted to talk to him about the type of things that cause me to pace the floor. He said he understood completely and I should go ahead without hesitation. I then reminded him that we are in the wind-up phase of an extremely important election campaign in our own country. I said I thought McGovern would seize on anything like a military takeover in the Philippines in an effort to use it as the final proof of his charge that the foreign policies of Nixon, particularly in the Asian area, were a total failure. I said I thought he would scream that “even the Philippines” had been so badly messed up that the very form of government which we instituted here was now in the hands of military dictatorship, supplied by our equipment. He would probably try to make a major thing of it, proving that this was the beginning of another Vietnam “even in the Philippines.” I said I know Nixon pretty well, and I thought he would be greatly upset if the Philippines gave the appearance of blowing up in his face at a time like this. I returned to the idea that our hands could become so tied up that as a practical fact we couldn't do any of the things we really wanted to do for the Philippines.

9. Marcos said he had made no decision to move towards martial law, and he had never considered anything beyond that, such as military rule. He did admit, however, that planning for martial law was at an advanced state. He said that under any conditions he could foresee he would not consider any extra-constitutional moves in the Philippines. We then got into a discussion as to what type of events had to happen under the Philippine Constitution wherein it would be constitutional to declare martial law. He concluded that words might have a different meaning for us and the Philippine Constitution was perhaps broader in this respect than our own.

11. Marcos told me at one point that guns were not the answer. He said he did not mean that over the long haul that the Philippines did not need adequate military forces. He then went into quite a brilliant description of the state of things in the Philippines and the absolute necessity for social reform. He said after all of his years in government, including seven in the Presidency, that he did indeed question the ability of the Philippines to achieve adequate reforms in time under the present system. His descriptions of its evils, and graft and corruption, of the impossibility of getting adequate legislation, and adequate resources for desperately needed reforms could hardly have been equalled by any harsh critic of this country. It is hard to escape [garble] that he thinks that his place in history might be made if he had the power of drastic reform. He might even see at this point this is his only route to regain his popularity even to the point where he could win handily in a future election, although he made no reference to either of these thoughts.

Excerpt from a Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, September 23, 1972

President Marcos imposed martial law throughout the Philippines at midnight September 22. He proclaimed it officially at mid-day September 23, according to press reports, saying that it did not involve military rule and that civilian government would continue. We do not yet have the text of the proclamation, and thus do not at this point know its specifics, particularly as to whether Marcos suspended the Congress.

Patricia H. Kushlis writing in Whirled View: "[S]kewed, feel-good reporting from an Embassy too often helps to produce skewed, bad analysis that can result in skewed and hence bad policy decisions."

It turned out that Aquino was more prescient about Marcos' ambition and his warning of Marcos becoming a dictator was not an exaggeration. The day before martial law was imposed the US Ambassador sent a cable talking about economic issues in the host country. An embassy cable dated on the day martial law was declared states “Marcos said he had made no decision to move towards martial law.” It was a bad reading of the local situation, for sure; either that or one has to admit that the US Embassy at that time had been played exceptionally well by somebody with a more deft hand.

The text from Ambassador Henry Byroade's oral history interview talking about his stint in the Philippines can be accessed through the Truman Library here. If you read it with this FRUS series, you get quite a good picture in full colors.

The Long Foreign Service Hangover

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In 1961 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. was a Special Assistant to President Kennedy. In that capacity, he wrote to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy concerning the Bowles Memorandum to the President. Chester Bowles was the State Department’s Under Secretary of State at that time, and was writing about the Agency’s organizational needs. The Schlesinger memo below is probably one of the few coherent insights into the Foreign Service culture. I think it is relevant today as when it was written 48 years ago. The risk aversion did not happen overnight ... it did not come out of thin air ... it came about because of what happened to people like John Service and others. The organization as a living system remember even as we generally suffer from short memory...

Washington, August 11, 1961.

Subject: Mr. Bowles's Memorandum of July 28

1. I agree with the essential argument of the Bowles memorandum—that the State Department would be more effective as an instrument of government if more top officials believed vigorously in the purposes and objectives of the Administration. Old Frontier people cannot carry out New Frontier policies. Or rather I agree with this argument so far as it goes, while at the same time wishing to emphasize that, in my judgment, it only covers a part of the problem. If Mr. Bowles's concentration on personnel suggests that he thinks bringing in more New Frontiersmen will solve all the troubles of the State Department, I do not agree with this. The appointment of more able Kennedy outsiders will help create the conditions for solution; but the problems are deeper and more obstinate than the Bowles memorandum suggests.

2. My few months at the White House have convinced me that the traditional tripartite division of the national government into executive, legislative and judicial branches is inadequate. With a strong President, there are really four branches of government: the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and the Presidency. A President who advances new ideas and policies may well encounter as much resistance in the executive branch as in the Congress or the Supreme Court. I was academically aware of this from my excursions into the Roosevelt era; but I know much more vividly today how acute and deep-rooted the problem is of mobilizing the executive branch behind new programs and purposes.

3. This problem may be especially acute in the State Department because of the 'non-political' and 'elite' character of the Foreign Service.

The typical Foreign Service officer is well above the average in decency, intelligence and devotion. However, the typical Foreign Service officer also tends to be somewhat emasculated so far as policy commitment is concerned. One reason for this is that Foreign Service training has the effect of divesting the professional officer of strong views on substantive policy. It almost seems as if the Foreign Service receives a group of spirited young Americans at the age of 25 and transforms them in the next twenty years into a collection of eunuchs (or possibly my protracted exposure to ARA has distorted my judgment).

Why this process of emasculation?

(a) Foreign Service traditions derive from the time when America's role in the world was passive and spectatorial; consequently Foreign Service officers still tend to be reporters rather than operators.

(b) Foreign Service officers are regularly shifted from one country to another and from one job to another. This lack of continuity—Iceland one year, Tanganyika the next—discourages them from developing a very intense interest in policy issues. (In any case, they are taught that their job is to carry out the policy, however idiotic they may personally consider the policy to be.)

(c) It is no coincidence that the areas where the problem of learning a difficult language compels continuity—the Russia Service and the China Service—are precisely the areas where the Foreign Service professionals have been least emasculated and most independent and outspoken. But it was precisely these areas which suffered most heavily in the Dulles period. Dulles's punitive action against the men in the Foreign Service who were most conspicuously free and strong individuals (Bohlen, Kennan, Davies, Service, Thayer, etc.) proved to the rest of the Foreign Service what a mistake it was ever to go out on a limb. The Department is still suffering from the hangover of the Dulles period.

(d) The system of promotions within the Foreign Service further discourages policy initiative, because it is hard to propose new policies without seeming to criticize present ones. Junior officers may well hesitate to challenge Assistant Secretaries with power over their next assignments or, indeed, over their future careers.

Obviously the Foreign Service cannot consist of a collection of freewheelers each pursuing his own foreign policy. But the factors listed above have exaggerated an inherent tendency toward caution to a dangerous point. And Foreign Service resistance to innovation is further reinforced-and often in a most unwholesome way—by the prevailing sense that the Foreign Service is an exclusive club which must jealously guard foreign policy from the meddling of naive and presumptuous amateurs.

4. How to overcome this built-in resistance to change? How to annex the State Department to the Kennedy Administration?

The answer begins, of course, with strong leadership at the top-of the sort which has enabled McNamara and Gilpatric to proceed so successfully in their reconquest of the Pentagon. Strong top leadership has been lacking in State.

It is also important, as Mr. Bowles suggests, to get able, Kennedy-oriented men in jobs of middle-level administrative responsibility. I believe that he is, in the main, right when he claims that the New Frontiersmen have done much more to revitalize our conduct of foreign affairs than the Foreign Service professionals. It is natural enough that this should be so. Men who were in tune with John Foster Dulles are not likely to come up with bold initiatives for the New Frontier. Probably too many such men are still in key jobs. In ARA, and no doubt elsewhere, some of the Foreign Service officers are out of sympathy with the Kennedy foreign policy. It would certainly help to get more men of the Ball-Cleveland-Coombs-Chayes-Williams order at the Assistant Secretarial level.

At the same time, there should be no crusade against Foreign Service officers. They have to do most of the work. Many of them will begin to adjust to the new dispensation. The best among them (Bohlen, Kennan, Thompson, Woodward, Gullion and others) enjoy the New Frontier and flourish in the new expansive atmosphere.

5. More important: new men are only part of the problem. The Bowles memorandum ignores a number of structural questions which increase the Department's inherent tendencies toward inaction and postponement. Making policy in the State Department is like negotiating a hopelessly intricate obstacle course. One may recognize the need for interminable clearance and concurrence while at the same time wonder whether these things are not sometimes erected into excuses for doing as little as possible. The Bowles memorandum also ignores fundamental, long-run questions, like that of the training and philosophy of the Foreign Service.

In short, we require more Kennedy-oriented men in State, especially, as Bowles suggests, in ARA, FE and European Affairs. Why not develop a general pattern for the geographic areas of insider/outsider teams, one as Assistant Secretary, the other as Deputy? But we also require a hard and skeptical reexamination of the policy-making process within the Department. (This reexamination might also be carried out by insider/outsider teams; it cannot be entrusted to the Foreign Service alone—or to the Council on Foreign Relations alone!)

6. In the end, let us face the fact, only one man can exert the leadership to do the job. That is the Secretary of State.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, State Department, 8/5/61–8/14/61. Secret.

Document 35. A draft memorandum to President Kennedy from David E. Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, dated August 9, also commented on Bowles' July 28 memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, State Department, 8/5/61–8/14/61)

Insider Quote: There are no bad missions, just bad ambassadors

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Every previous reorganization of the Foreign Service and the State Department has involved at least some such straitjacketing of operations in the field. The hope this time, one which I fully share, is that we can achieve major improvements without suffering much of this kind of damage, because this reorganization is being done from within, by the professionals themselves. Even professionals, however, can mesmerize themselves with their own generalizations, particularly if they have been steeped for a while in the hothouse atmosphere of Washington; so even the present effort requires constant attention from its leaders to keep it honest and pragmatic rather than theological. In the final analysis, there are no bad missions, just bad ambassadors. No set of rules is a substitute for executive talent.

Letter From the Ambassador to Nepal (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume IICarol Laise served as Ambassador to Nepal from 1966 to 1973

Nixon on Cleaning Up That State Dept

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WashingtonJanuary 7, 1969

At the beginning of a new Administration I believe that an analysis of the qualifications of all of our Ambassadors abroad, career as well as non-career, should be made. While the great majority of career men will probably be retained in their present posts, the beginning of a new Administration is a good time to move some of the dead wood out and to move some of the unqualified men from one post to a less sensitive one.

In my travels abroad I have, of course, seen the usual number of political appointees who weren't qualified for the job they held, but I have also seen a number of career men who were pretty inadequate and who should be replaced.

I think a very hard-headed analysis should be made just as soon as we take over on January 20 so that any changes can be made within the first two or three months that we are in office. If we delay beyond that point we will be subject to the charge of being vindictive, personal or political. Changes at this time, of course, will be expected.

Memorandum From President-Elect Nixon to Secretary of State-Designate RogersFrom Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Secretary Rogers Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Printed from an unsigned copy.

On the day of his re-election as President, November 7, 1972, Nixon had a long discussion with his Assistant H.R. Haldeman about changes in administration personnel for the second term. “His feeling is that he's ambivalent—to a degree at least—about Rogers, whether he will keep him or not, although he realizes that he shouldn't,” Haldeman noted in his diary entry for November 7. “Doesn't really know what he wants to do at State, if he does let Rogers go.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition).

Two days later Haldeman had dinner with John Ehrlichman and Henry Kissinger and, according to Haldeman's diary entry for November 9, “we went through the whole question of State and Defense and foreign policy with Henry. It comes down to his general agreement that we should go ahead with [Kenneth] Rush at the State Department, because you have to get a man who basically functions according to the orders he gets, as the P's man, rather than an independent Secretary of State.” (Ibid.) Speaking of Rush during an Oval Office meeting with Kissinger on November 13, the President said: “I am going to tell him: I am going to take the responsibility for cleaning up that State Department and I want him to be my man.” Just prior to that comment Nixon had asserted that his “one legacy is to ruin the foreign service. I mean ruin it—the old foreign service—and to build a new one. I'm going to do it.”

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976347. Editorial Note(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, November 13, 1972, Oval Office Conversation No. 814–3) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Insider Quote: Dealing with Stress

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Q: So, what is the classic way that the Foreign Service deals with stress?

KOTULA: You just stiff upper lip and "that's the way it is." There's this dualism again. You know, "this is the way it is" and a number of people in the Service say, "Oh, this is exciting, this is why I joined the Foreign Service, this is where it's at, this is where the action's happening." But there is an opposite side. They don't deal with the real terror and how frightening a lot of this is. How can you say... there's a stuffed feelin(she laughs) -- I'm out there waving the flag, I'm showing the best there is of our country, and you're not "allowed" to have feelings of being scared to hell, you're not allowed to own the negative parts of it.

Q: And nobody gives you any help in interpreting them and working through them?

KOTULA: They give you help fixing you up after you(laughing) fall to pieces, but- (she trails off in laughter).

The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training | Spouse Series | Frontline Diplomacy, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.Excerpted from Interview with Kotula, Ruth EnslieArt Teacher and Professional Artist (FS Spouse 1966-1989)Digital ID: http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mfdip.2004kot01

A spouse remembers: "My God, I'm not a person!"

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KOTULA: Oh, yes, a lot less of this. And I had -- there were obviously a lot of receptions in San Jose, Costa Rica, that included visiting Congressmen or high-up specialty people in the Department of State, whether it be whatever agency or department-- USIS, or the Bureau of Consular Affairs. And there were a number of women who would come through from time to time from Washington, whether with Congressmen or from the Department of State or some other agency. Coming officially or accompanying someone, what have you. These were high-level receptions. I don't know how many times in a year, vis-a-vis women visitors, one of them would ask me, "Oh, and what do you do in the embassy?" And I'd say, "No, I'm a professional artist. My husband is So-and-so." And that would be the end of that conversation, and it would be very clear what I was thought of. You know, like, "You don't count!" (both laugh heartily) I can understand, but it just adds to your feelings of being a non-person. You get that feeling from men, but I think I've got that feeling from women a lot more.

Q: Really?

KOTULA: Yes.

Q: Especially people from outside the community, visiting people?

KOTULA: Yes. Women on Congressmen's staff who were visiting with the Congressman. I didn't get it from female Congresswomen. I did get it from women working within the Department of State or other agencies who were visiting. Several of them, I recall, were working for the U.S. Information Agency.

Q: You think perhaps they could be educated a little better? (she laughs)

KOTULA: I don't know how you'd get over that. But that's just another thing that adds to the feeling "my God, I'm not a person."

The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training | Spouse SeriesExcerpted from Interview with Ruth Enslie KotulaArt Teacher and Professional Artist (FS Spouse 1966-1989)

Insider Quote: 4th of July Go Smoothly - Makers

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"Shortly after our arrival in Kingston, we celebrated a Fourth of July party for the diplomatic corps and all Americans. I met countless times with the wives of our Consular staff to make sure everything would go smoothly. We hired a little donkey saddled with a pannier on each side filled with rum. Christopher led the little donkey around, offering our guests a drink which his older sister had prepared at the last minute with too much emphasis on the rum, as we discovered later. It is not surprising that the party was a huge success, the best ever given on American Independence Day we were told by many who attended. We were still happily celebrating when it became dark and we quite forgot to haul down the flag. Later in the night, we were reminded by one of the departing guests. At about the same time, I discovered that some of our staff had passed out from the leftover rum in the little donkey's panniers. A memorable evening!"

Mildred Teusler Ringwalt
Memoirs of a Foreign Service Officer's Wife 1938-1958
The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

Remembering John Stewart Service

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On June 17, fifty-two years ago today, Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the oral history collection of ADST, John Service talked about the released of the Supreme Court decision: "Anyway, this was a new day, the day of TV. Almost as soon as the Supreme Court decision was announced, TV people descended on us, both in my office and then later on out at our apartment. Fortunately, as I say, we had a statement ready."

STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SERVICE

I am thankful for the Court's decision and for our judicial system which gives each American the means to protect his rights and reputation.

For almost nineteen years I was proud to make my career in the American Foreign Service. Every chief under whom I worked and every competent and authorized review of the facts found my service useful and loyal.

In December, 1951, the world was informed that I had been summarily dismissed for "doubt of loyalty". Administrative appeal was refused, and legal action became my only recourse. Through it, the unfounded action of the Loyalty Review Board was declared illegal and expunged. The Government eventually conceded that my discharge was not based upon doubt of my loyalty or security and that its sole basis had been the illegal action of the Loyalty Review Board. Now the discharge has been declared illegal and the slate is clean.

My debt is great: to my attorney, Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, who accepted the case of a stranger more than seven years ago and, without regard for his own interests, has since devoted his great ability to clearing my name; to the several attorneys who in association with him have contributed to this outcome; to a courageous employer who was willing to give a job to a man publicly defamed; and to hundreds of friends whose unshaken confidence supported my family and me in this long fight for vindication.

Read more in the Library of Congress Frontline Diplomacy Collection.